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The European Union requires member states to promote research and technological devel-
opment with their industrial policies according to the “Treaty on European Union”, which
was signed in Maastricht in 1992.1 China, which has seen unprecedented growth over the
last decades as “the world’s factory”, clearly aims at a smooth transition towards a knowledge-
based economy with its current five-year plan for the years from 2016 to 2020: The first of five
focus areas is innovation.2 These are just two examples of technological progress becoming
a top priority for policy makers. But why does innovation feature on political agendas with
increasing prominence compared to other factors of development and growth?
Economists have long recognized that the accumulation of physical capital cannot explain
long-run growth (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994). The technological knowledge in an
economy determines its ability to transform labor and capital into valuable outputs. Providing
workers with additional factories and machines has diminishing returns, at least if they do
not also become better as a result of technological advances. One production factor, whose
importance society is less aware of as a decreasing share of the population is employed in
agriculture, is fertile soil. As the amount of land the global population can work with is fixed
(or may even decline as a consequence of climate change and desertification), the productivity
of additional workers is eventually subject to the law of diminishing returns as well. In fact,
the first time in human history during which both per capita income and the population have
increased over an extended period, has only begun little more than two centuries ago with
the Industrial Revolution. Hudson (2014) emphasizes the crucial role of innovation in various
areas, extending far beyond steam power and factory production. Already in 1798, the rapid
1Treaty on European Union, Title XVII, Article 173
2https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/The%2013th%20Five-Year%20Plan.
pdf (last accessed 7 September 2017).
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increase of the population led Malthus to suggest that humanity might be trapped, as food
supply could only grow arithmetically, while the population grew geometrically. Any increase
in productivity would translate into higher population growth, such that the only stable
population size was at subsistence level. It has since turned out that birth rates adjusted
eventually and population growth in industrialized countries has slowed down. In some
countries, like Germany or Japan, it has even dropped to rates around zero. While parts of
the world are still in earlier stages of the demographic transition and the global population
continues to grow, current predictions3 point towards a leveling-off, with a world population
of about 11 billion by 2100. At the same time, overall living standards are increasing. Thus,
the outlook for humanity is not as gloomy as Malthus’ theory predicted. Yet, a stable world
population at a higher level requires further technological progress, beyond the developments
that enabled such growth in the first place, to limit resource degradation and environmental
problems. China’s current five-year plan, for instance, recognizes the need for “green growth”
in the third of its five major objectives.
Hence, innovation is more important than ever and economists can go beyond incorpo-
rating the growth of knowledge into their models, passively modeling how engineers and
scientists refine processes and develop products. If the creation and diffusion of knowledge
are not exogenous, but emerge endogenously in the economic system, understanding their
determinants is crucial (e.g. Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
Too many areas of economics have contributed to the identification of the factors that deter-
mine technological progress to provide a comprehensive review here. Instead, the following
describes how the chapters of this thesis fit into this context and what they add to the litera-
ture. The first chapter exploits transitional provisions in the process of European integration
as a natural experiment to identify the effects of free movement of labor on the production
and diffusion of knowledge. The second chapter studies the effect of competition on the type
of corporate research and development (R&D) in the context of the recent surge in Chinese
imports to Europe. The third chapter contributes to the literature on patents and innova-
tion, drawing evidence from U.S. antitrust history to estimate how patents affect follow-on





While concerns about human capital may seem like a recent political issue, the first patent
system in the Republic of Venice was established in 1474 precisely to attract skilled artisans
from other regions (Moser, 2013). By contrast, concerns about too much immigration through
membership in the EU and, in particular, the labor market consequences were hotly debated
ahead of the “Brexit” vote in 2016. The impact of international labor mobility is not only
controversial in destination countries, however. Emigration is often associated with a loss of
human capital, or “brain drain”, that hurts the economies of origin countries and prevents
them from catching up. In the first chapter4, we exploit the introduction of free movement
of labor in the EU to identify the causal effects of international labor mobility on knowledge
production within source countries as well as knowledge flows to these countries. The
introduction of free movement of labor after the accession of new EU member states did not
come into effect immediately in 2004 and later. The transition periods in the opening of labor
markets to migrants from new EU members were decided individually by old EU countries
for specific industries. This creates a suitable natural experiment for the identification of the
effects of emigration. The transitional provisions created exogenous variation in the ability of
new EU members’ citizens to migrate to old EU member states.
In response to Paul Krugman’s assertion that knowledge flows do not leave a “paper trail”,
patent citations have been found to be a suitable approximation (Jaffe et al., 1993). Thus, our
study not only takes advantage of the fact that, since the Venetian Statute, patent systems
have spread throughout Europe and thereby give us a proxy of the amount of innovation. The
references to other patents also allow us to trace knowledge flows to emigrants’ origins.
We find that rather than suffering from “brain drain”, industries with higher migration outflows
increase innovation as measured by patents. Moreover, an analysis of cross-border citations
suggests that the loss in human capital is compensated by reverse knowledge flows, such that
emigration is even helping source countries to converge towards the technological frontier.
Consistent with our interpretation, the effects are larger when restricting the sample to high-
skilled migrants.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between labor mobility and
innovation in general (e.g. Bosetti et al., 2015; Kaiser et al., 2015), but also add to research
4Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Yvonne Giesing and Nadzeya Laurentsyeva.
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on international migration and human capital. In the latter literature, several studies take
advantage of changes in the H-1B visa program in the U.S. to study the effects of immigration
in destination countries (e.g. Kerr and Lincoln, 2010), whereas Kerr (2008) uses the program to
study the effects on innovation and productivity in home countries. One important difference
between this program and our setting is that H-1B visas are targeted at skilled labor, while we
analyze the effects of free movement laws affecting all skill groups.
Furthermore, our study relates to the literature on the localization of knowledge by identifying
migration policy as one way to mitigate the effects of country borders, which have been found
to be particularly strong obstacles to knowledge flows (Jaffe et al., 1993; Hu and Jaffe, 2003;
Singh and Marx, 2013). Our results can help to inform migration policy.
In the second half of the last century, Europe’s economies saw increased trade not only within
the European Economic Area, but also with other continents. Imports from the world’s most
populous country have grown so much that a growing literature studies the effects of this
“China Shock” on the U.S. and Europe (e.g. Autor et al., 2013; Dauth et al., 2014; Autor et al.,
2016b). Economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping, who became the paramount leader of the
country in 1978, initiated a transition from socialist command economy to market-based
economy. In 2001 China even became a member of World Trade Organization (Naughton,
2007). Building on work by Bloom et al. (2016), I exploit this exogenous shock to study a more
general question in the second chapter: How does competition affect firms’ R&D strategies?
While the relationship between competition and the amount of innovation is an old question
that has been investigated at least since Schumpeter (1942), both theoretically and empirically,
much less is known about how competition affects the type of R&D that firms invest in. Some
theories have been proposed (e.g. Cabral, 2003; Kwon, 2010), but empirical evidence of the
causal relationship has been lacking.
Motivated by the theoretical literature on competition and innovation (Aghion et al., 2001), I
first explore the effects of competition on firms’ investments in an R&D model. The private
benefits of large innovations change less with competition than those of small steps, since
there is no room for increased business stealing if an innovation is so significant that the inno-
vator becomes a monopolist in any case. This implies a decreasing share of large innovations
among all innovations in my model. This relationship holds independently of the initial level
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of competition, by contrast to the effect of competition on the overall amount of innovation.
Yet, this finding is compatible with the inverted-U relationship between competition and total
innovation found in the literature (Aghion et al., 2005). Finally, the model shows that the level
of competition that maximizes the total amount of large innovations in an industry is lower
than the one that maximizes total innovation, thereby providing a theoretical explanation
for the trend towards more incremental R&D observed by Arora et al. (2015). Therefore the
optimal competition policy changes if the externalities of different types of innovation differ,
e.g. because of higher spillovers to other industries for larger innovations.
Technological progress has also affected the methods used in this chapter. Statistical tools
for text analysis have been available for a long time (e.g. Deerwester et al., 1990), but only
the increase in computational power available to researchers has enabled the recent increase
in applications of machine learning methods to large data sets in general and text data in
particular (Gentzkow et al., 2017). The empirical part of this chapter develops new measures
to quantify the type of innovation. The measures compare patent abstracts of a firm to those
of a comparison group such as previous patents of the same firm or the industry. The idea is
that a larger step leads to larger changes in the vocabulary in abstracts as well. An advantage
of these measures compared to citation-based measures is that they are fixed at the time of
application. The number of citations to a patent, by contrast, is determined later on and
depends on market conditions itself, while the similarity measures cannot be affected by
later developments and, in particular, changes in the private value of inventions as a result of
competition.
In instrumental variables regressions, I find support for the theoretical prediction of a decline
in the share of large innovations as competition increases due to the growth of Chinese
imports. Confirming the model, the empirical results suggest that the relative private value of
incremental innovations indeed increases when imports rise.
As this distortion towards smaller innovations should be taken into account in welfare consid-
erations, the empirical estimation of this causal relationship is relevant to various policies,
e.g. with respect to trade, standardization, and mergers.
When studying innovation in general, incentives are a natural starting point for economists
and intellectual property rights are supposed to provide them for the production of knowledge.
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As ideas can be considered public goods, there may be underprovision without intervention.
Intellectual property protection thus is an attempt to strike a balance between the inefficiency
of a monopoly with incentives for innovation. This tradeoff has been described formally by
Nordhaus (1969), but the idea that a temporary monopoly can serve as a reward can already be
found in Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” (1776).5 On top of this balance between monopoly
and incentives, however, the fact that knowledge is both an input in knowledge production
as well as the output has to be taken into account. Any researcher using Google Scholar, the
search engine for academic publications, is greeted by the quote “Stand on the shoulders of
giants”, a metaphor which is often attributed to Isaac Newton, but has been expressed long
before. Hence the cumulative nature of science has long been appreciated and economic
theory, too, has considered this complication, e.g. to study the effects of patents on follow-on
innovators’ incentives (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995). The extent to which
such effects are economically relevant, rather than an insight of purely academic interest, is
ultimately an empirical question that researchers have begun to address more recently (e.g.
Galasso and Schankerman, 2015b; Sampat and Williams, 2015).
The government not only takes an active role in the market by granting temporary monopolies
to innovators through the patent system, however. At the same time, the government imple-
ments competition policy to prevent firms from abusing their market power. Some remedies
available to antitrust authorities have the potential to affect an economy’s capacity to produce
innovations and need to be studied from this perspective as well. The third chapter6 of this
thesis contributes to the literature by studying one of the most innovative organizations of
the 20th century, the Bell Laboratories (Bell Labs), and the consent decree that resulted from
an antitrust case against the parent company AT&T in 1956. This ruling has made thousands
of patents available without royalties to any company or inventor in the U.S., including those
protecting various groundbreaking innovations such as the transistor. Based on forward
citations to the affected patents, we estimate that follow-on innovation increased by 17% in
the following five years. Young and small companies seem to be the primary beneficiaries
5On rewarding merchants for taking risks, Smith writes: “It is the easiest and most natural way in which
the state can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is
afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated, upon the same principles
upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author.”
(Book V, Chapter I, Part III)
6Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Martin Watzinger, Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer.
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of the ruling. This suggests that patents pose a particularly strong barrier for these firms,
which is consistent with the literature (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a). Moreover, we find
that compulsory licensing can only be an effective antitrust remedy if market foreclosure is
addressed as well. In the telecommunications industry, where Bell kept its dominant market
position, we do not find an effect on follow-on innovation.7 Our results on long-run inno-
vation confirm that compulsory licensing increased patenting by about 25% in the affected
technology areas.
The chapters of this thesis are self-contained and can be read independently.
7Note that this effect of competition policy on the citations to earlier patents confirms the need for the
text-based measure in the second chapter, since the novelty of an innovation cannot be affected by later policy






Does Emigration Foster Innovation?*
1.1 Introduction
Remittances, the money international migrant workers are sending back from the country of
employment to their home country, represent an important source of income for developing
countries and hence constitute a direct benefit of emigration (Russell, 1986). Furthermore,
apart from financial contributions, skilled migrants can “send” back the knowledge they have
acquired while working in other countries. This remittance of knowledge has the potential to
increase innovation in the origin countries and bring them closer to the technology frontier,
thus mitigating the negative effects of the loss of human capital due to emigration.
The number of highly educated foreigners in the OECD area now exceeds 31 million, ac-
counting for 45% of the increase in the foreign born population over the last decade (OECD
Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries, 2016). The number of skilled migrants has
especially increased within Europe since many members of the European Union (EU) and the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have introduced free movement for citizens of the
partner countries. Given the strong increase in labor mobility and rising concerns in countries
experiencing net outflows of skilled people, it is important to understand the consequences
*This chapter is based on joint work with Yvonne Giesing and Nadzeya Laurentsyeva.
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of migration. Should firms and policy makers think and act in the context of a “global war for
talent” or can the international mobility of skilled individuals make everyone better off, in
particular, by stimulating cross-border knowledge flows?
In this study, we establish a causal link between labor mobility, knowledge flows, and in-
novation activities. By exploiting changes in the European labor mobility legislation as a
quasi-experimental setting, we evaluate the effect of skilled emigration on innovation. We
find that the emigration of skilled individuals increases patenting in source countries and
argue that knowledge remittances can explain this positive effect. Using data on patent ci-
tations and migration flows from 32 European countries, we find that emigration increases
cross-border knowledge flows. Industries that are exposed to a higher mobility of their work-
ers start to cite patents from the emigrants’ destinations more frequently than before. The
international mobility of skilled workers seems to enlarge R&D networks and promote the
transfer of tacit knowledge. In this way, migration enables a faster diffusion of knowledge
from more to less technologically advanced countries and helps the latter to catch up.
We embed these results within the following conceptual framework. We assume a knowledge
production function, where innovation (here, for instance, measured by the number of
patents) is produced with the inputs of capital and labor and a certain production technology.
Emigration leads to a reduction in labor and thus has a direct negative effect on innovation
production. However, there might also be an indirect effect, which has often been overlooked
in this discussion. International migration can increase the flow of ideas and knowledge across
borders. Migrants might share knowledge about new technologies, processes, and products
with their former colleagues and friends at home. This increases the stock of knowledge in the
source countries and, through the recombination of ideas, positively affects innovation. The
production technology thus improves and patent production can grow even if the available
skilled labor is reduced. Our conceptual considerations thus suggest that migration has a
negative direct and a positive indirect effect on patenting levels in source countries. Although
we cannot disentangle these effects with our data, we provide empirical evidence on the total
effect.
The main challenge in the empirical analysis is the endogeneity of migration flows. This
could be due to reverse causality or omitted variables. To establish causality, we construct an
10
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instrumental variable (IV) for migration, using changes in labor mobility laws within Europe.
These laws are adopted and enforced by the destination countries and hence can be treated
as exogenous to economic conditions in migrants’ source countries.
The aim of our estimations are twofold. Combining several data sources, we do not only
establish a link between emigration and innovation in the source country, but also shed light
on the effect of knowledge remittances, potentially driving innovation. We start by analyzing
the effects of international labor mobility on total patenting activity in source countries.
The IV estimate suggests that a 1% increase in the number of emigrants increases patent
applications by 0.64% in the following two years. This result is statistically significant at the
1% level and robust to controls, fixed effects, and varying lags. The effect is quantitatively
more pronounced when we consider only the flows of migrants with patenting potential.
We complement the analysis of innovation activity by looking at the convergence in patenting
between migrants’ origin and destination industries. We limit the sample to pairs where
the destination is more technologically advanced than the origin and analyze whether the
difference in patenting levels changes with migration flows. This is a highly policy-relevant
question, especially in the context of the European Union: Some countries may block the
initiatives aimed at enhancing within-EU labor mobility by arguing that the outflow of skilled
people will further augment the asymmetries between richer and poorer member states.
Contrary to this argument, though, our results show that patenting differences between
origins and destinations decrease in the number of emigrants. Hence, emigration can promote
convergence to the innovation level of more advanced economies.
To establish the channel for the positive impact of emigration on innovation, we link emigra-
tion to reverse knowledge flows, that is the transfer of knowledge from migrants’ destinations
back to their origins. While skilled emigrants do not patent in their home country anymore,
they can stimulate knowledge and technology diffusion, thus improving the production tech-
nology in the origin country. Common to the innovation literature, we use cross-border
patent citations as a proxy for knowledge flows. The regression analysis relates the number of
citations to a particular destination country with the number of migrants that currently work
there. We find evidence that knowledge flows from destination to origin indeed increase with
11
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migration: the 2SLS regressions yield an elasticity of knowledge flows to emigration equal to
0.59.
Our project relates to two broad strands of the literature. The first one investigates the effects of
labor mobility on innovation. Several papers have established a positive effect of migration on
patenting in destination countries. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) and Doran et al. (2015) use random
visa allocations to find causal effects for the U.S. Bosetti et al. (2015), Parrotta et al. (2014),
Ozgen et al. (2014) and Niebuhr (2010) focus on European countries and establish cultural
diversity as one of the main channels to generate new ideas and innovation. The effect of
migration on source countries received less attention. Kerr (2008) and Choudhury (2015) find
that source countries benefit from knowledge flows and return migration and consequently
increase patenting and innovation. Kaiser et al. (2015) provide firm-level evidence by looking
at worker mobility within Denmark. They find that hiring new knowledge workers increases a
firm’s patenting activity. Interestingly, the former employers of these workers also increase
patenting, which can be explained by reverse knowledge flows. Braunerhjelm et al. (2015)
conduct a similar analysis with a matched employer-employee dataset from Sweden and also
show that both the receiving and the sending firms benefit from the mobility of knowledge
workers. The effects are stronger for interregional mobility. We contribute to this literature
by providing causal evidence that emigration leads to an increase in patenting. We thereby
confirm what Kerr (2008) and Choudhury (2015) showed for China and India in a very different
context and using another methodology. As we have comparable patenting data for source
and destination countries, we can extend this result and show that emigration leads to a
catch-up process.
The second strand of the literature analyzes the determinants of knowledge flows. Starting
with the seminal contribution by Jaffe et al. (1993), these studies have established that knowl-
edge is localized beyond the effects of agglomeration. Later studies focused on international
knowledge spillovers (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Hu and Jaffe, 2003), showing that knowledge
takes time to cross country borders. Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) challenge the approach
by Jaffe et al. (1993) and point out that intra-national localization effects are not robust to
a finer technology classification. However, even with their more conservative estimations,
the international localization remains significant. Singh and Marx (2013) investigate whether
12
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advances in communication technologies and lower costs of traveling reduce the localiza-
tion of knowledge over time. While they find evidence for a reduction in the significance of
state borders in the U.S., their results show that the effect of international borders has even
strengthened over time. Few studies so far analyzed the impact of international migration
on cross-border knowledge flows.1 Kerr (2008), for instance, studies the role of skilled immi-
grants in the U.S. and finds that immigrants form ethnic scientific networks that enhance the
technology transfer to source countries.
We extend this literature on knowledge flows to the European context using an identifica-
tion strategy that allows for a causal interpretation. We build a unique dataset by merging
comparable migration data for 32 European countries with European patent data and find
evidence for knowledge flows. Due to our unique European enlargement setting, we are
able to estimate causal effects of labor mobility independently of other integration events
by exploiting different opening times for trade, FDI and migration. We find that the positive
effect of mobility on knowledge remittances is particularly high for migrants with patenting
potential and is robust to a variety of specifications and samples.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes a conceptual framework
to guide our empirical analysis. Section 1.3 outlines the data, followed by Section 1.4 that
presents the empirical specification and describes the instrument. Section 1.5 discusses the
results. Section 1.6 suggests knowledge flows as the channel. Section 1.7 provides robustness
checks and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Considerations
This chapter analyzes the effects of emigration on innovation in source countries. As there
are two opposing effects, our storyline becomes clearer if we support it with some conceptual
considerations. The considerations are based on a classical knowledge production function
as introduced by Griliches (1979) and further developed by Jaffe (1986) and Jaffe (1989). We
augment the knowledge production function with emigration. The concept illustrates two
1Prior literature on international knowledge flows has focused on trade, foreign direct investment and R&D
accessibility (Peri, 2005; MacGarvie, 2005, 2006).
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opposing effects: a reduction in knowledge production due to a decreasing skilled labor
force vs. an increase due to a better production technology induced by knowledge flows and
technological spillovers.
We assume a simplified knowledge production function of the form
Y = A f (K ,Ls). (1.1)
K is a measure of relevant capital available for research and development such as laboratories
and equipment. Ls stands for skilled labor and A measures total factor productivity (efficiency
of knowledge production). In our case A describes how well labor and capital can be combined
to produce the knowledge output Y and captures factors that are not explicitly modeled, such
as the knowledge stock on which researchers can build. To measure the output Y , we refer to
patents, as is common to the literature.
The direct effect of emigration, in this setting, is a reduction in Ls . Due to the outmigration
of skilled people, less workers are available for the production of innovation in the source
country. The innovation output Y should thus decrease.
However, there is a second indirect effect of emigration that works through the total factor
productivity A. After emigration, workers send back knowledge to their home countries.
For instance they may transmit technological information and ideas back to their previous
employer through communication with former colleagues. This employer becomes better at
producing innovation, which is reflected in an increasing A.
Theoretically, it is unclear whether the negative direct or the positive indirect effect prevails.
This depends on several other characteristics such as the industry, the technology, and the
innovation process. Consequently, it is even more important to gain this knowledge from a
rigorous empirical assessment of the question. Using patent data as a measure of innovation
output Y and controlling for various other factors corresponding to K and components of A





We create a unique dataset by merging comparable migration data for 32 European countries
with European patent data. The dataset has four dimensions: origin region2, destination
country, industry (two-digit, NACE Rev. 2), and year. The dependent variables of interest
are the number of patent applications (by origin-industry-year) as a proxy for innovation
and the number of cross-border citations (by origin-destination-industry-year) as a proxy for
knowledge flows. The main explanatory variable is the annual number of emigrants from a
given origin currently employed in a given destination industry.
The ideal migration dataset would contain precise data on migration flows, disaggregated
by origin and destination (countries and employing industries), skill level, and occupation.
In the absence of such a dataset, we use the second-best data from Eurostat Labour Force
Surveys (2000 - 2014). These are harmonized surveys, which take place annually in all EU
countries, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland and cover around 5% of national populations.
The surveys provide demographic information on individuals, including their current country
of residence, region of origin (EU15+4, NMS10, NMS2 or Other), education level, occupation,
and currently employing industry.3 We thus obtain the stock of migrants by year, region of
origin, destination country, and destination industry. In addition, we can use the information
by education level (university degree, vocational degree, or below) and by occupation (two-
digit, ISCO) to identify the stock of migrants with patenting potential.4 The available dataset
has several limitations. We can only observe the region of migrants’ origin instead of the
country. This means that we cannot differentiate between different 2004 accession countries
but have to treat them as one region (NMS10). Similarly we have to treat Romania and Bulgaria
2Here and in the following text “region” refers to the region to which Eurostat’s LFS data aggregate migrants’
origin countries: EU15+4 (EU15 and EFTA), NMS10 (new member states in 2004), NMS3 (Bulgaria, Romania and
Croatia) and all other countries. The fact that the EU3 region consists of Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the
EU in 2007, and Croatia, which followed only in 2013, adds further imprecision, as we cannot tell from the data
how many emigrants from this region came from Bulgaria and Romania and were able to take advantage of the
EU’s right to free movement already.)
3EU15+4 include 15 pre-2004 EU member countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) + 4 EFTA countries
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland). NMS10 include countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus) and NMS2 include
countries that joined the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
4We assign a dummy called patenting potential to migrants working in occupations “Managers” and “Profes-
sionals” (ISCO codes: 11, 13, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 32, 35).
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as one region (NMS2). Furthermore, as we do not observe the origin industry of a migrant,
we assume that it is the same as the current industry at the destination. Besides, we cannot
identify flows of return migrants. These limitations result in high observational noise and
might bias our estimations towards zero.
To construct the instrument for migration flows we use changes in the European labor mobility
legislation. We obtain the relevant information from the Labour Reforms database, prepared
by the European Commission, which we complement with information from national legisla-
tions of the destination countries. Our baseline dataset covers the years from 2000 to 2012,
this period encompassed several changes to European labor mobility as described in more
detail in Subsection 1.4.2.
The data on innovative activity and knowledge flows come from the EPO’s Worldwide Patent
Statistical Database (PATSTAT, 2014 Autumn Edition).5 We are able to assign patents to
industries (two-digit NACE Rev. 2) via the International Patent Classification (IPC) of patents.6.
We then aggregate patent applications by country, industry, and year and patent citations
by patenting country, cited country, industry, and year. In our dataset, patenting country
corresponds to the origin country of migrants, while cited country corresponds to their
current destination. To assign patents to countries, we use the PATSTAT information about the
location of patent inventors and applicants, which are usually the organizations employing
the inventors. Since a patent can have several inventors, it may be assigned to multiple
countries if it is the result of an international collaboration. In these cases, we assign a share of
the patent to each country that is proportional to the share of co-inventors from that country.
The causes and consequences of such collaborations have been studied by Kerr and Kerr
(2015). Through this assignment of patents to the inventors’ countries it is possible to link a
patent with the location of all the patents that cite it.
5Patents and patent citations are imperfect measures for innovation and knowledge flows and have been
criticized for example by Duguet and MacGarvie (2005). Yet, these are the best proxies, which are available over
long periods of time and comparable across the countries we study.
6In order to assign four-digit IPC classes to industries, we use the concordance table provided by Eurostat in
Appendix 1 of the publication “Patent Statistics: Concordance IPC V8 - NACE REV.2”, published in October 2014





Figure 1.1 motivates the subsequent econometric analysis: cross-border patent citations
(a proxy for knowledge flows) significantly increase following the introduction of free labor
mobility between a pair of countries. This figure mirrors the response of migration flows to
changes in labor mobility regulation within Europe (Figure A.1 in the Appendix).
We complement the dataset with several important control variables: bilateral industry-
specific FDI flows (provided by Eurostat), GDP and bilateral trade flows (from CEPII). By
combining these different data sources, we can draw conclusions about the effects of interna-
tional migration on patenting in the origin countries and establish reverse knowledge flows
as the channel, while controlling for possible fixed and time-varying confounders.
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Notes: Annual treatment effects on cross-border citations in patent applications around the introduction of
free movement (1965-2014). The regression includes year and country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the citing country level.
Source: PATSTAT, European Commission, own calculations.
1.4 Econometric Specification
In our empirical analysis we first provide causal evidence for the effect of emigration on
patenting in origin countries. Second, we link this effect to the increase in knowledge flows.
We obtain the elasticities of patenting and cross-border citations to migration using OLS
and 2SLS approaches. In the latter, the variation in migration flows is generated only by the
17
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exogenous changes in labor mobility laws over 2000-2012. Our baseline regressions include
the sample of all patenting European countries. Besides, we provide separate estimates for a
sub-sample of Eastern European countries, which were affected the most by the changes in
labor mobility over the analyzed period.
1.4.1 Baseline Regressions
Patenting in Origin Countries
We start by analyzing the effects of emigration on total patenting in the origin countries.
For this, we aggregate the data at the origin, industry, and year level. Because we do not
have detailed country-of-origin data, we use the region of migrants’ origin: EU15+4, NMS10
and NMS2. The dependent variable is the number of patent application in a specific origin,
industry, and year. The explanatory variable is the number of emigrants from a specific region
that work in the same industry but in other European countries. We estimate the following
fixed-effects regression:
Yoi y =β1Moi y−l +β2Xoi y +φy +φoi +²oi y (1.2)
where o denotes the region of origin, i the two-digit industry, and y the year. Yoi y is the log
number of patent applications in a given region and industry. Moi y−l is the log number of
emigrants from an origin region, currently working in a given industry.7 l stands for the lag
between migration and patenting. The coefficient β1 captures the elasticity of patenting to
migration. Xoi y contains time-varying controls: a dummy for EU membership, trade inflows,
and FDI inflows. φy and φoi denote time and origin-industry fixed effects. ²oi y is the error
term. The identifying variation thus comes from the within origin-industry changes in the
number of emigrants and patent applications. To account for a possible endogeneity bias,
we complement the OLS estimations with the 2SLS results, where we instrument migration
with changes in labor mobility legislation. We describe the instrument in more detail in
Section 1.4.2 below.
7Here and in all other specifications, before taking logs we add 1 to each observation. This transformation
ensures that we do not lose observations with zero values.
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Patenting Asymmetries between More and Less Advanced Countries
We go one step further and analyze whether migration increases or, on the contrary, lowers
patenting asymmetries between more and less advanced economies. On the one hand,
agglomeration effects and the resources available for research could lead to richer destinations
specializing even more on their comparative advantage, thus hindering convergence. If we
assume that skilled migrants move from less innovative to more innovative places, labor
mobility can increase patenting asymmetries despite some positive effects on the origin. On
the other hand, through the migrants working abroad, industries at origins can get access
to the frontier knowledge from more advanced economies. This can increase innovation
efficiency in origin industries and can allow a faster catch-up process with the technology
leaders. Hence, patenting asymmetries between destinations and origins of migrants might





)=β1Modi y−l +β2X1oy +β3X2d y +β4X3odi y +φy +φodi +²odi y (1.3)
The level of observation is origin-destination (od) pair, industry (i ), and year (y). The depen-
dent variable log (
Pdi y
Poi y
) is the log difference in patent applications between the destination
and origin industries. The main explanatory variable is Modi y−l - the log number of migrants
from origin o working in industry i in destination d . l stands for the lag between migration
flows and patenting. The coefficient β1 shows whether the patenting asymmetries increase or
decrease in migration. In this specification we can also control for time-varying origin- and
destination-specific effects (X1oy , X2d y , X3odi y ): the total number of patents at origin, the total
number of patents at destination, the total number of patents in a given industry, a within EU
dummy (equals one when both origin and destination are EU members), the ratio of GDP
per capita between destination and origin, bilateral industry-level FDI, and trade flows. φy
and φodi denote time and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. ²doi y is the error term.
The coefficient β1 is thus identified solely through the variation in the number of emigrants
within an origin-destination-industry. General changes in patenting at origin and destination




Further, we investigate one potential channel behind the effect of migration on innovation:
knowledge flows. One speaks of knowledge flows whenever a researcher or an inventor builds
on the work done by others to create ideas or to solve a specific technological problem.
A common way to track knowledge flows is to use citations data (Jaffe et al., 1993). This
approach assumes that a citation to a particular patent or a publication reflects the usefulness
of the knowledge contained therein for further work. To determine the effect of migration on
knowledge flows we estimate the following empirical model:
Yodi y =β1Modi y−l +β2X1oi y +β3X2di y−l +β4X3odi y +φy +φodi +²odi y (1.4)
As in Specification 1.3, the level of observation is origin-destination (od) pair, industry (i ),
and year (y). The outcome of interest Yodi y represents the log number of cross-border
citations. Modi y−l is the log number of migrants from origin o working in industry i at
destination d . l stands for the lag between migration flows and patenting. We focus on
reverse knowledge flows, i.e., knowledge flowing from destination to origin countries of
migrants. Hence, Yodi y represents citations to patents from destination countries by new
patents at origin.8 For example, YPL/BEi y counts citations by Polish patents in industry i ,
filed in year y , to existing Belgian patents. It proxies the knowledge flows from Belgium to
Poland. MPL/BEi y−l represents the number of Polish migrants in Belgium, currently working
in industry i . The coefficient β1 captures the elasticity of citations to migration. In our
example, it shows the percent change in the number of citations from Poland to Belgium if
the number of emigrants from Poland to Belgium increased by 1%.
To avoid mechanic effects from the general increase in patenting at origin or destination
industries, we control for the number of patent applications in the origin industry (X1oi y )
and for the lagged number of patent applications in a destination industry X2di y−l . X3odi y
denote other controls: a within EU dummy (equals one when both origin and destination
countries are EU members), the total number of patents in a given industry, the bilateral FDI,
8We consider citations in patent publications and date patents with their application filing date.
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and trade flows. φy and φodi denote time and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. ²odi y
is the error term. We again run both OLS and 2SLS regressions.
1.4.2 Instrument for Migration Flows
Even though we control for many observable factors and have a number of fixed effects in
the baseline OLS regressions, an endogeneity problem might still arise. Estimates could be
biased, for instance, if reduced patenting at the origin forces inventors to leave. To avoid
this problem, we use changes in the labor mobility laws in Europe as a source of exogenous
variation for migration flows.
The freedom of movement for workers is a policy chapter of the acquis communautaire of
the European Union and represents one of the four economic freedoms: free movement of
goods, services, labor and capital. According to the Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU, “freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work and employment.” In practice, it means that there are no restrictions
(such as quotas on foreign workers) or additional bureaucratic procedures (such as obtaining
a work permit or a permission from the local authorities) related to the employment of
foreign citizens. This right primarily concerns the citizens of the EU and EEA member states
who, starting from 1958, have gradually introduced free labor mobility towards their partner
countries.9
In our project, we exploit two episodes of changes in the free labor mobility in Europe.
First, in 2004 all EEA countries introduced free movement for the citizens of Switzerland.
Switzerland responded with a symmetric measure in 2007.10 Second, a special scheme has
been in force following the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. For up to seven years after
the accession, old EU members could restrict the access to their labor markets for citizens of
new member states. While some countries kept the restrictions for the whole period, some
9Norway and Iceland exert this right since 1994. Liechtenstein exerts this right since 1995, but imposes a
permanent quota for all EEA citizens.
10However, as a result of the “Against mass immigration” initiative, Switzerland is scheduled to impose




provided easier labor market access only in certain industries, and some opened up their
entire labor markets directly upon the accession. When imposing restrictions the countries
had to apply them to the whole group of NMS from the same entry year. Therefore, they could
not target labor mobility laws at the citizens of some particular states. Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway, and Switzerland applied the transitional provisions towards the accession countries
in the same way. These labor mobility laws created variation in the migration flows between
European countries on the country, industry, and year level. Table A.1 in the Appendix
provides an overview of the precise opening dates of countries and industries. Importantly
for the identification, these changes to labor mobility did not coincide with other integration
events (free movement of capital and goods).
Figure 1.2 shows the spikes in migration from NMS during the initial opening in 2004, when
countries such as the UK, Sweden, and Ireland opened their labor markets and in 2011 when
all transitional provisions for the 2004 accession countries where abolished and Germany, for
instance, fully opened its labor market.
We can thus instrument real migration with exogenous labor mobility legislation. The first-
stage regression takes the following form:
Modi y = γ1F Modi y−1+γ2F Modi y−2+γ3F Modi y−3+γ4Xodi y +νy +νodi +uodi y (1.5)
F Modi y−l is an indicator variable, which is equal to one if a specific industry i in a destination
country d is open for labor migrants from a country o in a given year y . We include a one,
two and three year lag to allow for the delayed effect. In our sample this indicator changes
only for origin and destination pairs with either Switzerland or new EU member states. As
these migration flows might be different, we show separate results for migration from only
Eastern Europe in every case. Xodi y , νy , and νodi are the same controls and fixed effects
as used in the baseline OLS specifications. When using the instrument for the patenting
regressions (Specification 1.2), we aggregate the values of the free movement variable by
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origin, industry, and year.11 In this case, the F M variable can be interpreted as the exposure
of a given origin-industry (oi ) to free labor mobility of its workers.
When constructing the free movement dummies, we take into account the fact that many old
EU members did not explicitly specify which industries are open to migrants from the NMS,
but rather allowed for special job schemes in sectors that experienced labor shortages. In case
of such implicit exceptions, we set the free movement dummy equal to one and multiply it by
a measure of labor shortages in a given industry of an old EU member state. As such measure,
we use the share of firms (in the destination industries) reporting to be constrained by the
factor labor. These data are available from the European Commission Business Survey. To
account for possible endogeneity (arising, for instance, when labor shortages are reported in
industries that grow faster in all EU countries), we control for the overall number of patent
applications in a given two-digit industry (aggregate over all European countries).
1.5 Results
In this section, we first show the effects of migration on total patenting at the origin. Second,
we provide evidence that emigration can reduce patenting asymmetries between less and
more advanced economies. We show OLS as well as 2SLS results. First-stage and reduced
form regressions are provided in the Appendix. Our baseline sample includes all patenting
European countries. In addition, we show separate estimations for the sub-sample of Eastern
European countries.
1.5.1 Migration and Patenting
This section shows that the emigration of labor increases overall innovation, measured by
the number of patent applications per year in a region. As the migration data only allow
us to estimate the effect of emigration at the region level, we aggregate the free movement
variable by industry and region of origin: EU15+4, NMS10, and NMS2. The aggregated F M
11For each origin region we have 31 free movement indicators corresponding to 31 possible destinations. We
aggregate them to one measure by using proximity weights (the inverse log distances between the two largest
cities of two countries.)
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Table 1.1: Patent Applications and Migration, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0994*** 0.0949** 0.637*** 0.903***
(0.0259) (0.0420) (0.139) (0.199)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0572 1.175***
(0.0420) (0.332)
in EU -0.262*** -0.298*** -0.296*** -0.112 -0.0729 -0.406**
(0.0903) (0.0752) (0.0844) (0.157) (0.205) (0.164)
L2.Trade flow 1.634*** 2.535*** 2.124*** -0.679 -0.945 3.325***
(0.348) (0.432) (0.342) (0.607) (0.877) (0.724)
L2.FDI inflow 2.03e-05** 3.15e-05** 2.10e-05** 1.16e-05 1.84e-05 2.34e-06
(9.82e-06) (1.22e-05) (8.06e-06) (2.07e-05) (2.90e-05) (1.12e-05)
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53
F 6.517 11.29 7.285
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country
and innovation in that country. The first three columns are estimated with OLS and the last three columns
use a 2SLS estimation with our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent variables
are the number of patent applications in an industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the
citation-weighted patent applications (i.e., patent applications + forward citations to these patents). Patent
application numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of migrants and trade flows are taken in natural
logarithms (more precisely, for variable x we use log(x+1) to include observations where x = 0). The sample
includes all EU members and countries in the European Free Trade Association. All specifications include year
and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level. Sources:
PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
measure approximates the number of countries to whose labor markets an inventor in a
certain industry and region of origin had access and is normalized to be between 0 and 1,
where 1 corresponds to full access to all EU15+4 countries.
The first three columns of Table 1.1 show the baseline OLS regressions and the last three
columns show 2SLS regressions, which use the labor mobility legislation as an instrument
for migration.12 Columns 1 and 4 estimate the relationship between the overall number
of emigrants and the number of patent applications from inventors in that region. These
12Note that the right to free movement was not symmetric due to a one-sided transition period, e.g. workers of
old EU member states have been able to move to new EU member states as a rule earlier than the other way round.
Thus the instrument varies also with the direction of migration and we observe variation in emigration and
patenting over time for pairs of origin region and industry. We cluster on the origin-industry level to account for
autocorrelation in the regressions in Table 1.1. When we consider asymmetries and citations, there is additional
variation depending on the destination country, such that we cluster on the origin-destination-industry level.
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regressions show that workers’ migration to other EU member states has a significant and
positive effect on patenting in the regions of origin. As both variables are measured in
logarithms, the coefficient can be interpreted as the elasticity: the effect in the IV estimation
in column 4 suggests that a 1% increase in the number of emigrants in an industry causes
patent applications in the region of origin to increase by 0.6%. The 95% confidence interval
for the elasticity is between 0.37 and 0.91. If we consider the average number of emigrants
in the year 2004 (2459 emigrants) and the average number of patent applications 2 years
later (255 applications) for new EU member states per industry, this implies that about 1 to 2
additional applications result from 25 additional emigrants.13 Note however, that this number
only includes migrants in industries that were matched to the patent data, i.e., in which there
is patenting. Furthermore, the number of patent applications in 2006 we have used for this
calculation already includes the additional applications, such that the number of additional
patents is likely to be lower. Despite the noise and the level of aggregation in our data the
regressions are able to reject that there is a negative effect.
The second and fifth columns of Table 1.1 use citation-weighted patents as the treatment
variable, i.e., the number of patent applications plus the number of citations to these patents
in a region, industry, and year. The number of later patents building on and therefore citing a
patent is often used as a measure of quality.14 The citations for more recent cohorts in our
sample are subject to truncation, which is controlled for through year fixed effects. As the
coefficients are similar, we conclude that the quality of patenting has not deteriorated. Thus,
merely a higher propensity of inventors in origin regions to file patents as a result of European
integration does not seem to be the driver of the effect. Of course, the number of later patents
citing a patent (forward citations) is only a rough measure of quality and may be affected
by emigrants spreading information about their home countries’ latest technologies abroad
as well. Nonetheless, a higher number of forward citations would likely be associated with
a greater benefit of source countries’ innovations, since they indicate that more follow-on
innovation built on them.
131% of 2459 emigrants is about 25 and 0.37% (0.91%) of 255 applications is 0.94 (2.32).
14The relationship between citations and the social value of an invention has been documented in a case
study on Computed Tomography scanners in Trajtenberg (1990). A more recent study by Moser et al. (2015)




Columns 3 and 6 differ from the other regressions in Table 1.1 in the migration variable, which
here includes only emigrants with patenting potential. Whereas the OLS regression shows a
smaller and insignificant partial correlation, the coefficient in the IV regression is larger than
the corresponding coefficient for all migrants in column 4.
The OLS estimate is likely to be downward biased due to omitted variables and reverse
causality. If there is an omitted variable in the OLS regressions that is negatively correlated
with emigration and positively with patenting levels, then the OLS estimate is downward
biased. This is very likely and could be driven, for instance, by management quality. A good
manager might lead to a good work and research environment. This results both in high
patenting levels and low emigration from this firm and consequently biases the OLS estimate
downward. Moreover, we might encounter reverse causality in the OLS regressions. If higher
patenting levels lead to less migration, then we observe a negative relationship between the
two variables that goes in the other direction. As a consequence, the OLS estimator is smaller
than it should be and thus downward biased.
Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix provide the first stage results and the reduced form that
complement the 2SLS results analysis. One can see that the instrument is highly relevant in
the first stage and that the overall effect of the three lags for the free movement variables sum
up to a positive effect.
Table A.4 in the Appendix provides the same table with the restricted sample of NMS10
countries (2004 accession years). Due to the level of aggregation in the migration data, the
2SLS effects are not significant. Importantly we find no evidence of a significant negative
effect, which would be expected if the loss of human capital dominated.
1.5.2 Migration and Convergence
While the results of the previous section suggest that emigration can positively affect innova-
tion at the origin, this section investigates whether this positive effect is enough to reduce
patenting asymmetries between less and more advanced economies or whether international
migration still benefits knowledge production at destination countries more. This analysis
is relevant for policy discussions about benefits and costs of free labor mobility in Europe.
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Furthermore, the results in this section serve as a robustness check for the effects found above.
When analyzing asymmetries we use all four dimensions of our dataset: origin, destination,
industry, and year, and can therefore control for unobserved origin- and destination-specific
time-varying changes, which could bias our estimates of patenting elasticity to migration in
Section 1.5.1.
To have a clear direction of migration flows from less to more advanced economies, we restrict
the sample to the origin-destination pairs, where destinations are EU15+4 countries and
origins are new EU member states. In addition, in our baseline sample we consider origin and
destination pairs with Switzerland as a destination and other EU15+4 countries as origins. We
also show the results for migration from Eastern Europe only, and the results are consistent.
For each industry and year, we construct an asymmetry measure as the log difference between
the amount of patent applications at destinations and origins.
On average, destination industries file more than three times the amount of patent applica-
tions compared to origins. As expected, the patent quality of the former is also higher. We
then regress the asymmetry measure on the number of migrants. Table 1.2 presents OLS
(columns 1-3) and 2SLS (columns 4-6) results. The OLS coefficient of migration is slightly
positive, but is not statistically significant. This may be caused by the bias due to higher
migration outflows from more problematic industries. Another reason is that once we move
to the more disaggregated level, we introduce more noise in the migration data (more missing
and zero observations). This especially concerns already disaggregated migration data by skill
and occupation. 2SLS estimates, however, suggest that emigration allows origin industries
to catch up to the patenting level of destinations: a 1% increase in the number of migrants
reduces patenting asymmetries by 0.30% (column 4 and 5 in 1.2). The coefficient for mi-
grants with patenting potential is much larger in magnitude, but is imprecisely estimated
(see column 6). Overall, the regressions’ results can be interpreted within the framework of a
patent production function with decreasing returns to skilled labor: a marginal increase in
patent production at destinations (due to the immigration of skilled labor) is smaller than
the marginal increase in patenting at origins (due to the increase in patenting efficiency), e.g.




Table A.6 in the Appendix presents the results from the same specifications but estimated on
a restricted sample with new EU member states as origins and EU15+4 as destinations (thus
excluding emigration from EU15+4 to Switzerland). The obtained coefficients are slightly
smaller in magnitude, but still significant. Table A.7 in the Appendix shows the reduced form
results, where instead of migration figures we use the bilateral free movement dummies.
One of the drawbacks of our migration data is the large amount of missing observations,
which could be either due to the effective absence of migrants or to misreporting.15 This
raises external validity issues to our estimations in terms of a generalization to all European
countries. Therefore, the most interesting results of Table A.7 are in columns 5 and 6 where we
present the coefficients from the regressions over the whole sample of origin and destination
pairs. The number of observations increases multiple times, yet the coefficients for the free
movement dummies are very close to the estimates from the baseline sample. Moreover,
most coefficients are more precisely estimated due to improved power: we note that EU
membership, higher bilateral trade flows and FDI also help the convergence.
While interpreting the regression coefficients, we implicitly assume that migrants stay within
the same industry. This is reasonable, as for skilled migrants the losses associated with
changing the industry are substantial. Hence, they are more likely to seek employment in
the same sector in the destination countries. If the assumption would not hold for some
industries, how would this affect our estimations?16 Suppose there are two industries: L and
M in Poland and Belgium. The Polish migrants from industry L move to Belgium to work in
industry M . Empirically, we observe MBE/PL/M/y to increase. The inflow of the skilled Polish
workers in the Belgian industry M raises its innovation activities (or in the worst case, does
not affect them). The performance of the Polish industry M is likely to remain unchanged.
The asymmetry measure log (
PBE/M/y
PPL/M/y
) either increases or at most stays the same, which goes
in the opposite direction of the reported effect. We thus might underestimate the magnitude
of the effect.
15For example, due to missing migration data we have to drop all observations with Germany as a destination
country.
16There are pairs of NACE industries, between which inventors may indeed be likely to move, for example




Table 1.2: Convergence in Patenting Levels and Migration, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0319 0.0376 -0.305** -0.334**
(0.0223) (0.0276) (0.146) (0.158)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.117** -1.831
(0.0575) (2.212)
Patents, origin -1.220*** -1.391*** -1.206*** -1.207*** -1.376*** -1.419***
(0.0762) (0.0817) (0.0753) (0.0883) (0.0946) (0.281)
Patents, dest 1.066*** 1.105*** 1.069*** 1.058*** 1.096*** 1.021***
(0.0713) (0.0908) (0.0717) (0.0777) (0.0978) (0.0894)
Within EU 0.00806 -0.0884* 0.0109 0.0194 -0.0759 -0.0180
(0.0483) (0.0531) (0.0487) (0.0520) (0.0572) (0.0635)
GDPd /GDPo -0.173 0.400 -0.197 -0.188 0.384 0.173
(0.316) (0.367) (0.319) (0.338) (0.394) (0.530)
L3.Trade flow -0.0791 -0.0236 -0.0718 -0.0281 0.0326 -0.113
(0.0629) (0.0799) (0.0622) (0.0679) (0.0867) (0.0827)
L3.FDI flow 0.000575 -0.000443 0.000380 -0.000116 -0.00120 0.00254
(0.00668) (0.00668) (0.00671) (0.00783) (0.00786) (0.00926)
Observations 2,946 2,946 2,946 2,864 2,864 2,864
R-squared 0.486 0.551 0.486 0.424 0.500 0.325
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 582 582 582 500 500 500
F 83.92 122.8 76.50
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patent sdest /Patent sor i g i n . Number of migrants,
number of patents (in origin and destination countries), GDP ratio between destination and origin, FDI, and
trade flows are in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications include
year and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-
industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.6 The Channel: Knowledge Flows
Having established that emigration leads to an increase in patenting, we want to analyze one
potential channel in more detail: knowledge flows. This section shows that migrants stimulate
knowledge flows from their new destinations to their countries of origin.
Table 1.3 presents the baseline OLS and 2SLS results. The dependent variable is the log count
of citations by patents in the origin to the destination country. This dependent variable
proxies the knowledge flows due to emigration. In the baseline estimations, we allow for
two-year lags between the time of migration and the citations in the patent applications. The
results are similar for a one-year lag but slightly weaker. Importantly, given the structure of
the dataset, we can account for origin-industry and destination-industry shocks. A possible
threat to identifying the coefficient of interest would arise if destination industries, which
experienced a positive patenting shock, started to attract more workers from other countries.
A higher supply of patents from this destination would also mechanically increase the amount
of citations to this country. We can control for such an effect by including the number of
patent applications in the destination industry (with a three year lag).17 In a similar way, we
control for the number of patent applications in the source country. The migration effect is
identified from the within origin-destination variation in the migration stocks and the count
of cross-border citations. Since both dependent and explanatory variables are in natural logs,
the coefficient represents the elasticity of cross-border citations to the number of migrants.
In the first column, we regress the citations on the overall number of migrants Modi y , year,
and origin-destination-industry fixed effects; in column 2 we add additional time-varying
controls; in column 3 we use the number of migrants with patenting potential as the main
independent variable. OLS results suggest a positive association between migration and
cross-border citations. The estimated coefficient for migrants with patenting potential is
robust to all controls and is twice as large compared to the overall migration stock.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 1.3 show the 2SLS results that yield quantitatively larger elasticities
than the OLS. A 1% increase in emigrants induces a 0.59% growth in cross-border citations
to their origins. Table A.8 in the Appendix summarizes the results for the sub-sample where
17As a rule of thumb, it takes about three years for a patent to be granted.
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Table 1.3: Citations to Destination Industries, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0334* 0.0269 0.799*** 0.588***
(0.0170) (0.0167) (0.213) (0.225)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0638* 2.916
(0.0348) (2.302)
Patents, origin 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.174*** 0.192***
(0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0268) (0.0310)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0435*** 0.0431*** 0.0427*** 0.0219
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0236)
Within EU -0.0501 -0.0471 -0.0698* 0.0468
(0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0416) (0.0845)
L3.Trade flow 0.00665 0.0119 -0.104* 0.00902
(0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0617) (0.0440)
L3.FDI flow 0.00780 0.00711 0.0126** -0.0134
(0.00493) (0.00495) (0.00570) (0.0203)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.080 0.095 0.095
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 20.29 22.20 14.98
Notes: The dependent variable is number of citations from a region and industry to another country per year.
Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI
and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications
include year and origin-destination-industry level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
origin-destination-industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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new EU member states are origins and EU15+4 are destinations. Despite the reduction in the
sample size, the main 2SLS coefficients remain positive and significant. The reduced form
regressions (Table A.9 in the Appendix) are also consistent. When we estimate the reduced
form for the whole sample of origins and destinations, the free movement coefficients gain
significance and quantitatively remain almost identical to those from the baseline sample.
This indicates that some of the insignificant results in the baseline regressions (as, for example,
the imprecise coefficient for migrants with patenting potential) are mainly due to power
problems with noisy migration data.
Previous research has emphasized the role of communication between moving researchers
and their former colleagues at the previous employers (e.g. Kaiser et al., 2015; Braunerhjelm
et al., 2015). To test whether the channel they have found for inventors moving between firms
within a country is also the primary channel of international knowledge flows in our setting,
we exclude the inventor’s network. To do this, we exclude citations between inventors and all
employers (applicants) and other inventors they are listed with on a patent application at any
point in time. Table 1.4 reports the results for the restricted sample. While the coefficients
change slightly, they remain positive and significant. Thus only a small part of the effect
seems to be driven by the inventors’ close network. Knowledge flows that this method could
not capture include, for example, if a student at an Eastern European university moves on to
work in Western Europe, filing patents for the first time and citing her professors’ research.
However, the sizable effect that remains suggests that wider spillovers play an important role.
Citations are not always added by the inventor himself but can also be added by the examiner.
One worry might thus be that examiners become more aware of research done in other
European countries and that they consequently are more likely to add citations from these
countries. Alternatively, the effect might be driven by the fact that more patents are filed at
the European Patent Office, where examiners may be more likely to add references to foreign
patents than at the national offices.18 This concern is addressed by Table A.11, which shows
18The latter concern is also addressed in Table A.10, where only citations among patents filed with the USPTO
are included, such that European institutional changes should not affect the results.
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Table 1.4: Citations to Inventor’s Network Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0346** 0.0276* 0.797*** 0.631***
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.197) (0.203)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0464 3.878*
(0.0314) (2.355)
Patents, origin 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.155*** 0.177***
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0262) (0.0358)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0353*** 0.0350*** 0.0344** 0.00732
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0247)
Within EU -0.0496 -0.0471 -0.0711* 0.0787
(0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0403) (0.0867)
L3.Trade flow 0.0296 0.0350 -0.0893 0.0312
(0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0597) (0.0484)
L3.FDI flow 0.00982** 0.00925* 0.0150*** -0.0179
(0.00481) (0.00482) (0.00569) (0.0224)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.077 0.091 0.091
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 19.18 19.85 10.82
Notes: In this table, citations within the network of the inventor are excluded, i.e., citations from applicants
and inventors with whom the cited inventor has patented at any point in time. The dependent variable is
the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation counts, number of
migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows are taken
in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the results only with citations that were added by the applicant (rather than the examiner or a
third party) according to PATSTAT and we can see that there are no qualitative changes.19
There are a number of ways for the knowledge flows to occur in practice. One possibility is
that emigrants increase the awareness of new knowledge or technologies. This could happen,
for example, if emigrants inform their former colleagues or if they meet at conferences.
Another possibility is that researchers in the source countries are aware of new knowledge or
technologies but need to learn how to use the tacit knowledge embedded in them. A close
contact among former colleagues might spur the transfer of tacit knowledge. Additionally
19In unreported regressions, we limit citations further to only include those that are marked in PATSTAT as
applicant-added and, additionally, where citing and cited patents are both priority patents filed at the USPTO.
The results are qualitatively similar despite the fact that only less than 1% of citations remain.
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return migration can increase innovation in source countries. Often, emigrants return to their
home countries after several years abroad and create start-ups or contribute to innovation in
other ways.20
1.7 Robustness
To confirm the validity of the results, we conducted a number of robustness checks. We find
that the increase in patenting activities as a result of emigration is not driven by different
pre-trends or institutional changes in the European patenting system.
One way to check the validity of the results is to examine pre-trends. If our results are valid,
the coefficient of interest should be zero if we regress citation patterns on future labor market
openings. Figure 1.1 in Section 1.3 shows the annual treatment effects for the regression
of cross-border citations on the free movement variable. We look specifically at bilateral
citations during the time period 15 years before and 15 years after free movement between
two countries has been established. The data we use for this graph are based on patent
applications over the 50 year period from 1965 to 2014. The regression includes year dummies
and country-pair fixed effects to take out trends. The figure shows that there is no significant
change in cross-border citations in the years prior to the establishment of free labor mobility.21
This is reassuring and increases the credibility of our results. It becomes clear that the effect
only starts to gain momentum at the time of the introduction of free movement and builds up
over the following years.
One might also worry that the institutional framework of registering patents has changed in
the EU, especially in the context of EU enlargement and the European Patent Convention.
We thus restrict the sample to patents that have been registered at the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Table A.10 in the Appendix shows the results. While we have
fewer observations, the qualitative results remain the same. The results thus do not seem to
be driven by institutional changes in Europe.
20Our time frame of analysis is more likely to reflect the increasing awareness of new technologies or the
transfer of tacit knowledge.
21Note that this graph uses country-level data, such that the free movement indicator only switches to 1 once
all sectors are open. Some of the (insignificant) increase before time 0 may thus be due to the partial openings
during the transition periods, which we exploit in the main part of the chapter for identification.
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1.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study analyzes the effects of emigration on patenting levels in source countries. We find
that countries that experience emigration increase their level of patenting. We further suggest
that this has led to a catch-up process that brought origin countries closer to the technology
frontier. We also find that the international mobility of people has increased technology and
knowledge spillovers as evidenced by cross-border patent citations in the respective countries.
Specific channels that could have fostered the knowledge spillovers are the transfer of tacit
knowledge, the increased and improved network of inventors and return migration.
One policy recommendation that directly follows from these findings is that the EU could
benefit from further facilitating migration within Europe. As there are no more legal barriers
to free labor mobility, hindering factors are mostly language and administrative barriers. The
EU could reduce these barriers by ensuring the recognition of foreign qualifications and
the promotion of language courses at all age levels. In this way, the EU can exploit the full
potential of migrants both for destination and source countries.
Another policy implication is to ease skilled migration to Europe from outside the European
Union. This could be achieved by easing the access to European labor markets and the
recruitment of highly qualified foreign workers. While the Blue Card has been a step in this
direction, its scope could be increased to obtain a higher impact and administrative barriers
should be reduced. For those skilled migrants that are already in Europe, for instance skilled
refugees, labor market restrictions should be lifted to ease labor market integration. If these
people can be integrated fast into qualified positions without a loss in human capital, the
innovation system would greatly benefit.
We have shown in this chapter that source countries can benefit from emigration through
knowledge flowing back into the country. These benefits of knowledge flows can be maxi-
mized by facilitating research networks with emigrated inventors, for example by organising
conferences in the origin countries. Furthermore, governments can design programs to ac-
tively keep the diaspora engaged and by encouraging and facilitating return migration. Return
migrants bring back the newly gained knowledge and many times create their own start-ups
which can foster development in the countries of origin.
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While this chapter establishes that knowledge flows mitigate the negative consequences of
emigration, further research is needed to shed light on the precise way these knowledge flows
are created and characterized. Do migrants possess tacit knowledge that flows with people
but cannot be transferred by other means? Or do migrants enlarge the R&D network and
create better awareness of technologies in other countries? Do migrants have a competitive
advantage in negotiating licensing fees with their country of origin? These open questions
may guide further research in order to better understand how to increase knowledge flows





Small Steps or Giant Leaps?
Competition and the Size of Innovations
2.1 Introduction
“We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters.”
— from Founders Fund’s manifesto
This statement, often attributed to the co-founder of PayPal and Founders Fund, Peter Thiel,
succinctly expresses the disappointment felt by many when comparing past expectations to
the actual technological progress of the last decades. The enthusiasm after breakthroughs
such as the Moon landing seems to have given way to an aspiration of quick profits through
tiny improvements, for instance in communication technology with social media websites and
apps. Another PayPal co-founder, Elon Musk, even felt compelled by the public’s apparently
waning interest in attempting “giant leaps” to other planets to pour his fortune into a risky
space start-up.1
But is there actually any empirical evidence for this sentiment beyond anecdotes, i.e., has
corporate innovation really changed in recent decades? R&D spending has increased over
this time period and appears to have paid off, at least when measured by the number of
1The title of this chapter is a reference to Neil Armstrong’s first words from the lunar surface on 21 July 1969:
“That’s one small step for (a) man, one giant leap for mankind.” https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/
History/alsj/a11/a11.step.html (last accessed on 5 September 2017).
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granted patents. At the same time, there has been a puzzling decrease in groundbreaking
innovations from corporate R&D. Arora et al. (2015) come up with a number of potential
explanations for their observation that firms’ innovation has indeed shifted towards more
incremental innovation. One of them attributes the trend to an increase in competition
due to globalization. However, the authors emphasize that their evidence only suggests a
relationship, but not necessarily causality.
The present study makes three main contributions. First, the choice between innovation
technologies targeting small or large inventive steps is incorporated into an R&D model
with interesting implications. Second, a new measure is developed to quantify the types
of innovations from patent abstracts. Third, the measure is used in instrumental variable
regressions to estimate the causal relationship between import competition and the type of
innovation.
The model endogenizes the allocation of resources to projects aiming at large inventive
steps versus more incremental ones. Motivated by a product market competition model
based on Aghion et al. (2001), I formalize how competition affects profits and, as a result,
R&D portfolio choice. Competition is modeled as the extent of substitutability between
the duopolists’ products, but allows for a wide range of interpretations, such as trade tariffs
or technological standardization. In a dynamic framework I show that an increase in the
intensity of competition leads to a decline in the share of large innovations in total innovations.
This effect is compatible with an inverted-U relationship between competition and the total
amount of innovation. However, the negative relationship between competition and the share
of large innovations holds independently of the initial level of competition. Furthermore, the
intensity of competition maximizing the amount of large innovation is lower than the intensity
maximizing overall innovation (which, in turn, is lower than the one maximizing the amount
of small innovation). If the social value of large innovations is higher, the socially optimal
level of competition is lower than the one maximizing the total number of innovations.
A firm’s incentives to invest in R&D stem from two sources: On the one hand, successful cost
reduction allows the firm to appropriate part of the social benefit of the innovation. On the
other hand, there is an additional component to higher profits resulting from R&D that is
due to business stealing (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). In the model, market size is assumed
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to be fixed. Changes in competition affect business stealing more for incremental steps,
where a product is very comparable to its predecessor and to the products of competitors
without innovations. By contrast, for more radical innovations, this effect is negligible and the
innovator effectively becomes a monopolist.2 This study attempts to not only illuminate a
crucial aspect in the relationship between competition and innovation, but also to reconcile
seemingly contradictory observations such as the trend towards both more patents and fewer
groundbreaking innovations. This puzzle may thus exist not (only) because of an increased
ease of patenting even minor innovations over time, but because firms have adjusted their
R&D strategies to increased foreign competition and produce more incremental R&D, which
is less risky and leads to more, albeit smaller, steps.
The predicted relationship between competition and the type of innovation is tested using
changes in competitive pressure due to growing imports from China with the data and the
initial conditions instrument from Bloom et al. (2016). To quantify the type of innovation in a
way that is coherent with the model, I calculate novel measures based on the similarity of a
firm’s patents to a comparison group of patents. The idea is that larger inventive steps lead a
firm to areas in technology space which are more distant from previous innovations. Different
technologies entail changes in the terms occurring in patent abstracts. Thus the continuous
similarity variables may be interpreted as inverse measures of the size of inventive steps.
The estimations support the causal relationship between increasing competition and a shift
towards more incremental research, i.e., the patents become more similar to a firm’s own past
research. While this effect is a change of firms’ behavior, I also investigate whether increasing
import competition affected the selection of firms which are still observed patenting in
later periods, as the direction of research may be hard to adjust. The analysis of outcomes
for firms with different initial R&D types suggests that the primary channel is a change in
firms’ behavior. There is some evidence that the sales of firms with more incremental initial
research decreased less, following an increase in Chinese import competition, than those
whose innovations were less incremental. Thus competition makes small steps relatively
more valuable, a fact that is in line with the model.
2Drastic innovation implies complete business stealing, as other firms are forced out of the market by a large
innovation. However, the important difference is that post-innovation profits are independent of competition.
Profits after a large innovation are not affected by policies favoring competitors which can no longer be active in
the market due to their technological lag.
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There exists a well developed literature on the relationship between competition and inno-
vation. Schumpeter (1942) introduces the idea that market power is crucial to innovative
activity, both in terms of large firms’ capability to innovate – he describes advantages to scale
such as the ability to leverage the abilities of “better brains” or improved access to finance –
and the incentives for “creative destruction” arising from the prospect of profits, which could
not exist under perfect competition. A seminal contribution by Arrow (1962) points out the
“replacement effect” in the opposite direction: A monopolist has little incentive to invent a
new or improved product if this leads to self-cannibalization. I.e., it steals the old product’s
business, while not increasing profits as much as for an entrant, from whose perspective the
entire market share of the new product is part of the innovation’s net payoff. Schmidt’s (1997)
model shows that separation of ownership and control can give rise to another positive effect
of competition on the incentives for managers through the increased threat of liquidation.
However, reduced profits from a cost reduction through increased competition may lead to a
non-monotonic relationship.
An inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation is also supported empirically
in Aghion et al.’s (2005) influential paper. In their theoretical model, the authors find that
incentives for innovation through escape competition and the Schumpeterian effect dominate
at opposite ends of the spectrum of competition intensities due to the composition of industry
structures (which, in their model, means duopolists may be at the same technological level or
one may be ahead of the other).
Nonetheless, the survey by Schmutzler (2010) on the general relationship between competi-
tion and innovation concludes that it remains an “unresolved question”.3 Most studies in this
literature do not distinguish between different types of innovations. However, a small number
of publications specifically address this question and a number of further papers deal with
the size of the targeted innovations in extensions.4 The most relevant ones in the context of
this study are briefly summarized below.
3An earlier survey by Gilbert (2006) similarly describes the conclusions from the literature as “meager”.
4Note that this is different from the distinction between process and product innovation. Either of these
innovations may be small or large, as the new product or process may be more or less similar to what has existed
before. However, in my model innovations affect only the current market through cost reductions, such that
process innovation is the appropriate concept. Nonetheless, in reality the distinction is less sharp and a new
product, such as the smartphone, may render products in various other markets obsolete (such as MP3 players
and compact digital cameras).
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Cabral (1994) is the first paper to study this question and shows that firms in the market will
take on less risk in their R&D portfolios than would be socially optimal due to the effect of the
competitor’s success probability on the difference between social and private returns. Aghion
and Howitt (1992) come to a similar conclusion in an endogenous growth model, in which
the result is driven by the effect of business stealing. However, none of these papers focuses
on the change in this bias when the intensity of competition increases. In a later paper, Cabral
(2003) studies the effect of a firm’s position on the quality ladder on its R&D strategy. He finds
that even with an infinite horizon firms will play the risky strategy when sufficiently behind
and the safe one when they lead. The critical assumption is that there is a lower and an upper
limit to a firm’s profit, such that there is indeed “less to lose” when behind than when ahead.
There is no intensity of competition modeled beyond the technological position, which does
not capture a parameter that competition or trade policy can directly affect. Kwon (2010)
studies the influence of the number of competitors on firms’ R&D choice between a risky and
safe project. Assuming that each of the two innovations can be patented only by a single firm,
which is drawn at random among the innovators, Kwon finds a bias towards low risk projects
as well. He also analyzes the change of this bias with an increase in competition, which in his
model means a higher number of competitors. Understanding competition in this way, the
study predicts that more competition makes riskier projects more attractive due to the lower
probability of parallel innovation. In my model, by contrast, the number of firms is fixed and
competition only affects their profits.
A distinction between exploration and exploitation has also been made more recently by
Manso (2011) and a series of following papers which further explore the topic (e.g. Ederer,
2013; Ederer and Manso, 2013; Balsmeier et al., 2017). These studies approach the question
from an organizational perspective, abstracting from the market structure that determines
which type of innovation the owner of a firm wishes to incentivize for an agent or a team
to choose in the first place. Their models feature a principal-agent framework, in which an
optimal incentive contract is determined, whereas my study is concerned with the effect of
the incentives that emerge in the market on different types of R&D investments. Connecting
these two elements and exploring the transmission of market incentives to contracts and
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organizational incentive structures is an interesting area for future research, especially since
R&D managers require psychological elements to be taken into account.5
While the interpretation of the competition parameter in this and similar models is rather
abstract, the empirical part of the chapter focuses on one particular type of competition that
has received increasing attention recently: the competition that comes with openness to
trade and in particular the effect of Chinese import competition. Various recent articles have
studied the impact of this “China Shock” (Autor et al., 2016b) on American and European
economies. This surge in imports from China has been the result of increasing openness to
global markets by the country’s government, in particular through broad reforms in 1993 to
enable the country to become a WTO member (Naughton, 2007). The accession followed in
2001.
Whereas much of this literature has been concerned with the effects of these imports on the
domestic labor markets (Autor et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2015) and a diverse set of other
questions, two recent studies in this literature, which explore the effect on innovation, come to
opposite conclusions: Bloom et al.’s (2016) study finds that European firms are driven towards
increased technological upgrading and more innovation by competition (an effect “within
firms”), as well as an increased chance of survival for firms which are already technologically
ahead. The empirical part of my study builds on their work, combining their data with
additional data from PATSTAT, the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database of the European
Patent Office. Autor et al.’s (2016a) later working paper finds that innovation has decreased
in American firms as a result of increased imports from China. While several reasons for the
opposite sign of the effect compared to Bloom et al.’s (2016) work are discussed, in reference
to Aghion et al. (2005) the authors suggest that the more competitive markets in the U.S.
may simply be beyond the maximum of the inverted-U, such that additional competition
decreases innovation.
The next section of the chapter presents the model and derives its implications for the effects
of competition on the types of corporate innovation. Section 2.3 describes the empirical
5Lacetera and Zirulia (2012) combine both approaches, however the choice between basic and applied
research in their model does not reflect the feature of interest to my study. In their paper, the distinction between
the two types is that basic research is open, which leads to externalities and from which the researcher derives
utility, while in my study the larger inventive step of more radical (and possibly more basic) research endeavors
is essential.
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approach and the construction of the measures for the types of innovation, as well as the
empirical results. Section 2.4 summarizes the conclusions and outlines potential directions
for future research. The appendix presents a model without the simplifying assumptions
that enabled an analytical solution of the main model. Furthermore, additional empirical
robustness checks are shown.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Set-Up
Incentives for different types of R&D investments depend on the difference between product
market profits with and without the innovations. This section first presents the set-up of the
dynamic R&D model and the assumptions regarding profit levels with different technologies
and their changes with competition. In particular, while being ahead by a large step always
yields higher profits than by a small step, it is assumed that higher competition increases
profits only for a firm leading by a small step. A large step yields constant monopoly profits.
The motivation for these features is based on models from Aghion et al. (2001, 2002)6 and is
discussed after the presentation of the model. These assumptions are then shown to imply a
decreasing share of large innovations in all innovations. This decreasing share is compatible
with Aghion et al.’s (2005) inverted-U relationship between competition and total innovation
and holds independently of the initial level of competition, i.e., the position on the curve. The
maximum of the absolute level of large innovation then occurs at a lower level of competition
than that of total innovation. Thus the model suggests that maximizing total innovation may
not be the socially optimal policy if large steps lead to higher externalities.
In the R&D model, there are two firms competing in an industry over an infinite time horizon.
In each period, innovations of different types and firms are disjoint events, such that at
most one may occur, and the probabilities of small and large innovations for the two firms
depend on their investments in the previous round. The R&D outcome determines the relative
6Note that only the working paper of Aghion et al.’s (2002) study models the product market explicitly. The
published version (Aghion et al., 2005) abstracts away from the details of product market competition and
instead introduces a parameter measuring the extent to which the duopolists are able to collude.
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technological positions of the firms and their product market profits. Then R&D investments
are made and the next period follows. The firms are assumed to be myopic in the sense
that they consider only next period’s product market profit and current R&D costs in their
optimization.
The industry state is characterized by their relative positions: They may be at the same
technological level or one firm may be ahead of the other, either by a small or by a large step.
Following Aghion et al. (2005), it is assumed that the leading firm cannot invest in R&D. A
firm leading by a large step earns a profit of piL = 1. Irrespective of the size of the lag, the
follower can invest only in catch-up R&D and earns a product market profit of piF = 0. The
intensity of competition is captured by the variable ∆ ∈ [0, 12 ] and affects product market
profits for leveled firms and small step leaders. Each leveled firm earns pi0 = 12 −∆, i.e., higher
competition reduces the sum of their profits from 1, which equals a large step leader’s profit,
to 0. A firm leading by a small step earns piS = 12 +∆. Thus the firms’ profits increase from 12
to 1 as competition increases. Only firms in leveled industries have two continuous choice
variables, nL for large steps and nS for small steps. The variables ni , i ∈ {L,S,F } are the
success probabilities for each type of innovation in a period and are associated with costs7
2n2i , i ∈ {F,S,L}. Since it is assumed that there are no parallel innovations, R&D costs and
profits ensure that the sum of probabilities in equilibrium does not exceed 1. In addition, the
laggard’s benefits from spillovers are reflected in the help parameter h (with h < 78 ).8 In terms
of model dynamics, this parameter allows an exogenous influence on the tendency of the
economy to return to the leveled state (or, equivalently, the probability that an industry is
in the leveled state at any point in time). The help parameter can be seen as an additional
policy variable reflecting the strength of intellectual property protection and the extent of
7Since this study is concerned primarily with the changes in investments in the two innovation technologies
rather than their levels, in the model the equilibrium probability of achieving a large innovation will never be
smaller than that of a small innovation. This is the case simply because cost functions are assumed to be the
same for both technologies and thus a large cost reduction is more attractive by definition. The appendix shows
that the levels may be easily adjusted by introducing a cost parameter, such that large innovations are more
costly. Since the mechanism is not affected by this, I opted for improved analytical tractability in the main part
of the chapter and omitted these cost parameters.
8This help parameter benefits the laggard by increasing the probability of catching up and earning the profit
pi0 in the leveled state next period. Such assumptions on h are not necessary in the model in the appendix,
since the probability of two innovations occurring at the same time is 0 in continuous time. The model in the
appendix supports the results of this section.
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Figure 2.1: Possible Positions on the Technology Ladder
F 0 S L
Notes: Firms may be equally advanced (0), lead by a small step (S) or by a large step (L), or lag behind as follower
(F ).
knowledge spillovers between companies.9 These positions10 and the possible movements
between them are depicted in Figure 2.1.
Since the model abstracts away from strategic interaction and firms look ahead only one
period, a firm’s profit and R&D investment depend only on its technological position and the




+nLpiL+nSpiS + (nL+nS)piF + (1−nL−nS −nL−nS)pi0,
wherepi0 is the product market profit of a firm in the neck-and-neck state, from which the total
costs of R&D are subtracted. After the current period, the firm may find itself in a different
state. For simplicity, the next period is not discounted and its value is the expected profit in
the product market. Furthermore, as it is assumed that only either one or no innovation may
occur in each sector per period, parallel innovations are not considered. With probability
nL the firm makes a large innovation and with nS a small one, leading to profits piL and piS ,
respectively, in the product market. The next term takes the potential transition to position F
into account: If the other firm innovates, whose investment variables are nL and nS and are
taken as given by the optimizing firm, the future profit will be that of a follower piF . Finally,
9An example of a policy likely to affect these spillovers are non-compete contracts, which have been found
to even affect relocation decisions of knowledge workers by Marx et al. (2015). As a result of the assumption that
firms look ahead only one period, increasing h always increases innovation in this chapter’s model. If firms take
all future periods into account as in the model in the appendix, however, faster catch-up decreases the value of
being ahead.
10From the perspective of the following firm, the size of the lag does not matter such that only one position is
depicted.
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none of these transitions may occur and the next period’s present value will be the same
neck-and-neck present value as in the current period.
A lagging firm only has to choose the level of catch-up R&D nF in its optimization (where




piF −2n2F + (nF +h)pi0+ (1−nF −h)piF (2.2)
The structure of the objective function VF is similar to that of leveled firms, except that there
are fewer choices to make and the help parameter h plays a role in influencing the probability
of a successful catch-up. Finally, a firm leading by a small or large step has no decisions to
take and no R&D costs, such that there is no R&D optimization.
Firms’ maximization leads to the first order conditions below, which give the optimal invest-
ment levels.
4nL =piL−pi0 (2.3)
4nS =piS −pi0 (2.4)
4nF =pi0−piF (2.5)
To be consistent with a steady state, the probabilities that an industry is in either of the three
states (leveled with probability µ0 or unleveled with probability µF , where one firm is leading
by either a large step or by a small step) have to sum to one: µ0+µF = 1. Furthermore, the
inflows and outflows of the states have to be equal.
2µ0(nL+nS)=µF (nF +h) (2.6)
The average innovation rates IL for large and IS for small steps in the economy depend on
the investment choices of firms in the leveled state, as well as the probability of the industry
being in that state µ0. The decrease of this latter probability for high levels of competition is
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the source of the downward sloping part of the inverted-U relationship between competition
and innovation.
IL = 2µ0nL (2.7)
IS = 2µ0nS (2.8)
These innovation rates describe the expected number of innovations per period for the
average industry for large and small steps, respectively.11 The results below describe how
these rates are affected by the intensity of competition ∆.
2.2.2 Discussion of the Model
In order to focus most clearly on the mechanisms leading to the results, the model makes
several assumptions. The most important ones are discussed in this section.
The model summarizes the product market in the profit levels and, in particular, assumes
that leveled firms’ profits decrease in competition and a small step leader’s profits increase,
while profits after a large step are constant. These features are consistent with models such as
Aghion et al. (2001), as explored further in Appendix B.4. These models assume that consumer
spending is fixed in a duopolistic industry. Competition is modeled as the substitutability
between the firms’ products. The size of the inventive step is reflected in the cost ratio. In
the extreme case where a large innovation leads to zero costs, the innovator serves the entire
market and its profit equals consumer spending, which is 1, independently of competition.
The idea is that if a technological advance is sufficiently large, the other firm will leave the
market and thus policies, which make it easier for a competitor to steal business, will have
no effect. Increasing competition decreases the profits of leveled firms, however, and it
11The innovation rates could also be interpreted as the probability of an innovation of a certain type in a
period. E.g. the probability of a large innovation (IL) depends on the probability that the industry is in the leveled
state (µ0), because this is necessary for innovations at the technological frontier. Furthermore, IL depends on
the probability of producing a large innovation in the leveled state for each firm (nL). This is multiplied by two,
because there are two firms and innovations are disjoint events.
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increases the benefits of leading by a small step.12 A small technological improvement by one
competitor is not sufficient to take over the entire market, e.g. because of barriers such as
tariffs, transportation costs or incompatibility. Thus reducing such barriers is assumed to
have a bigger effect on competitors which are technologically close. The empirical analysis
below provides suggestive evidence that small steps indeed become more beneficial under
higher competition.
To focus on the changes in industry structure and innovation, the model assumes that there
are no parallel innovations. This simplifies firms’ optimization and could be justified by the
fact that, as the period under consideration becomes shorter, success probabilities decrease
and the probability of parallel innovation may become negligible.13 The assumption that
firms look ahead only one period can be explained by the limited tenure of CEOs and the
insufficient alignment of their incentives with long-term investors’ interests.14 The consider-
ably more complex model in the appendix does not make this assumption and the results
survive in the numerical solution. An assumption that remains, however, is that while firms
maximize their present value through their R&D investments, they are unable to commit to
future implementation of strategies that are not profit maximizing from the perspective of
another position, in which the firm might find itself later.15 The exclusion of such strategic
considerations can again be justified by a high probability that CEOs will be replaced if they
do not maximize the company’s present value at any point in time. Thus the behavior of the
future company, whether decided by the same CEO or another, is constrained and has to be
taken as given by the current CEO.
The fact that the number of firms in the model is fixed may be justified by the existence of
strong barriers to entry in many innovative sectors. In other markets, however, the effect on
entrepreneurs’ innovation should factor into competition policy. While the optimal level of
12The model in the appendix assumes that small steps are sufficiently large for the leader’s profits to increase
with competition. Besides the arguments discussed in the context of the model in the appendix, it should be
noted that this model’s emphasis is on comparing drastic to all other innovations. The exclusion of smaller
advances also seems justified in view of the empirical analysis: Working with patent data, a truncation of
observed inventive steps is inevitable, i.e., the smallest improvements will not satisfy patentability requirements.
13The two innovation technologies for the two firms could also be thought of as leading into four different
technological directions and only at most one is “correct” and leads to an improvement.
14This simplification is also made in Chapter 12 of Aghion and Howitt (2008).
15A leader, for example, might want to threaten higher R&D investments in the leveled state, than is profitable
at that position, in order to deter the other firm from investing in catch-up R&D.
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competition may change, the shift towards small innovations should persist if outside innova-
tors can replace incumbents and compare post-innovation profits. Competition increases
the profits which entrants can expect after a small innovation, while large innovations yield
constant monopoly profits. Similarly, if outsiders need to enter through catch-up innovation,
their incentives upon entry would be shifted towards small steps by competition.
2.2.3 Results
The innovation rates IL and IS , as defined above, take only innovations at the technological
frontier into account, while catch-up innovation does not push beyond the best available
technology in the industry. R&D investments in these types of innovation are therefore
made only when firms are at the same technological position. Their success probabilities for
both types of innovation (nS for small steps and nL for large steps) are shown in Figure 2.2.
Both investments increase in competition (∆) because pre-innovation profits (i.e., profits in
the leveled state) decrease and incentives are determined by the difference between post-
innovation and pre-innovation profits. The difference in the slope is the result of increasing
profits for the small step leader, but constant profits after large innovations. Figure 2.2 also
shows that in the unleveled states the follower’s investment in catching up (nF ) decreases
with competition, as reaching the leveled state becomes less attractive.









Proof. See appendix, Section B.1.
The proposition states that the share of large innovations declines for any level of competition.
The change in this share with competition can be seen in Figure 2.3. The intuition is that more
competition makes both types of innovation more attractive as it decreases a neck-and-neck
firm’s profits. However, only small innovation additionally becomes more attractive because
of increased post-innovation profits through additional business stealing. The inverted-U
relationship between total innovation and competition is maintained in the numerically
solved model in the appendix, in which profits follow directly from a product market model.
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Figure 2.2: R&D Investments in Leveled State








Notes: Investments in R&D of each type for a firm in the leveled industry state (nL in dashed green and nS in
dotted red) and in catch-up innovation for unleveled states (nF in solid blue). (h = 0.2)
Figure 2.3: Share of Large Innovations








Notes: This graph shows the share of large innovations in all innovations ILIL+IS depending on the intensity of
competition ∆. (h = 0.2.)
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Figure 2.4: Absolute Levels of Innovation
ΔL* ΔS*Δ*






Notes: This graph shows the absolute levels of total innovations I , as well as large (IL) and small (IS ) innovations,
for a given intensity of competition (∆): I in solid black, IL in dashed green and IS in dotted red. (h = 0.2)
As Figure 2.4 demonstrates, for some parameter values, the amounts of small and large innova-
tion (i.e., innovation rates IS and IL) may themselves follow an inverted-U, not only their sum.
(In the figure, this is only the case for IS .) The fact that the inverted-U relationship between
overall innovation and competition can persist indicates that there is no conflict between
this study and the results of Aghion et al. (2005). Rather, this model investigates the com-
position of the total amount of innovation, which is more commonly studied. Nonetheless,
as described below, while the socially optimal level of competition may still be interior (i.e.,
∆ ∈ (0, 12 )), it need not be the level that maximizes overall competition, when externalities of
different types of innovation differ. Note that unlike the effect of competition on the amount
of innovation, the effect on the share of large innovations stated in Proposition 1 is negative,
independently of the initial level of competition in the model. Thus, while the effect of an
increase in competition, e.g. due to globalization, on total innovation may be positive or
negative, the model unambiguously predicts a shift towards smaller steps.16
16A statement from Google executives Schmidt and Rosenberg (2014) fits well with the model’s prediction
that, as globalization has increased competition, the share of resources devoted by firms to catch-up and small
step innovation has increased. In their book “How Google Works” they lament: “Business leaders spend much of
their time watching and copying the competition, and when they do finally break away and try something new,
they are careful risk-takers, developing only incremental, low-impact changes.”
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Aghion et al. (2005) explain the inverted-U relationship between competition and innova-
tion as the interplay of two countervailing effects: On the one hand, more competition
increases the difference between pre-innovation and post-innovation profits in the leveled
state (“escape competition”). On the other hand, the incentives for a laggard to catch up to
the technological frontier decrease as competition becomes more intense (“Schumpeterian
competition”), as is easily seen in the extreme case of Bertrand competition, where both,
lagging behind and being at the same level of the competitor, yield zero profits. They assume
that a leader cannot benefit from additional innovation, e.g. because of spillovers, such that
it never invests in R&D. A crucial feature of their model is the “composition effect”, which
results from the decreasing share of industries being in the leveled state, rather than in the
unleveled state, as competition increases, and which determines which of the two previous
effects dominates. For low levels of competition, an industry is more likely to be in the leveled
state, such that the positive escape competition effect on neck-and-neck firms’ innovation
prevails. For high levels of competition, an industry is more often in the unleveled state
and further increases in competition make catching up and reaching the leveled state less
attractive for the follower (while the leader does not innovate at all).
Proposition 2. The absolute level of small innovation IS follows an inverted-U shape for h < 14
and otherwise is increasing in competition for any initial level of competition. The absolute
level of large innovation IL is decreasing in competition if h ≤ 1+
p
6




If h is in between these values, IL has an inverted-U shape.
Total innovation I = IL+ IS is increasing in competition if h ≥
√
1
6 and is otherwise inverted-U
shaped.
Proof. See appendix, Section B.2.
Intuitively, the reason for the inverted-U is that incentives to innovate in the leveled state
increase with competition, but the share of industries able to innovate at the technology
frontier decreases as fewer industries are in that state. Figure 2.5 shows the share of leveled
industries µ0 as a function of competition.17
17The parameter h helps the follower to catch up. Hence, the higher this help parameter is, the more likely is
it that an increase in competition increases innovation, since it increases the probability of being in the leveled
state, in which competition increases R&D investments.
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Figure 2.5: Share of Industries in Leveled State






Notes: Share of industries in the leveled state for a given intensity of competition (∆). (h = 0.2)
While for a model with one type of innovation the level of competition at which the curve
reaches its maximum may be of interest for the optimal policy, a question that arises only
in this chapter’s model is the relative position of the curves’ maxima. In Figure 2.4 total
innovation is maximized at the interior competition intensity ∆∗, while the expected number
of small innovations per period IS is maximized at the higher level ∆∗S . By contrast, the
innovation rate for large innovations is maximized at the lowest level of competition (∆∗L = 0).
Proposition 3. The level of competition ∆∗L , at which the absolute amount of large step inno-
vation the economy produces is maximized, is at most ∆∗, which maximizes total innovation.
The level ∆∗S , which maximizes the amount of small step innovation, is at least as high as ∆
∗.
∆∗L ≤∆∗ ≤∆∗S
Proof. See appendix, Section B.3.
The proposition confirms that this order of the competition intensities maximizing large,
total and small innovation holds generally. The variable of interest to policy makers – the
socially optimal level of competition – thus depends on the relative social value of small and
large innovations. Taking a step back from this abstract model, this means that the fact that
small and large innovations are likely to have different net social values, the optimal policy
differs from an unweighted maximization of the number of innovations, e.g. approximated
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by the number of patents. If larger innovations tend to have higher externalities, the optimal
level of competition could be lower than the one that maximizes overall innovations. The
optimal competition policy ideally takes technological differences into account. Established
industries, in which the social benefits of further large step innovations seem low, may be
regulated more tightly, whereas lenient regulation may be appropriate for nascent industries
with new technologies, where experimentation is relatively more likely to yield sizable positive
externalities on consumers and other innovators.
Proposition 2 shows that the model is compatible with the inverted-U relationship found in
the literature. Proposition 3 demonstrates that the effects of competition on different types of
innovation are relevant for the optimal policy. The main prediction of the model, however, is
Proposition 1.
Hypothesis: An increase in the intensity of competition decreases the average size of corporate
innovations.
This hypothesis is tested in the next section. The results from the model are driven by the
effect of competition on profits at different technological positions.18 Below, the impact of
the type of inital innovation on various economic outcomes for firms is tested. The empirical
results suggest that competition indeed increases the relative value of small steps through
higher sales.
2.3 Empirical Identification of the Relationship between Com-
petition and the Type of R&D
The model presented in the previous section and the research question itself contain variables
which pose an empirical challenge not only because of identification, but also because of
measurement. This section discusses the study’s approach to quantifying competition and,
18For simplicity, the relationship between competition and product market profits with different relative
technological positions is an assumption in this section, which then explores the implications. By contrast, in
Appendix B.4, a similar relationship emerges from a product market competition model based on Aghion et al.
(2001). The empirical results are also in line with this model. Higher competition enables the leading firm to sell
more with given marginal costs.
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more specific to this context, the type of innovation, so as to avoid “making assumptions
about how unmeasurable things affected other unmeasurable things”.19
There are various ways to measure competition and the substitutability parameter α in
models like Aghion et al. (2001) may be interpreted as representing different policies affecting
competition. One important area in which policy makers can influence the extent to which
firms are able to enter each others’ market is trade policy. For instance, Autor et al. (2016b)
suggest the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation from Aghion et al.
(2005) as a potential explanation for the contradiction between their results and Bloom
et al.’s (2016), thereby interpreting competition in the R&D model as import competition.
While production processes may well differ between Chinese exporters and their European
competitors, e.g. due to lower labor costs, the matching industry classification in the data set
suggests that they serve the same markets, such as the one for “Vehicular Lighting Equipment”
(SIC 3647). Note that the analysis includes only patents of European firms and that their
market position may be threatened even if the imported goods are of lower quality, as long
as they are sufficiently cheaper. The model’s intuition is still reflected in this setting, since a
small improvement in quality (or a decrease in production costs) could then be more valuable
by preventing business stealing. A sufficiently large technological advantage always allows a
firm to sell to the entire market, but the increased availability of imported goods in the market
makes a small step relatively more likely to attract customers.
A bigger challenge is posed by the type of innovation, which far fewer empirical studies have
tried to quantify. To get a continuous measure of a patent’s similarity compared to previ-
ous research I use natural language processing to evaluate patent abstracts. Such machine
learning methods are gaining popularity in economics in general, as well as in innovation
economics in particular20. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Kaplan and Vakili (2015) may be
the methodologically most closely related papers. The former study uses the similarity of
product descriptions to study mergers and acquisitions and the latter constructs a binary
19In one of Paul Krugman’s New York Times columns from August 2013, he argued that a reason for why New
Growth Theory fell out of favor was that “too much of it involved making assumptions about how unmeasurable
things affected other unmeasurable things”. URL: https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-new-
growth-fizzle/ (last accessed on 30 May 2017).
20Recent examples of textual analysis methods and applications in economics include Baker et al. (2016),
Hansen et al. (2017) and Hansen and McMahon (2016). For overviews of available methods see Balsmeier et al.
(2016) and Bholat et al. (2015).
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measure of novelty, which is calculated using a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei et al.,
2003), to evaluate the “cognitive novelty” of innovations. My preferred measure, which is
described below, uses a different approach, but in the appendix I verify that the results are
qualitatively unchanged when using LDA, among other variations in the calculation of the
similarity measure. Kaplan and Vakili (2015) is not only relevant to this study because of their
technical approach, but also because of the economic insight gained from their analysis: Their
study draws a clear distinction between the economic value and the “cognitive novelty” of
an innovation, which may be viewed as corresponding to profitability in the product market
and step size (or cost reduction in the model in the appendix) of an innovation, respectively.
Hence, I estimate how the average novelty in a market is affected by import competition. The
results suggest that this choice is indeed driven by a change in the private economic value of
novelty.
Another advantage of the similarity measure over citation-based measures is that it is fixed
at the time of the application, whereas forward citations accumulate afterwards as further
innovations build on the patent. The extent of follow-on innovation, however, may itself
be the result of the economic value rather than of cognitive novelty.21 While the two are
clearly correlated, only the value, but not the novelty, of a given innovation can be affected by
competition ex post.
2.3.1 Data and Measure Based on Latent Semantic Analysis of Patents
This study presents a first empirical test of the causal relationship between product market
competition (more precisely, Chinese import competition) and the type of innovation firms
produce. Each firm in the sample is assigned a novel measure of R&D type (interpreted as the
extent to which the R&D portfolio is geared towards incremental innovation rather than more
radical or drastic innovation) based on textual analysis of the abstracts from its patent filings
in a year. This section explains the steps to construct the measure of the type of corporate
innovations used in the empirical analysis below from patent data from the European Patent
Office (PATSTAT 2014 Autumn Edition, which includes not only data on European patents but
also from various national patent offices and in particular the USPTO).
21In fact, Kaplan and Vakili (2015) use forward citations as their measure of economic value.
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To prepare the corpus of documents (i.e., patent abstracts) for further analysis, I limit the
sample to abstracts in English22 and use the Natural Language Toolkit (Bird et al., 2009) to
stem all words with the Porter Stemmer (Porter, 1980), such that ideally inflections of the
same word result in the same stem. In a next step, the term frequency-inverse document
frequency (tf-idf) matrix is produced using scikit-learn, a machine learning library for the
Python programming language (Pedregosa et al., 2011). This approach is commonly used in
the area of information retrieval for natural language processing and transforms the text in
each document into a vector, in which each word (or in this case, more precisely, word stem) is
one dimension. Thus, the order of words in the abstract is ignored (a so-called “bag-of-words
model”). By contrast to raw frequencies, tf-idf assigns lower weights to words that appear in a
large share of documents (like “signal”, “method” or “process”), whereas terms that appear
in a smaller subset of abstracts (like “auction”, “penicillin” or other more specific terms) are
assigned a higher weight in this measure.23 This method better approximates an emphasis
on the terms that define the content of a document. Furthermore, English stop words (e.g.
articles like “the”) are ignored explicitly, as well as stems occurring in more than 50% of
abstracts or in fewer than 5 abstracts (not only in an individual firm’s patents, but in all of the
patents over the entire sample period).
While the tf-idf matrix could be used already to measure the similarity between documents,
e.g. by calculating the cosine similarity of vectors, I next apply a singular value decomposition
(Deerwester et al., 1990).24 SVD is applied for dimensionality reduction and used as part of
latent semantic analysis (LSA, sometimes also called latent semantic indexing), as a reduced
matrix with fewer dimensions is better able to capture synonymy and polysemy, i.e., words
22If patent applications have multiple abstracts, PATSTAT contains the English version according to its data
catalogue. For a few abstracts, however, the language is incorrectly classified as English in the data. I remove
these observations by verifying the language with the “Compact Language Detection in R” package, which
makes Google Chrome’s language identification library available for the R programming language (https:
//cran.r-project.org/src/contrib/Archive/cldr/).
23Implementations of tf-idf in different studies and software packages vary in their precise functional form.






, where nd ,v is the number of occurrences of term v in document
d , nd is the number of documents and d fv is the number of documents which contain v . Vectors are then
divided by their Euclidean length for normalization. The results are robust to using sublinear scaling for term
frequencies instead, which means that a term’s additional importance from additional occurrences is decreasing
(Manning et al., 2008) and the tf-idf expression becomes (1+ ln(nd ,v ))(1+ ln( 1+nd1+d fv )) (and tf-idf is set to zero for
terms that do not occur).
24Table B.16 shows that the results are comparable if similarities are calculated directly from a tf-idf matrix.
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with multiple meanings (Manning et al., 2008; Murphy, 2012). Intuitively, the document
vectors from the tf-idf matrix, which contains 70167 documents and 17922 terms, are “sum-
marized” to a smaller number of components in this low-rank approximation based on SVD.
While it is not possible to interpret the meaning of each of the 100 continuous variables (i.e.,
components) that are calculated for each abstract, the main advantage of SVD for this study
is that different words with related meaning tend to be mapped into the same dimensions,
such that a comparison based on SVD is more robust to changes in wording without changes
in meaning.
Next, the vectors with the 100 components for each patent of a firm filed in a year are averaged
and their cosine similarity to the average firm’s vector of the comparison group is calculated
as the similarity measure. The comparison group consists of patent applications filed in the
preceding four-year period25 and includes patents of either only the same firm, of all firms in
the same two, three or four-digit SIC category, or of all firms in the sample.
In short, a patent whose abstract is very similar to the comparison group’s corpus of patent
abstracts is assigned a high similarity score.
These similarity measures are constructed for data from Bloom et al. (2016) on European
firms and their exposure to Chinese import competition, to which they are matched using
the Amadeus-PATSTAT-match provided by Peruzzi et al. (2014).26 Bloom et al.’s (2016) data
sources include Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database on firms and UN Comtrade. In the
regressions I use matched patent applications from all patent offices covered in PATSTAT
except for Chinese patents to maximize the number of observations, while excluding direct
effects on the propensity to protect intellectual property in the exporters’ own market. Another
reason for the exclusion of patents filed with the Chinese patent office (SIPO) from the analysis
is the sharp increase in patenting there starting in the late 1990s (Hu and Jefferson, 2008). The
literature suggests that several factors have contributed to this “Chinese patent explosion”
and that changes in patent law as well as lower novelty requirements may be among them
(Hu and Jefferson, 2009; Eberhardt et al., 2016). Robustness checks in the appendix with all
25The comparison group consists of four years to increase the probability that a firm has comparison patents,
such that it can be included in the regressions, while excluding the earlier year for which the similarity measure
is used in the long differences estimation.
26I retain only observations with a high match quality (variable “phat” in Peruzzi et al.’s (2014) dataset of
more than 0.99).
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patents (including patents filed in China and those with abstracts in non-English languages)
or selections on other criteria show that the qualitative results are not sensitive to these
choices.
2.3.2 Econometric Specification and Results
The econometric strategy is based on Bloom et al. (2016), who study the effect of Chinese
import competition on the number of patents, IT upgrading and total factor productivity
(TFP). Combining the data as explained in the previous section, I estimate the following
regression equation:
∆similarityi j kt =β∆ShareImChinai j kt +∆ ft +εi j kt , (2.10)
where indices denote firm i , industry j , country k and year t . The equation is estimated in
five-year differences, such that fixed effects that remain constant over time, e.g. for firms,
industry sectors and countries, disappear. The regression includes year fixed effects ∆ ft
to account for general time trends which should not be attributed to differential growth in
Chinese import penetration. ∆ShareImChinai j kt is the regressor of interest – the five-year
difference in the share of imports to an industry coming from China – and can be viewed as
roughly corresponding to the extent to which firms are able to enter each other’s markets and
steal business through superior or cheaper products, which is captured in the competition
parameter in the model.27 While import competition data are available at the four-digit
SIC level, firms’ exposure depends on the distribution of their activity over (one or several)
industries, such that the equation is estimated on the firm level and not pooled at the industry-
level. As most of the variation is between four-digit SIC categories (rather than between firms
within an industry), standard errors are clustered on the SIC4 level.
27Note that the ∆ in the model measures competition and can be viewed as a function of substitutability α in
the model in the appendix, whereas in this empirical section “∆” denotes five-year differences in the variables.
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As Chinese imports may have increased more in some sectors because its innovations were
more or less incremental than others, I use Bloom et al.’s (2016) initial conditions instrument28
for the endogenous variable ∆ShareImChinai j kt . The two-stage least squares regression
reported below instruments for this variable with ShareImChina j t−6 ·∆ShareImChinat , i.e.,
the initial share of Chinese imports of all imports in the specific sector (in the European
Union and the U.S.) is interacted with the overall growth of Chinese import competition.
Appendix B.5.3 reports first-stage estimation results and OLS regressions. The first stage shows
that the instrument is sufficiently powerful despite the reduction in sample size compared
to Bloom et al. (2016). The F statistic is above the rule of thumb of 10 for weak instruments
(Staiger and Stock, 1997). Amiti and Freund (2010) find that Chinese imports increased mostly
in existing products rather than new ones. Bloom et al. (2016) argue that this supports the
instrument’s exogeneity. This also explains the instrument’s relevance and, in the context
of my study, suggests that import growth was not driven by Chinese exporters’ expectations
about the development of particular industries’ innovation. Note that the exclusion restriction
relies on the changes in similarity not being directly affected by initial conditions (or both
being affected by a third variable), while a higher propensity of Chinese firms to enter sectors
with already more incremental innovation would not be a threat to validity.
Note that for the sample period from 2001 to 2005 (and similarity measures in each of those
years being compared to five years earlier), the assumption of the model that market size is
fixed seems plausible from a European perspective. The Chinese domestic product market is
likely much less important for European producers than access to the European market is for
Chinese exporters during this time period.
Figure 2.6a and the kernel density estimation in Figure B.6 show that there is significant
variation in (the five-year difference of) the similarity measure over the sample of patents. The
sample used in the estimation is considerably smaller than the one used in Bloom et al. (2016)
as only firms with patents in a given year and five years before can be used. Furthermore, not
all firms have been successfully matched to patent data and, depending on the comparison
28In most of their estimations, Bloom et al. (2016) rely on an instrument using quotas in textiles and apparel
that were lifted. As this restricts the sample to a sector that may not be representative and for which firms’ ability
to choose the type of innovation may be particularly limited by technological constraints, I use their second
instrument. Appendix B.5.4 shows that the IV estimates are similar, but are likely to be biased towards OLS due
to the weak instrument in this smaller sample. The F statistic is even well below the “less strict rule of thumb”
of 5 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
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Figure 2.6: Histograms of Five-Year Change in Similarity Measure
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group, the firms’ similarity measure may be missing for some years. For example, if the
comparison group of patents consists of the firm’s own patents in the preceding four-year
period, firms which have not patented before will not be assigned a similarity score. The
sample size therefore increases as the comparison group is defined more broadly at different
levels of industry aggregation. The sample used in the main estimation with a comparison to
a firm’s own patents, which leads to the smallest sample, is shown in Figure 2.6b.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
∆ sim(comp.) 0.03 0.27 -0.76 -0.30 -0.13 0.04 0.19 0.38 0.81
∆ sim(SIC4) 0.02 0.17 -0.51 -0.20 -0.09 0.02 0.13 0.23 0.66
∆ sim(SIC3) 0.01 0.16 -0.60 -0.19 -0.09 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.52
∆ sim(SIC2) 0.01 0.15 -0.46 -0.17 -0.08 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.59
∆ sim(all) 0.01 0.15 -0.49 -0.17 -0.08 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.55
∆ ShareImChina 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.54
ShareImChina j t−6
·∆ShareImChinat 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.75
Observations 868
Notes: The descriptives in this table include the observations of the estimation based on the com-
parison to all previous patents (see Table 2.2, column 5). This sample is the largest one of the five
columns, since it is more likely that comparison group patents exist than for the more narrowly
defined comparison groups. The sample includes five-year differences for the years from 2001 to 2005.
The data are from PATSTAT, Bloom et al. (2016) and Peruzzi et al. (2014).
The results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations are reported in Table 2.2 and
show that an increase in import competition leads to a shift towards more similar, i.e., more
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incremental, corporate innovation for a given firm. The coefficient in column 1 uses the
outcome measure for the similarity of a firm’s patents in one year to its own patents filed in
the preceding four years. The strongest effect, both in terms of size and statistical significance,
is found here. This means that firms in sectors with higher Chinese import penetration file
patents that are closer to their past research agenda in terms of technological direction. It
can be interpreted as a reduction in exploration or radical innovation as a result of more
intense competition. In light of the model, this empirical result is in line with a decrease in
the average size of the inventive step, such that new innovations are closer to previous ones in
the technology space.
The next four columns in Table 2.2 use different similarity measures for the outcome (which
is still the five-year difference in this measure). Columns 2 to 4 compare a firm’s patents
filed in a year to the entire industry’s patents filed in the preceding four years, where the
industry is defined on the four, three and two-digit SIC level, respectively. In the fifth column,
the comparison group consists of all matched firms’ patents in the previous four years. The
coefficients of interest tend to become smaller as the comparison group is broadened to
include more firms and varied sectors. While the sign remains positive, the effects in these
four columns are not statistically significant. Hence, while there is clearly no evidence of a
shift towards innovations becoming more different from any of the groups, the increase in
similarity seems to be driven by a focus on a firm’s own core research agenda.29 Note that the
sample contains only European firms, such that the new competitors from China are excluded.
A conceivable reaction of European industries could be extended cooperation in R&D or even
collusion. The absence of a significant effect on similarity to a firm’s industry suggests that
this is not the case. At the same time, additional specialization on niches could decrease
similarity to the market, but does not seem to take place at a significant extent either.30
Again, if higher average similarity in an industry is positively correlated with competition,
e.g. because technologies are more standardized and markets can be entered more easily by
Chinese firms, this does not threaten the identification for two reasons. First, the model is
29An interesting area for future research is the relation between these findings and firm scope, as studied by
Akcigit and Kerr (2010). It may also be that more intense competition provides incentives for narrower research
and, as a result of the small steps remaining in the firm’s original technical direction, its scope narrows.
30This conclusion does not change if a firm’s own patents are excluded when the similarity to its industry
is calculated. Note that my results are also consistent with Autor et al. (2016b), who do not find evidence for
industry switching.
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estimated in differences, such that only changes, but not differences in levels, are estimated.
Second, a valid instrument ensures that what is estimated is indeed the effect of an increase
in competition on the change of average similarity, rather than the reverse.
The larger coefficient in the first column is partly due to the larger average similarity of a firm’s
patents to its own previous research than to the other comparison groups. The descriptive
statistics in Table 2.1 show that also the standard deviation is about twice as large for similarity
to own patents as for the other similarities. However, dividing the coefficients in Table 2.2 by
the standard deviations of the respective variables in the sample reveals that the effect remains
larger for the comparison to own patents and decreases as the comparison group is widened.31
One way to interpret the effect size is to calculate how a firm’s position in the similarity
distribution changes through import competition. The median of the similarity measure (and
not of its change) for the sample in column 1 is 0.562. The mean of ∆ShareImChina is 0.025.
Multiplying this number by the coefficient 1.459 in column 1 and adding it to the median
results in a similarity of 0.598. Thus the median firm is shifted by the mean effect from the
50th to the 56th percentile in the similarity distribution.
These results contribute the identification of a causal mechanism, which is playing a role
in the trend away from risky basic research towards more applied and incremental R&D, to
the observation by Arora et al. (2015). Venturing into the technological areas pertaining to
other industries may yield more radical innovation through novel recombinations of ideas,
but staying in one’s field is likely to deliver more predictable results. When these latter small
steps become relatively more valuable in the product market through increased risk of and
opportunity for business stealing, firms adjust their research accordingly. Note also that the
sample contains only firms which have patented in at least two years with a period of five
years in between. Thus the subset of firms provides evidence of an actual change in these
firms’ behavior rather than a change in the sample of firms, e.g. through differences in survival,
as considered in the next subsection.
31The coefficient for the change in import competition in Table 2.2, column 1, is 1.459. Divided by the
standard deviation for the sample used in this regression, shown in the appendix in Table B.2 (which is the same
as the one for the larger sample in Table 2.1), is 0.27 is 5.40. The same calculation for the coefficient in column 5
of Table 2.2 yields an effect size of (0.138/0.15=) 0.92.
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Table 2.2: Similarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.459*** 0.314 0.288 0.135 0.138
(0.557) (0.331) (0.342) (0.242) (0.243)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 298 421 425 428 428
SIC4 114 135 139 142 142
SIC3 67 74 75 78 78
SIC2 17 19 19 19 19
N 707 860 865 868 868
Notes: The dependent variable is the five-year difference in the similarity measure (based on SVD with
100 components), which uses the abstracts of a firm’s patents in a year to calculate their similarity to
the comparison group of patents in the preceding four-year period. In column 1, the comparison
group consists of a firm’s own past patents. In columns 2 to 4, the comparison group contains patents
of all firms in the same industry, where the industry is defined increasingly broadly based on the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) (using four, three and two-digit SIC categories, respectively).
In column 5 the comparison group includes patents of firms from all other industries as well. The
model includes year fixed effects (see Equation 2.10) and is estimated with two-stage least squares
using Bloom et al.’s (2016) initial conditions variable to instrument for the increase in Chinese import
competition. The sample period is from 2001 to 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit
SIC level. The data are from PATSTAT, Bloom et al. (2016) and Peruzzi et al. (2014).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The smaller sample compared to Bloom et al. (2016) is a result of the data requirements for the
similarity measure (and of the imperfect match between data sets). The similarity measure
based on a firm’s own patents can be calculated only if there are at least four patents in the
data (two in the two years for which the five-year difference is calculated and two for their
respective comparison periods). Thus the sample is not representative of the total population
of firms. However, when studying innovation, it may be precisely these particularly innovative
firms, which remain in the sample, whose behavior we are interested in. If one considers an
economy’s overall innovation, the most innovative firms will necessarily have contributed to
it disproportionately. Thus, policy makers may also be particularly interested in the response
of these firms’ R&D to increasing competition. Nonetheless, in Appendix B.5.2 regressions are
repeated with adjusted weighting, such that each firm receives the same weight. The main
effect is slightly smaller, but still significant at the 10% level.
Tables B.3 and B.4 in the appendix show the distribution of the firms included in the regres-
sions in column 1 of Table 2.2 over countries and industries, respectively. Neither a country
nor a two-digit SIC category contain more than a quarter of all firms in the sample and the
distribution over countries and industries appears representative, with larger shares for larger
countries and with Machinery and Chemicals among the top categories.32
One potential problem in these main regressions may result from the inclusion of patents from
various different patent offices. The process of European integration has affected intellectual
property rights and, in particular, more and more patents are filed with the European Patent
Office rather than national offices. Furthermore, the availability of abstracts in English can be
affected by the route through which a patent is filed. Thus, a general shift towards English or
towards a different way of filing patents may confound the results if it has been affected by
Chinese import competition as well.33 To address these concerns, in Appendix B.5.1 I show
the same regressions using different samples of patents. Including only USPTO patents at the
cost of a further reduced sample size leads to qualitatively similar results (Table B.5). This
robustness check also ensures that patents filed with multiple patent offices with delay are
32The finer four-digit SIC categorization reveals that SIC 3499 “Fabricated Metal Products, Not Elsewhere
Classified” and SIC 2834 “Pharmaceutical Preparations” have the highest shares with 5.0% and 4.4% of firms in
the sample, respectively. All other four-digit SIC categories include less than 4% of firms each. Repeating the
regressions with either German or British firms excluded does not change the results qualitatively.
33Note, however, that level differences should not affect the results in the specification in five-year differences.
Only changes correlated with Chinese import competition would pose a problem to identification.
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not driving changes in the similarity measure, since only the U.S. filing would be included.34
Table B.6 goes in the opposite direction and increases the sample to include patents filed in
China and others with non-English abstracts (while duplicates are still removed). The results
are qualitatively and in terms of statistical significance the same as in the main regression in
Table 2.2.
The main regressions do not control for the change in the number of patents. As the results
of Bloom et al. (2016) demonstrate, this number is itself affected by the change in Chinese
import competition. It is therefore likely a “bad control”, in the sense that the total effect of
competition on the type of innovation is correlated with a change in the number of patents,
because the latter is influenced by competition as well (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Thus a
regression including this control variable may lead to an erroneous attribution of some of
the change in similarity to the change in patenting, while this may merely be a correlation.
It is also possible, however, that the growth of patenting indeed affects similarity (and this
may, at least partly, mediate the effect of competition on similarity). Table B.1 in the appendix
reports the results and shows that the coefficients for the competition variable hardly change
at all. An increase in patenting is correlated with lower similarity, which would suggest that
the additional patents are due to the firms’ entering new research areas rather than merely an
increase in the propensity to file patents to protect intellectual property.35
Another concern regarding the process of patenting could be a shift towards secrecy. If such a
shift were induced by Chinese import competition, e.g. due to weaker intellectual property
rights in China, it would have to affect large innovations more than incremental ones to
explain the results without an actual change in R&D. Even if this were the case and companies
34Another way to ensure that later filings in other countries do not influence the measure is to limit the
sample to include only priority filings. This smaller sample leads to a weak instrument problem, however, and
does not permit a reliable estimation, although the estimated effect is of a similar magnitude. Interestingly,
the first stage improves if the sample is restricted further to include only Amadeus-PATSTAT matches above a
matching score of 0.995 (the F statistic is 6.36) and the magnitude of the effect increases to about 3.5, which
is significant at the 10% level. The cutoff for the matching score presents a tradeoff between sample size and
matching accuracy. Qualitatively, however, the results are robust to selecting different cutoffs and 0.995 in
particular leads to similar results with the sample used in Table 2.2 as well.
35This result alleviates a concern that has been raised in conversations with scientists at an innovation
consultancy: Firms may be more likely to split inventions into multiple patents under increased competition
in order to create patent thickets. Note also that simply increasing the number of patents would not bias the
results, since only the frequency of terms, but not their absolute number, affects the measure. A bias could result
if the additional patents, into which a given invention is split, are filed in different years. If this were the case,
however, a positive correlation between more patenting and higher similarity would be expected.
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merely avoided filing patents for large innovations without R&D adjustments, however, a
decrease in the number of patents would be expected, contradicting the evidence. Moreover,
the results below suggest that an initial focus on more incremental research increases sales
under import competition. Note that Arora et al. (2015) conclude that their observations are
not the result of a change in publication practices either.36
Appendix B.5.5 demonstrates the robustness of the results to variations in the methods used
for text analysis.
Change of Firm Behavior or Firm Selection?
While the theoretical model keeps the number of firms constant and assumes that only
their endogenous choice of R&D investments in different types of innovation is affected by
competition, an overall causal relationship between competition and smaller step innovation
in markets might as well be caused by an effect on the survival probability for firms with
different, but fixed, R&D allocations. The previous estimation has identified a change in
innovation for surviving firms (and which have continued to file patents). Of course, the
two effects are not mutually exclusive and it is therefore interesting to explore whether the
selection effect seems to play a role as well, when European firms’ competition with Chinese
exporters intensifies. Following Bloom et al. (2016), I combine their data with my similarity
measures to estimate the change in various outcomes for firms previously working on different
types of innovation. The absence of the probability of survival itself as an outcome in Table 2.3
is due to the fact that almost all of the firms in the sample survived. The sample of firms
used here is larger than in the previous estimations as only a measure for initial similarity is
needed, but not for current similarity. Nonetheless, this requirement limits the sample to (at
36While Arora et al. (2015) only make the binary distinction between scientific publications and patents,
their finding that Chinese import competition is associated with lower stock market valuation of a firm’s
journal publications is consistent with my finding on sales. Their results on patents, however, merely confirm
the increase observed by Bloom et al. (2016), but cannot draw a finer distinction between equally protected
intellectual property in patents. Another explanation for the trend away from scientific publications proposed
by Arora et al. (2015) is a decrease in firm scope, making applied research relatively more valuable. While these
changes may play a role in the general trend, my results do not suggest that they are the channel through which
import competition affects R&D. A firm which has previously patented in three areas and, after an increase
in competition, continues patenting in just one of them, would have a lower similarity measure than a firm
continuing in the three areas. Also, I do not find a significant shift towards more similar research within firms’
main industries, while if peripheral research areas were discontinued, this might be expected.
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least initially) innovative firms with sufficient patents for the construction of the similarity
measures.
Table 2.3 reports the results of estimating the following equation with 2SLS (where the addi-
tional instrumental variable for the interaction term is the interaction of the initial conditions
instrument with initial similarity):
∆outcomei j kt =β1∆ShareImChinai j kt +β2(similarityi j kt−5 ·∆ShareImChinai j kt ) (2.11)
+β3similarityi j kt−5+∆ ft +εi j kt ,
where the dependent variable is the five-year log-difference of five economic outcomes for
the firms in the sample: employment, patent filings, new products, sales and total factor
productivity. The coefficient β2 estimates the differential effect of an increase in the share of
Chinese imports and firms with a higher initial similarity score (where own patents are the
comparison group).
Despite the larger sample, most of the coefficients of interest (belonging to the interaction
term) are insignificant. This suggests that the main effect of increased import competition is
on existing firms’ behavior rather than on the economic outcomes for firms with potentially
hard to adjust R&D strategies.
In Table 2.3, the largest coefficient is on sales, which are positively affected under increased
competition for firms whose initial research has been more incremental. This positive effect
on sales is significant at the 10% level and consistent with the model: A firm whose research
has been more incremental benefits from the increased private economic value after an
increase in competition. The small steps allow the firm to more easily steal business from
foreign competitors or, presumably more likely in the setting of Chinese import competition
in Europe, enable it to better protect its market share.
Table 2.3 does not adjust for multiple hypothesis testing. Adjustments like Holm (1979) or
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) would lead to the conclusion that none of the null hypotheses,
that the outcomes are not affected by the interaction term, could be rejected at conventional
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Table 2.3: Initial Similarity and Various Economic Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Empl. Pat. New products Sales TFP
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 0.873 0.899 -1.846 -3.690** -1.415
(1.315) (1.728) (1.422) (1.542) (1.584)
Similarity ·∆ ShareImChina -1.447 1.843 0.523 6.288* 6.229
(3.036) (4.311) (2.223) (3.298) (4.770)
Similarity -0.030 0.083 -0.029 -0.186 -0.125
(0.117) (0.161) (0.082) (0.122) (0.146)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 659 591 807 489 243
SIC4 175 167 176 154 110
SIC3 92 91 89 84 62
SIC2 20 19 20 19 18
N 1524 1299 1945 1005 500
Notes: These regressions estimate the effect of initial R&D’s similarity measure (based on a comparison
to a firm’s own patents) and its interaction with Chinese import competition on five different economic
outcomes, again using the initial conditions instrumental variable in 2SLS estimation. The dependent
variables in columns 1 to 5 are the five-year log-differences in employment, patent filings, new
products, sales and total factor productivity, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit
SIC level. The data are from PATSTAT, Bloom et al. (2016) and Peruzzi et al. (2014).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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significance levels. Note, however, that these economic outcomes are not independent, such
that the dependence structure of the p-values is also likely to be far from independence
(Romano et al., 2010). For instance, the Bonferroni correction may thus be viewed as too
conservative. In particular, this dependence of outcomes even holds mechanically for the
similarity measures, which is why no adjustment is made in Table 2.2. Correcting for the five
hypotheses associated with the different similarity measures, the effect of competition on
similarity to a firm’s own previous patents would still be significant at the 5% level with the
aforementioned procedures or the Bonferroni method.
Innovation Type and Forward Citations
The preferred measure of the type of corporate innovation in this study is based on latent
semantic analysis of patent abstracts. This measure is capable of capturing a patent’s position
in technology space more precisely than traditional technological classifications, as it adjusts
to new words and concepts and can continuously measure a patent’s closeness to these
concepts. While such text-based measures are increasingly employed in the literature in
general (e.g. for industry classification in Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, or to measure uncertainty
in Baker et al., 2016) and in research using patent data in particular thanks to increasing
computational power, their calculation and interpretation is often less straightforward than
traditional measures based on citations. Much of the literature has captured the heterogeneity
between patents, e.g. in terms of economic value, using the number of citations or more
sophisticated measures based on the network of citations.
This section studies the effect of Chinese import competition on the simple and arguably most
popular measure of a patent’s characteristics, which is the number of times a patent is cited by
later patents (i.e., forward citations). This measure has been found to be a good proxy of the
value of patents (e.g. Harhoff et al., 1999).37 However, this study is not about the differences
in firms’ ability to produce valuable innovations, but about the type of innovations they aim
to produce, which in the model is understood as a choice variable that may be determined
37As mentioned above, while the similarity measure for a given patent application is fixed at the time of filing,
the value of a patent and its forward citations may be affected by competition later on. Nonetheless, forward
citations are likely to contain significant information about the quality of an invention and are frequently used
in the literature as such.
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by an R&D strategy that is adjusted to product market conditions. Therefore the outcome
variable is the five-year difference in the position of a firm’s average patent in the citation
distribution. These variables can also be interpreted as changes in the share of a firm’s patents
at the respective positions in the citation distribution and they replace the outcome variable
in Equation 2.10. The first dependent variable in Table 2.4 is an indicator which is one if a
patent has never been cited and zero otherwise. The second dependent variable (in columns
3 and 4) is an indicator for patents which are approximately in the middle 50% of the citation
distribution. The last two columns test whether a firm’s average patent is more likely to be
in the top quartile of citations when Chinese import competition increases. Table 2.4 shows
that the increase in never cited patents as a result of increased Chinese import competition
(again using the initial conditions IV) is highly significant. The negative effect on patents in
the middle of the citation distribution is significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the effect of
competition on the chance of a firm’s average patent being among the top 25% most cited is
negative, although not statistically significant.
Overall, the signs of the coefficients are consistent with a shift towards lower value patents
as a result of higher competition. Import competition leads firms to produce more patents
that are never cited and fewer patents with many citations. This is in line with the idea that
firms adjust their R&D strategy towards more incremental and lower risk research, leading
more likely to patentable innovations, but producing fewer breakthroughs. Controlling for
the initial number of patents does not change the results qualitatively in the even-numbered
columns.
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Table 2.4: Effect on Forward Citations of Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ not cited ∆ not cited ∆middle 50% ∆middle 50% ∆ top 25% cit. ∆ top 25% cit.
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.176*** 1.182*** -0.664** -0.661** -0.512 -0.521
(0.407) (0.407) (0.280) (0.277) (0.500) (0.499)
∆ ln(patents+1) -0.005 -0.002 0.007
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 571 571 571 571 571 571
SIC4 159 159 159 159 159 159
SIC3 83 83 83 83 83 83
SIC2 19 19 19 19 19 19
N 1171 1171 1171 1171 1171 1171
Notes: The dependent variables are the five-year differences in the position of a firm’s average patent
in the distribution of forward citations. All columns include year fixed effects and the even-numbered
columns control for the five-year change in patenting. The first two columns estimate the change
in never cited patents and columns 3 and 4 the change in patents in the middle 50% of the citation
distribution. The last two columns show the change in patents in the top 25% of the distribution. The
model is estimated with two-stage least squares using Bloom et al.’s (2016) initial conditions variable
to instrument for the increase in Chinese import competition. Standard errors are clustered at the
four-digit SIC level. The data are from PATSTAT, Bloom et al. (2016) and Peruzzi et al. (2014).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.4 Conclusion
This study explores the link between product market competition and the type of corporate
innovation. The literature has suggested intensified competition due to globalization as a
potential cause of the shift towards less risky innovation that has been observed over the
last decades (Arora et al., 2015). Building on existing models of competition and innova-
tion (Aghion et al., 2001, 2005), a fundamental difference in the incentives for drastic and
non-drastic innovation is shown to imply a shift towards a reduced share of large steps as
competition increases. A decrease in pre-innovation profits due to more intense competition
increases incentives for both types of innovation. However, only for small innovations do
post-innovation profits increase as well and thereby increase incentives to invest more than
for large innovation. Post-innovation profits for large innovations are constant due to the
fact that they lead to a monopoly position (following the definition for drastic innovation in
Tirole, 1988), i.e., the technological difference between leader and follower is so large that
competition policy, which makes it easier for firms to steal business from the other, has no
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effect, since the competitor no longer operates in the market. The endogenous choice of
investments in these two different types of innovation technologies is shown to be compatible
with an inverted-U relationship between competition and total innovation. The maximum
absolute level of large (small) innovation will occur at a lower (higher) level of competition
than the maximum of total innovation. The abstract parameter representing competition
in the model may be interpreted as a reflection of various policies affecting competition,
such as antitrust policy, standardization of technologies (e.g. chargers for devices such as
mobile phones or electric cars from different manufacturers) or the extent to which barriers
to international trade exist.
The empirical part of this chapter develops a novel measure of the type of innovation a firm
produces. Using latent semantic analysis, a firm’s patents are compared to its own previous
patents, the industry’s previous patents or all patents. Similarity to this previous research is
interpreted as the extent to which the research is incremental, i.e., the higher the similarity
measure for a firm’s new patent filings, the lower the share of large step innovation. This
measure is used to identify the causal effect of an increase in competition in an important,
albeit particular, setting: the impact of Chinese import competition on European firms’ R&D.
Following Bloom et al. (2016), I use instrumental variable regressions to estimate the effect
of a change in Chinese import competition on the change in the similarity measure of a
firm. The shift towards more incremental innovation caused by an increase in competition
is confirmed in the data. Furthermore, the interpretation of the model as an adjustment of
firms’ investment behavior, rather than of the types of firms that remain in the market, is
supported by the empirical results. Effects on outcomes for firms with different initial R&D
are mostly insignificant, but provide suggestive evidence for an increased private value of
incremental innovations, as predicted by the model.
Further studies are needed to estimate the causal relationship between competition and the
type of corporate R&D in additional settings. For example, an understanding of the role of
mergers and acquisitions as well as standardization in this relationship would be relevant for
policy makers.
Depending on the social value, and in particular the positive externalities, of small and large
step innovation, the socially optimal policy may not maximize the number of innovations, but
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should attach different weight to each type. Future research may clarify the optimal policy by
estimating differences in the appropriability of different types of innovation and in their social
value. Combining novel measures of innovation type with stock market reactions to patent
grants of assignees and of their competitors (Kogan et al., 2017) may be a promising way to
estimate their private and social values.38 Such an approach may also be able to identify
differential changes in these values after changes in competition.
The evaluation of policies affecting competition with respect to innovation is usually limited
to the amount of innovation. By revealing a distortion towards more incremental innovation
with increasing competition, this study has uncovered a hidden cost of lowering product
market prices in this way, that may be overlooked with traditional measures of innovation.
Depending on the differences in externalities of different innovation types, this cost may be
substantial. In addition, a comprehensive welfare analysis also needs to take into account that
corporate R&D is not the only source of technological progress. Hence, the relative strengths
of public and private organizations at producing different types of innovations and the extent
of spillovers also have to be considered in the optimal policy.
38Note that stock market reactions can capture only the “social value” for firms, but exclude consumer surplus,
such that additional proxy measures of broader externalities could be included, especially when estimating




Antitrust, Patents, and Cumulative
Innovation:
Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree*
3.1 Introduction
Innovation is a key driver of economic growth. One of the main instruments governments use
to foster innovation is the patent system. A patent gives the right to exclude others from using
the patented inventions in order to stimulate innovation. However, there is a growing concern
that dominant companies might use patents strategically to deny potential entrants, often
small technology-oriented start-ups, access to key technologies in an attempt to foreclose
the market.1 As start-ups are thought to generate more radical innovations than incumbents,
market foreclosure may harm technological progress and economic growth (Baker, 2012).2 To
address this problem many critics call for antitrust policies as a remedy (Wu, 2012; Waller and
*This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Watzinger, Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer.
1Derek Thompson, “America’s Monopoly Problem”, The Atlantic, October 2016; Robert B. Reich, “Big Tech
Has Become Way Too Powerful,” The New York Times, September 18, 2015, p. SR3; Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro
“Breaking up Big Tech Would Harm Consumer,” The New York Times, September 28, 2015, p. A24; Thomas Catan
“When Patent, Antitrust Worlds Collide,” Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2011.
2For example, Akcigit and Kerr (2010) show that start-ups do more explorative research and Foster et al.
(2006) show that in the retail sector the fast pace of entry and exit is associated with productivity-enhancing
creative destruction.
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Sag, 2014). Yet, up to now there are no empirical studies showing that antitrust enforcement
can effectively promote innovation.
In this study we investigate whether patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for follow-on
innovation, and if so, whether antitrust enforcement in the form of compulsory licensing of
patents provides an effective remedy. We advance on these questions by analyzing the effects
of one of the most important antitrust rulings in U.S. history: The 1956 consent decree against
the Bell System. This decree settled a seven-year old antitrust lawsuit that sought to break up
the Bell System, the dominant provider of telecommunications services in the U.S., because
it allegedly monopolized “the manufacture, distribution, and sale of telephones, telephone
apparatus and equipment” (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p.1668). Bell was charged with
having foreclosed competitors from the market for telecommunications equipment because
its operating companies had exclusive supply contracts with its manufacturing subsidiary
Western Electric and because it used exclusionary practices such as the refusal to license its
patents.
The consent decree contained two main remedies. The Bell System was obligated to license
all its patents royalty-free and it was barred from entering any industry other than telecom-
munications. As a consequence, 7,820 patents or 1.3% of all unexpired U.S. patents in a wide
range of fields became freely available in 1956. Most of these patents covered technologies
from the Bell Laboratories (Bell Labs), the research subsidiary of the Bell System, arguably
the most innovative industrial laboratory in the world at the time. The Bell Labs produced
path-breaking innovations in telecommunications such as the cellular telephone technology
or the first transatlantic telephone cable. But more than half of its patents were outside the
field of telecommunications because of Bell’s part in the war effort in World War II and its
commitment to basic science. Researchers at Bell Labs are credited for the invention of the
transistor, the solar cell, and the laser, among other things.
The Bell case is uniquely suited to investigate the effects of compulsory licensing as an
antitrust measure for two reasons: First, it allows to study the effects of compulsory licensing
without any confounding changes in the market structure. In compulsory licensing cases,
antitrust authorities usually impose structural remedies such as divestitures, which makes
it difficult to separate the innovation effects of changes in the market structure from the
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innovation effects of changes in the licensing regime. Yet, in the case of Bell no structural
remedies were imposed, despite the original intent of the Department of Justice. This was due
to the intense lobbying of the Department of Defense as Bell was considered vital for national
defense purposes.
Second, Bell’s broad patent portfolio enables us to measure the effect of compulsory licensing
on follow-on innovation in different competitive settings. 42% of Bell’s patents were related to
the telecommunications industry. In this industry, Bell was a vertically integrated monopolist
who allegedly foreclosed rivals. The remaining 58% of Bell’s patent portfolio had its main
application outside of telecommunications. In these industries, Bell was not an active market
participant. By looking at the differential effects of compulsory licensing inside and outside
of the telecommunications industry we can distinguish the effects of potential foreclosure of
patents and of potential bargaining failures that are inherent in the patent system.
Our analysis shows that compulsory licensing increased follow-on innovation that builds on
Bell patents. This effect is driven mainly by young and small companies. But the positive ef-
fects of compulsory licensing were restricted to industries other than the telecommunications
equipment industry. This suggests that Bell continued to foreclose the telecommunications
market even after the consent decree took effect. Thus, compulsory licensing without struc-
tural remedies appears to be an ineffective remedy for market foreclosure. The increase
of follow-on innovation by small and young companies is in line with the hypothesis that
patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for innovation because they can act as a barrier
to entry for small and young companies who are less able to strike licensing deals than large
firms (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Galasso, 2012). Compulsory licensing removed this
barrier in markets outside the telecommunications industry, arguably unintentionally so.
This fostered follow-on innovation by young and small companies and contributed to the
long run technological progress in the U.S.
Looking at the results in more detail, we first consider the effect of compulsory licensing on
innovations that build on Bell patents. We measure follow-on innovation by the number of
patent citations Bell Labs patents received from other companies that patent in the U.S. We
find that in the first five years follow-on innovation increased by 17% or a total of around 1,000
citations. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the additional patents other compa-
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nies filed as a direct result of the consent decree had a value of up to $5.7 billion in today’s
dollars. More than two-thirds of the increase is driven by young and small companies and
individual inventors unrelated to Bell. Start-ups and individual inventors increase follow-on
innovation by 32% while for large and old companies the increase is only around 6%. Robust-
ness checks show that the increase in follow-on innovation is not driven by simultaneous
contemporary shocks to technologies in which Bell was active or by citation substitution.
The increase in follow-on innovation by other companies is accompanied by a decrease in
follow-on innovation by Bell, but this negative effect is not large enough to dominate the
positive effect on patenting by others. The limited negative response by Bell is most likely
due to the fact that at the time of the consent decree, Bell was a regulated monopolist subject
to rate of return regulation. Yet, the consent decree changed the direction of Bell’s research.
Bell shifted its research program to focus more on telecommunications research, the only
business Bell was allowed to be active in.
In a second step we split the increase in follow-on innovation by industry. We do not find
any increase in innovation in the telecommunications industry, the aim of the regulatory
intervention. Compulsory licensing fostered innovation only outside of the telecommuni-
cations industry. This pattern is consistent with historical records that Bell continued to
use exclusionary practices after the consent decree took effect and that these exclusionary
practices impeded innovation (Wu, 2012). As no structural remedies were imposed Bell con-
tinued to control not only the production of telephone equipment but was - in the form of
the Bell operating companies - also its own customer. This made competing with Bell in
the telecommunications equipment market unattractive even after compulsory licensing
facilitated access to Bell’s technology. For example, the Bell operating companies refused to
connect any telephone that was not produced by Western Electric, the manufacturing sub-
sidary of the Bell System (Temin and Galambos, 1987, p.222). In other industries, compulsory
licensing was effective to foster innovation by young and small companies since Bell as the
supplier of technology did not control the product markets through vertical integration or via
exclusive contracts.
Although the 1956 consent decree was not effective in ending market foreclosure, it perma-
nently increased the scale of U.S. innovation. In the first five years alone, the number of
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patents increased by 25% in fields with compulsorily licensed patents compared to techno-
logically similar fields without; and it continued to increase thereafter. This increase is again
driven by small and new companies outside the telecommunications industry. We find only a
small increase in patents related to the production of telecommunications equipment. This
indicates that market foreclosure may slow down technological progress and suggests that
antitrust enforcement can have an impact on the long-run rate of technological change. In an
in-depth case study we also show that the antitrust lawsuit led to a quicker diffusion of the
transistor technology, one of the few general purpose technologies of the post-World War II
period.
We contribute to the literature by being the first to empirically investigate the effect of antitrust
enforcement on innovation. Our results suggest that foreclosure impedes innovation and that
compulsory licensing without structural remedies is not sufficient to overcome foreclosure.
Access to technology through compulsory licensing alone does not stimulate market entry
and innovation unless there is sufficient access to the product market as well. These insights
are relevant not only for antitrust cases about abuse of a dominant market position, such as
the Bell case, but also for merger and acquisition cases where compulsory licensing is often
used as a remedy when mergers are approved. Our empirical findings support theoretical
arguments in the antitrust literature suggesting that to increase innovation, antitrust measures
should focus on exclusionary practices and the protection of start-ups (Segal and Whinston,
2007; Baker, 2012; Wu, 2012).
We also contribute to the literature on intellectual property by providing robust causal evi-
dence for the negative effects of patents on follow-on innovation of small and young compa-
nies. Our estimate of an increase in follow-on innovation by 17% is significantly smaller than
the increase reported by Galasso and Schankerman (2015b). They study the innovation effect
of litigated and invalidated patents and find an increase of 50%.3 While our study looks mainly
at patents in the electronics and computer industry, Sampat and Williams (2015) consider
gene patents and find no effect on follow-on research. The size of our measured effects is
consistent with that reported by other studies such as Murray and Stern (2007) and Moser
3Litigated patents are selected by importance and by the virtue of having a challenger in court. Thus, the
blocking effects of these particular patents might be larger than the average effect for the broad cross-section of
patents.
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and Voena (2012). They study various measures of follow-on innovation and report an overall
impact of a patent removal of about 10-20% in biotech and chemistry. Our finding of entry
of companies as the main mechanism driving the positive innovation effects of compulsory
licensing is consistent with Galasso and Schankerman (2015b). They show that the increase in
citations can be attributed to small companies citing invalidated patents of large companies.
Finally, this study contributes to our understanding of innovation and growth in the United
States in the 20th century. By providing free state-of-the-art technology to all U.S. companies,
compulsory licensing increased U.S. innovation because it opened up new markets for a large
number of entrants. This interpretation is consistent with theoretical concepts and historical
accounts. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) show theoretically that compulsory licensing can
foster innovation because it enables more companies to compete for becoming the leader
in an industry.4 In line with this idea, Gordon Moore, the co-founder of Intel, stated that
“One of the most important developments for the commercial semiconductor industry (...)
was the antitrust suit filed against [the Bell System] in 1949 (...) which allowed the merchant
semiconductor industry ‘to really get started’ in the United States (...) [T]here is a direct
connection between the liberal licensing policies of Bell Labs and people such as Gordon Teal
leaving Bell Labs to start Texas Instruments and William Shockley doing the same thing to
start, with the support of Beckman Instruments, Shockley Semiconductor in Palo Alto. This
(...) started the growth of Silicon Valley” (Wessner et al., 2001, p. 86) Similarly, Peter Grindley
and David Teece opined that “[AT&T’s licensing policy shaped by antitrust policy] remains
one of the most unheralded contributions to economic development – possibly far exceeding
the Marshall plan in terms of wealth generation it established abroad and in the United States“
(Grindley and Teece, 1997).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the antitrust law-
suit against Bell and the consent decree. In Section 3.3 we describe the data and the empirical
strategy. In Section 3.4 we show that compulsory licensing increased follow-on innovation
and conduct robustness checks. In Section 3.5 we examine the effectiveness of compulsory
4In the model of Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), compulsory licensing also makes innovation less profitable
because leaders are replaced more quickly. In the case of Bell, compulsory licensing was selectively applied
to only one company which was not active in the newly created industries. This suggests that there was no
disincentive effect and that our empirical set-up cleanly measures the effects of an increase in competition on
innovation.
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licensing as an antitrust measure against foreclosure in the market for telecommunications
equipment. In Section 3.6, we present the long run effects of the consent decree on U.S.
patenting. Section 3.7 presents a case study of the licensing of Bell’s transistor technology, the
defining general purpose technology of the 20th century. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Bell System and the Antitrust Lawsuit
In this section we describe the Bell System and the antitrust lawsuit against Bell. We then
discuss the unique features of the case that make it ideally suited for our empirical analysis.
3.2.1 The Bell System was a Vertically Integrated Monopolist
In 1956, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) was the dominant provider of telecom-
munications services in the U.S. Through its operating companies, it owned or controlled
98% of all the facilities providing long distance telephone services and 85% of all facilities
providing short distance telephone services. These operating companies bought all of their
equipment from Western Electric, the manufacturing subsidiary of AT&T. As a consequence,
Western Electric had a market share in excess of 90% in the production of telecommunica-
tions equipment. Western Electric produced telecommunications equipment based on the
research done by the Bell Laboratories, the research subsidiary of AT&T and Western Electric.
All these companies together were known as the Bell System, stressing its complete vertical
integration (Figure 3.1). In terms of assets, AT&T was by far the largest private corporation in
the world in 1956, employing 598,000 people with an operating revenue of $2.9 billion or 1%
of the U.S. GDP at the time (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.31).
The Bell System held patents on many key technologies in telecommunications, as well as a
large number of patents in many other fields. Between 1940 and 1970, Bell filed on average
∼543 patents or 1% of all U.S. patents each year (see Figure 3.2). More than 70% of the
patents protected inventions of the Bell Laboratories (Bell Labs), arguably the most innovative
industrial laboratory in the world at the time.
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The Bell Labs were unique in their commitment to basic research. When the Bell Labs were
founded in 1925, no one knew which part of science might yield insights for the problems of
electric communication (Rosenberg, 1990; Nelson, 1962). As a result, the Bell System decided
that - besides supporting the day-to-day need of the System - the Bell Labs would engage
in basic science, assuming it would eventually yield products for some part of the large Bell
System (Gertner, 2012; Nelson, 1959; Arora et al., 2015).5
The Bell Labs produced path-breaking basic and applied research. Scientists at Bell are cred-
ited for the development of radio astronomy (1932), the transistor (1947), cellular telephone
technology (1947), information theory (1948), solar cells (1954), the laser (1957), and the Unix
operating system (1969). The 1950 staff of Bell Labs alone consisted of four future Nobel
Laureates in physics, one Turing Award winner, five future U.S. National Medals of Science
5According to the first head of basic and applied research at Bell Labs, Harold Arnold, his department would
include “the field of physical and organical chemistry, of metallurgy, of magnetism, of electrical conduction,
of radiation, of electronics, of acoustics, of phonetics, of optics, of mathematics, of mechanics, and even of
physiology, of psychology and meteorology”. This broad focus led to major advances in basic science, but also to
a large number of unused patents. For example, an investigation of the FCC in 1934 reported that Bell owned or
controlled 9,255 patents but actively used only 4,225 covered inventions (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p.3842).
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Notes: This figure shows the number of Bell patents in different technology subcategories over time. The
subcategories aggregate the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) following the scheme of Hall et al. (2001). We
re-assign patents in the field of Optics to the Communication patents, as optics in the form of optical fiber played
a large role in the development of communication technology starting in the 1960s. Of the compulsorily licensed
patents published before January 1956 only 29 were in the field of Optics. The data are from the Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
recipients and 10 future IEEE Medals of Honor recipients. In 1950, Bell Labs employed 6,000
people, one third of whom were professional scientists and engineers (Nelson, 1962; Temin
and Galambos, 1987). This was 1% of the entire science and engineering workforce in the U.S.
at the time.6
3.2.2 The Antitrust Lawsuit
On January 14, 1949 the United States Government filed an antitrust lawsuit with the aim
to split AT&T from Western Electric.7 The complaint charged that Western Electric and
6According to the National Science Foundation, the number of workers in S&E occupations was 182,000 in
the U.S. in 1950. Source: https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/c3/c3h.htm (last accessed 30 August 2016).
7This account of facts follows largely the final report to the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House on the Bell
Consent Decree Program (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959).
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AT&T had been engaged in the monopolization of the manufacture, distribution and sale of
telecommunications equipment in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p.46). According to the complaint, Bell was closing the market to all other
buyers and sellers of telecommunications equipment by exclusionary practices including
exclusive contracts and the refusal to license patents.8
To correct this, the government sought three main remedies. First, Western Electric was to be
separated from AT&T, split into three competing companies, and to transfer all of its shares
of the research subsidiary Bell Laboratories to AT&T. Second, AT&T was to buy telephone
equipment only under competitive bidding and all exclusive contracts between AT&T and
Western were to be prohibited. Third, the Bell System was to be forced to license all its patents
for reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.33).9 Yet,
none of this would happen.
The case ended with a consent decree on January 24, 1956, containing two remedies: First, the
Bell System had to license all its patents issued prior to the decree royalty free to any applicant,
with the exception of RCA, General Electric and Westinghouse who already had cross licensing
agreements with Bell (the so called B-2 agreements). All subsequently published patents had
to be licensed for reasonable royalties. As a consequence of the consent decree, 7,820 patents
in 266 USPC technology classes and 35 technology subcategories (Figure C.1 in Appendix C.1)
or 1.3% of all unexpired U.S. patents became freely available. Second, the Bell System was
barred from engaging in any business other than telecommunications.
The decree was hailed by antitrust officials as a “major victory”, but already in 1957 the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives started
to investigate whether the decree of AT&T was in the public interest. The final report issued
in 1959 pulled the decree to pieces: “the consent decree entered in the A.T. & T. case stands
8For example, Bell allegedly forced competitors “engaged in the rendition of telephone service to acquire
AT&T patent license under threat of (...) patent infringement suits,” or refused “to issue patent licenses except
on condition” to be able to control the telephone manufacturer or by “refusing to authorize the manufacture
(...) of telephones (...) under patents controlled by (...) the Bell System” or by “refusing to make available to the
telegraphy industry the basic patents on the vacuum tube” that are essential for telegraphy to compete with
telephone or by refusing to purchase equipment “under patents which are not controlled by Western or AT&T,
which are known to be superior” (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p.3838).
9There were two minor remedies: First, AT&T was not to be allowed to direct the Bell operating companies
which equipment to purchase and second, all contracts that eliminated or restrained competition were to be
ceased.
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revealed as devoid of merit and ineffective as an instrument to accomplish the purposes of
the antitrust laws. The decree not only permits continued control by A.T. & T. of Western, it
fails to limit Western’s role as the exclusive supplier of equipment to the Bell System, thereby
continuing monopoly in the telephone equipment manufacturing industry.”
The hearings of the Senate subcommittee uncovered a timeline of cozy back and forth ne-
gotiations and intense lobbying by the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD intervened
on behalf of Bell because it relied on the research of the Bell Labs. In World War II, the Bell
Labs had been instrumental in inventing the superior radar systems of the Allies. They also
engaged in around a thousand different projects, from tank radio communications to enci-
phering machines for scrambling secret messages (Gertner, 2012, p.59 ff.).10 In the following
years, Bell Labs continued to work for the DoD, for example by operating the Sandia National
Laboratories, one of the main development facilities for nuclear weapons.
After the complaint was filed in January 1949, Bell sought and obtained a freeze of the antitrust
lawsuit in early 1952 with support of the DoD, on the grounds that Bell was necessary for
the war effort in Korea. In January 1953, after Dwight D. Eisenhower took office, Bell began
to lobby for the final dismissal of the case. The argument was that the Bell System was too
important for national defense and thus should be kept intact. The government followed this
argument and the Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. asked Bell to submit concessions
“with no real injury” that would be acceptable in order to settle (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959,
p.55)
In May 1954, AT&T presented and in June 1954 submitted to the Department of Justice a
checklist of concessions that would be an acceptable basis for a consent decree. The only
suggested major remedy was the compulsory licensing of all Bell patents for reasonable
royalties. To support its position, Charles Erwin Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, wrote
Herbert Brownell Jr., the Attorney General, a memorandum to the effect that the severance of
Western Electric from Bell would be “contrary to the vital interests of our nation” (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p. 56). In December 1955, the Department of Justice communicated
with AT&T that it was ready to consider a decree of the “general character suggested [by A. T.
10To highlight the engagement of Bell, we show in Figure C.2 in Appendix C.1.2 the patenting activity of Bell
in radar and cryptography during World War II.
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& T.] in its memorandum (...) dated June 4, 1954” (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.92). Bell
agreed.
3.2.3 Advantages of the Bell Case for the Empirical Set-Up
The Bell case has two characteristics that make it ideally suited to measure the innovation
effects of compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy.
First, the consent decree did not impose any structural remedies for the telecommunications
market. This allows us to isolate the innovation effect of compulsory licensing without any
confounding changes in market structure. The reason why the Department of Justice did not
impose any structural remedies is unclear. The final conclusion of the Antitrust Subcommittee
blamed the lack of intent of the Attorney General to pursue Bell and the intense lobbying of
the Department of Defense for the fact that no structural remedies were imposed (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p.292). In contrast, the presiding judge Stanley N. Barnes stated that
in his opinion it was enough to confine Bell to the regulated telecommunications market
in order to prevent excessive prices and to end the exclusion of other suppliers (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p.317).
Second, due to Bell Labs’ commitment to basic science and its role in the war effort, Bell held
a large number of patents unrelated to telecommunications, in industries in which it was not
an active market participant. This gives us the opportunity to measure how the innovation
effect of compulsory licensing depends on the market structure. In the telecommunications
industry, Bell was vertically integrated. Hence Bell was not only a dominant player in the
production of the technology used for telephone equipment, but it also controlled the produc-
tion of telephone equipment (Western Electric), as well as the product market for telephone
equipment through its operating companies. In all other industries, Bell was a supplier of
technology, but was not active in production. Even more, the consent decree explicitly banned
Bell from ever entering into these businesses which meant that it effectively preserved the
market structure inside and outside of the telecommunications industry.
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3661 Telephones and Telegraphs
3651 Audio and Video Equipment
3711 Motor Vehicles
Industries with <50 patents
3829 Measuring and Controlling







3357 Insulation Nonferrous Wire
3399 Primary Metal Products
8071 Medical Laboratories




2281 Yarn Spinning Mills
3599 Industrial Machinery
Notes: The pie chart shows the distribution of compulsorily licensed patents by most likely industry. We assign
patents to the most likely four-digit SIC industry using the data of Kerr (2008). The data are from the Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
To visualize the broad patent portfolio of Bell we use the data of Kerr (2008) to assign the most
likely four-digit SIC industry group to each USPC class (Figure 3.3).11 Around 42% of all Bell’s
patents have their most likely application in Bell’s core business of producing telephones
and telegraphs (SIC 3661). The remainder is spread across a large number of fields with an
emphasis on electronics and industrial commercial machinery and computer equipment.12
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
For our estimation, we use comprehensive patent data for the U.S. from the Worldwide Patent
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office. In this data, we identify all
11We thank Bill Kerr for sharing his data.
12In Figure C.1 in Appendix C.1.1 we show the compulsorily licensed patents split by technology subcategories
following Hall et al. (2001). Only 31% of all Bell patents are in the field of telecommunications and the remaining
patents are spread over 34 other subcategories.
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compulsorily licensed patents of the Bell System with a list of patent numbers published in
the “Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee” of the U.S. Congress on the consent decree
of Bell in May 1958 (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958).13
In an ideal world, we would compare the number of realized follow-on innovations building
on Bell patents with and without the consent decree. The problem is, however, that this is not
possible: First, a census of follow-on innovations does not exist and second, we can observe
only the state of the world in which the compulsory licensing of Bell patents happened but
not the counterfactual situation without the consent decree.
To measure follow-on innovations we use patent citations. Bell patents could be freely licensed
after the consent decree, but patents that built on licensed Bell patents still had to cite them.
Thus, we can use patent citations as a measure for follow-on innovations even though patents
had lost their power to exclude competitors (Williams, 2015). The advantage of this measure is
that, in contrast to most alternative measures such as new products or R&D spending, citations
are consistently available from 1947 onward.14 Citations have the additional advantage that
they have a high frequency which allows a precise measurement of effects. The caveat is
that some citations might have been added by the patent examiner, which adds noise to the
measure (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Alcacer et al., 2009).
To construct a counterfactual for the compulsorily licensed Bell patents we use as control
group all other patents that are published in the same year, that have the same total number
of citations as the Bell patents in the five years prior to 1949, and that are in the same USPC
technology class. By conditioning on the publication year and prior citations we control for
the fact that, on average, young and high quality patents are cited more often. By conditioning
on the same technology class we control for the number of companies that are active in the
same field (i.e., for the number of potential follow-on inventors) and for technology-specific
citation trends.
13The list is the complete list of all patents owned by the Bell System in January 1956. It also includes patents
of Typesetter Corp. which were explicitly excluded from compulsory licensing in Section X of the consent decree.
We assume that these patents are unaffected.
14In 1947 the USPTO started to publish citations of prior art on the front page of the patent (Alcacer et al.,
2009).The first patent to include prior art was issued on February 4, 1947. Yet, inventions were evaluated against
the prior art already since the passage of the Patent Act of 1836. Prior to 1947, however, the prior art was available
only from the “file history” of the issued patent, which is not contained in PATSTAT.
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We can interpret our results causally under the assumption that in the absence of the consent
decree the Bell patents would have received the same number of citations as the control
patents did (parallel trend assumption). More specifically, the identifying assumption is that
conditioning on the control variables removes any systematic difference in follow-on citations
between Bell and the control patents that is not due to compulsory licensing.
One potential concern about this identification strategy might be that the antitrust authorities
chose to compulsorily license Bell patents for a reason related to the potential of follow-on
research of these patents. According to the complaint and historical records, compulsory
licensing was imposed because Bell used patents to block competitors in the field of telecom-
munications equipment. So if blocking patents are also patents that in the absence of com-
pulsory licensing would have experienced particularly strong follow-on innovation then we
might overestimate the effect of the consent decree.
Yet, this does not appear to be likely. In the absence of compulsory licensing, Bell’s telecom-
munication patents would have continued to block competitors because the consent decree
did not contain any other remedies aimed at restoring competition. Consequently, it seems
fair to assume that blocking patents would have continued to receive the same number of
citations as the control patents that have the same number of citations in the five years prior
to 1949.
Furthermore, this concern obviously does not apply to the 58% of patents Bell held outside the
field of telecommunications. These patents were included in the compulsory licensing regime
of the consent decree not because they were blocking, but purely due to their association with
the Bell System. Hence, there is no reason to expect any confounding effects.
To strengthen the point that the parallel trend assumption is plausible, we show in Section
3.4.1 that the number of citations of Bell and control patents was the same before the terms of
the consent decree became known. In Section 3.4.3 we also show that companies that did not
benefit from compulsory licensing did not start to cite Bell patents more after the consent
decree. Thus, the control patents are a plausible counterfactual for patents both inside and
outside of telecommunications.
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Another concern might be that Bell’s patenting strategy may have changed after the complaint
became known. This is why we focus on patents published by 1949, the year the lawsuit
against Bell started. The consent decree stated that only patents published before 1956 were
to be compulsorily licensed. As a consequence of this cut-off date, more than 98% of the
patents affected by the consent decree were filed before 1953, and more than 82% earlier than
1949. This implies that the characteristics of the majority of the affected patents were fixed
before the Department of Justice filed its initial complaint. To be on the safe side, we use only
patents granted before 1949, but the results do not change when we use all patents affected
by the consent decree.
Out of the 7820 Bell patents affected by the consent decree, 4,731 patents were published
before 1949. For 4,533 of these patents (i.e., for 95.8%) we find in total 70,180 control patents
that fulfill the criteria specified above. In our empirical analysis, we use the weights of Iacus
et al. (2009) to account for the potentially different number of control patents per Bell patent.15
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics. In column 1 we report the summary statistics for all
patents published between 1939 to 1956. In column 2 we report the summary statistics of all
Bell patents that were published between 1939 and 1956 and hence affected by the compulsory
licensing rule. Patents published before 1939 had lost their patent protection by 1956 and were
therefore not affected by the consent decree. In column 3 we report the summary statistics
of the Bell patents published between 1939 and 1948. These are the patents that we use in
our baseline regression.16 They are affected by the consent decree but published before the
lawsuit started and hence unaffected by a potential patenting policy change the lawsuit may
have triggered.
The summary statistics of Bell patents differ from those of non-Bell patents. The average
non-Bell patent in our data set receives 3.3 citations per patent and 6.1% of these citations are
self-citations.17 Bell System patents published in the same time period on average receive 5.2
15Iacus et al. (2009) proposes to use a weight of 1 for the treatment variable and a weight of
NTr eatment ,Str at a/NContr ol ,Str at a ·NContr ol /NTr eatment where NContr ol is the number of control patents in the
sample, NContr ol ,Str at a is the number of control patents in a strata defined by the publication year, the USPC
primary class and the number of citations up to 1949. NTr eatment and NTr eatment ,Str at a are defined analogously.
Using these weights we arrive at an estimate for the average treatment effect on the treated.
16To make the statistics comparable for affected and not affected patents, we only consider technology classes
in which Bell is active.
17In the main part of our study we only use citations by U.S. patents. In the appendix we run one regression
with citations of patents filed in foreign jurisdictions.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Bell System Bell System Bell System
Affected Baseline Sample
mean mean mean
Filing Year 1944.5 1943.6 1940.6
Publication Year 1947.6 1946.5 1943.1
# Years in patent protection after 1956 8.6 7.5 4.1
Total cites 3.3 5.2 4.9
Citations by other companies 3.1 4.5 4.3
Self Citations 0.2 0.7 0.7
Citations by other companies prior to
1949
0.3 0.9 1.4
Observations 293578 7820 4731
Notes: The table reports the average filing and publication year, the average number of years until patent
expiration and citation statistics for patents published between 1939 and 1956. Column 1 includes all patents
of non-Bell System companies in technologies where a Bell System company published at least one patent.
Column 2 includes all Bell patents published between 1939 and 1956. Column 3 includes all Bell patents
published between 1939 and 1949, the baseline sample of most of our regressions. A citation is identified as a
self-cite if the applicant of the cited and citing patent is the same or if both patents belong to the Bell System.
The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
citations and 13.4% of these citations are self-citations.18 The numbers for the subsample
of Bell patents published until 1949 are very similar. They receive on average 4.9 citations of
which around 14.2% are self-citations.
3.4 Results: Compulsory Licensing Increased Follow-On In-
novation
Prior to the consent decree, Bell licensed its patents to other companies at royalty rates of 1%
- 6% of the net sales price. Lower rates applied if a cross-license was agreed upon (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1958, p. 2685). The consent decree lowered these rates to zero and made
licensing available without having to enter into a bargaining process with Bell. In this section
we estimate whether and if so by how much this compulsory licensing increased follow-on
innovations.
18Except when explicitly mentioned in the text we correct for self-citations in all our regressions because we
are mainly interested to which extent other companies built on Bell Labs patents.
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly excess citations of patents affected by the consent
decree ("Bell patents") relative to patents with the same publication year, in the same three-digit U. S. Patent
Classification (USPC) primary class and with the same number of citations up to 1949. To arrive at these
estimates we regress the number of citations in each year on an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
patent under consideration is affected by the consent decree, and year fixed effects (Equation 3.1). We correct for
self-citations. The dashed line represents the 90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficient. The sample
under consideration contains 4,533 Bell patents and 70,180 control patents. We cannot match 198 Bell patents
to control patents. To adjust for the different number of control patents per treatment patent in each stratum,
we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
3.4.1 Timing: The Consent Decree Increased Citations of Other Compa-
nies Starting in 1955
In this section, we estimate the impact of the compulsory licensing on citations looking at the
time period 1949-1970. We employ the following difference-in-differences specification:
#Ci t ati onsi ,t =α+βt ·Bel li +Y ear F Et +εi ,t (3.1)
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where #Ci t ati onsi ,t is the number of follow-on citations of other companies to patent i in
year t . Bel li indicates whether the patent i is owned by the Bell System and is therefore
treated. We also include fixed effects for each year (Y ear F Et ).
Figure 3.4 shows per year the estimated number of excess citations of Bell patents that were
granted before 1949 relative to control patents, βt in Equation 3.1. From 1949 to 1954, the
average number of citations of treatment and control patents track each other very closely,
speaking in favor of parallel trends in citations to Bell patents and to the control patents. In
1955, the average number of citations of other companies to Bell patents starts to increase and
it converges again in 1960; 1960 is the average expiration date of the Bell patents in our sample
(Table 3.1).19 The yearly coefficients from 1955 to 1960 are mostly significantly different from
zero at the 10 % level.20
The increase in citations depicted in Figure 3.4 does not start in 1956, the year of the consent
decree, but in 1955. This is plausible because on May 28, 1954, Bell already suggested a consent
decree including the compulsory licensing of Bell System patents as described in Section
3.2. Thus, both the Bell Laboratories and companies building on Bell’s patents could have
known that compulsory licensing was pending as early as May 1954 (Antitrust Subcommittee,
1959).21
This timeline is supported by the cumulative abnormal stock returns for AT&T stocks shown
in Figure 3.5.22 Up to the election of Dwight Eisenhower, cumulative abnormal returns
were centered around zero. At the beginning of 1954, cumulative abnormal returns strongly
increased to around 11%. The large uptick in March 1954 is exactly synchronized with the date
of a memorandum summarizing a meeting of the Attorney General and Bell management
about how to resolve the Bell case (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p. 1956). Shortly thereafter,
in May 1954, Bell proposed compulsory licensing as an acceptable remedy to settle the lawsuit.
There is no more persistent positive or negative change in the cumulative abnormal return
19From 1861 to 1994, the term of the patent was 17 years from issuance.
20In Appendix C.2.1 we graphically compare the average yearly number of citations to Bell and to control
patents and find the same results.
21The first media mentioning of the consent decree against Bell was on May 13, 1955 in the New York Times.
Public officials confirmed that top level negotiations are ongoing “looking towards a settlement of the AT&T
case”.
22The historical stock market data is from CRSP.
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative abnormal stock return of AT&T compared to other companies in the Dow
Jones index, beginning in January 1948. The events marked in the graph are the beginning of the antitrust lawsuit
on January 14, 1949, the presidential election on November 4, 1952, Bell’s proposal of compulsory licensing on
June 4, 1954, and the consent decree on January 25, 1956. The data are from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP).
until 1959. In particular, the consent decree itself in 1956 did not seem to have had any more
informational value.
We can also infer from Bell’s behavior that as early as the first half of 1955, compulsory
licensing was expected. According to the consent decree, all patents had to be licensed for
free if they were published before January 24, 1956. If they were published after this cut-off
date, they were licensed on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis. So starting from the
date when Bell became aware of the clause it had an incentive to delay the publication of its
patents beyond the cut-off date.
According to the data, Bell indeed started to delay its patents at the patent office beginning in
the first half of 1955. To pin down the date, we compare the propensity of a Bell patent to be
published with the propensity that control patents are published for a given filing year. In
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Figure 3.6, we show these hazard rates of publishing in a particular year for the filing years
1949 and 1953. For the filing year 1949, the publishing rates per year are very similar for Bell
patents and patents from other companies. If at all, Bell patents were published a bit earlier.
For the filing year 1953, this picture is reversed: Starting in the first half of 1955, Bell patents
had a significantly lower probability of being published. This is consistent with Bell trying
to delay the publications of its patents and having credible information about the general
outline of the consent decree in the first half of 1955 at the latest.
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Figure 3.6: Hazard Rates for Publication of Patents by Filing Year



















































Notes: These figures show the hazard rates for publication of patents that were filed by Bell (solid line) and others
(dotted line). Subfigure (a) shows hazard rates for patent applications filed in 1949, Subfigure (b) for applications
filed in 1953. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent
Office.
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3.4.2 Magnitude: The Consent Decree Increased Citations to Bell Patents
by 17%
We next present our baseline regression. To quantify the size of the effects of the consent
decree, we estimate the average yearly effect of the consent decree on citations of other
companies for the time period 1949-1960. We employ the following difference-in-differences
model:
#Ci t ati onsi ,t =β1 ·Bel li +β2 · I [1955−1960]+β3 ·Bel li · I [1955−1960]+εi ,t (3.2)
where I [1955−1960] is an indicator variable for the treatment period. We define the treatment
period as from 1955 to 1960 based on the yearly coefficients in Figure 3.4.
The results are reported in Table 3.2 column 1.23 In the treatment period, the consent decree
resulted in 0.020 additional citations. This implies that, on average, the consent decree in-
creased citations to Bell patents by other companies by 17% from 1955 to 1960.24 Considering
only the 4,731 patents published before 1949, this implies a total increase of 568 citations. If
we assume homogeneous effects for all 7,820 patents published up to 1956, the total number
of excess citations is 938. The effect is also positive and statistically significant if we include
all patents up to 1956, the year of the consent decree (column 2).
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the additional patents for other companies
directly induced by the consent decree had a total value of up to $5.7 billion. To calculate
this number we use estimates for the average dollar value derived from Kogan et al. (2017)
to weigh each citing patent.25 According to these estimates, each compulsorily licensed
patent created an additional value of $121,000 annually in the treatment period (column
3). Assuming homogeneous effects for all 7,820 patents in the treatment group, the consent
23Note that patents receive fewer citations post treatment because older patents in general receive fewer
citations than younger patents. See Figure C.3 in Appendix C.2.1
24To determine the percentage increase, we first calculate the number of citations Bell patents would have
received in the absence of the treatment (counterfactual), using the coefficients in Table 3.2 column 1. The
counterfactual is 0.115 (= 0.183−0.004−0.064). We then divide the treatment effect, 0.02, by the counterfactual
(0.02/0.115= 0.174).
25Kogan et al. (2017) measure the value of a patent using abnormal stock returns around the publishing date
of the patent. We use this data to calculate the average dollar value for a patent in each technology class and
publication year.
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decree led to around $5.7 billion in economic value over six years, between 1954 and 1960.
These calculations represent an upper bound because they assume that without the additional
citations induced by the consent decree the patent would not have been invented (i.e., that
the compulsorily licensed patent was strictly necessary for the citing invention).
The effect is measurable across the quality distribution of patents. We split all patents by
the number of citations a patent received in the first five years after publication and present
results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.2. We define a high-quality patent as a patent with at least
one citation before 1949 and a low-quality patent as a patent with no citations. The effect is
stronger for high quality patents, but the effect is also statistically significantly different from
zero for low quality patents. The effect is also not exclusively driven by the computer industry,
which was just about to start in 1956. In column 6, we report results when dropping all 491
Bell patents classified in the technology subcategories “Computer Hardware and Software”,
“Computer Peripherals” and “Information Storage” or “Others” (Hall et al., 2001) and find a
similar effect. The effect is also not driven by the concurrent consent decrees of IBM in 1956
or RCA in 1958. IBM and RCA were defendants in an antitrust case with compulsory licensing
as the outcome. We drop all citations from patents that also cite either the patents of RCA or
the patents of IBM and report the results in column 7.
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3.4.3 Robustness Check: No Increase in Citations by Untreated Compa-
nies
One concern for the estimation is that the effect of compulsory licensing on subsequent
citations might be driven by a shock that increased follow-on innovation to Bell patents and
was correlated with the consent decree. For example, the antitrust prosecutors might have
chosen to press for compulsory licensing because they expected that there would be many
follow-on innovations based on the high quality of the Bell’s patents.
To see whether this might have been the case we analyze the citation patterns of unaffected
companies to Bell patents and to the control patents. The 1956 consent decree singled
out three companies that were explicitly excluded from the free compulsory licensing of
Bell patents: the General Electric Company, Radio Corporation of America, and Westing-
house Electric Corporation. The reason was that these companies already had a general
cross-licensing agreement, the “B-2 agreements” dated July 1, 1932. A fourth company, the
International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), was also not affected by the decree as
it had a patent pool with Bell.
We repeat our baseline analysis but use only the citations of the B-2 companies (including
ITT) as the dependent variable and report the results in Figure 3.7 and column 2 of Table C.1
in Appendix C.2.2. We do not find any effect. This suggests that the consent decree did not
change the citation behavior of excluded companies and the measured effects are not due to
a common technology shock. As these companies in total make up 12% of all citations to Bell
patents, this null effect is not due to a lack of measurability.26
A second concern might be that due to the free availability of Bell technology, companies
substituted away from other, potentially more expensive technologies. In Appendix C.2.3 we
show the results of additional auxiliary analyses suggesting that the effects are not driven by
citation substitution.
26We repeat our analysis also for foreign companies, which could also use Bell patents for free but which
did not receive technical assistance, and report the results in Table C.1, column 3 in Appendix C.2.2. Similarly,
we repeat our analysis for companies that already had a licensing agreement in place and compare them with
companies without a licensing agreement (Table C.1, columns 4 and 5, Appendix C.2.2). As expected, we find
that the effects are smaller for firms that were less affected by the consent decree.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of Compulsory Licensing on Subsequent Citations Among Companies
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly excess citations by General Electric Company, Radio
Corporation of America and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the three companies exempt from the consent
decree, and by International Telephone and Telegraph Company, which already had a patent pool in place, of
patents affected ("Bell patents") relative to patents with the same publication year, in the same three-digit USPC
primary class and with the same number of citations up to 1949. To arrive at these estimates, we regress the
number of citations by the unaffected companies in each year on an indicator variable equal to one if the patent
under consideration is affected by the consent decree and year fixed effects. The dashed line represents the
90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficient. To adjust for the different number of control patents per
treatment patent in each stratum, we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). The data are from the
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
103
ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
Finally, in Appendix C.2.4 we vary the construction of control groups and show that our results
are not driven by the particular choice of matching variables.
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3.4.4 Robustness Check: The Decrease in Bell’s Own Patenting is Lower
than the Increase in Patenting by Other Companies
We next examine how Bell reacted to the consent decree. Bell might have reduced its inno-
vation activities by more than other companies increased their innovation activities, such
that the net effect of the consent decree would be negative. To see, whether this is the case
we measure whether Bell continued to produce follow-on innovations building on its own
patents.27 Results are reported in column 8 of Table 3.2. The number of self-citations shows
a decrease of 0.006 self-citations in the years between 1955 and 1960. This decrease is sta-
tistically significant, but is not large enough to dominate the increase in citations by other
companies. In column 9 we present the effect on total citations, i.e., citations by other compa-
nies and self-citations by Bell. We find that total citations increased by 0.016. This speaks in
favor of a net increase in innovation due to the consent decree.
Bell’s innovation output in terms of number of patents continued to grow in line with expecta-
tions in the years following the consent decree. To show this, we construct a synthetic Bell and
compare it with the actual patent output of the Bell System. To construct a synthetic Bell, we
first calculate the share of Bell’s patents of all patents in each technology subcategory for the
years 1946, 1947, and 1948. Then we assume that Bell’s growth would have been in line with
the growth of other companies that existed before 1949 in these technology subcategories
so that Bell would have held its share in each subcategory constant for the following years.
Results are presented in Figure 3.8a. It shows that Bell’s patenting is on average smaller than
the patenting of the synthetic control, but not by much.28
Bell’s continued investment in research was in line with the incentives the consent decree
and the regulators provided. The consent decree did not significantly alter the profitability of
new patents. The consent decree mandated that Bell could demand “reasonable” licensing
fees for all patents published after January 1956. The reasonable royalty rates Bell charged
27Self-citations are a measure for how much a company develops its own patents further (Akcigit and Kerr,
2010; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015a).
28In Figure C.5 in the Appendix C.2.5 we compare the patenting output of Bell with other control companies
and find that Bell’s patent growth is in line - but at the lower end - of similar companies. The only exception is
the growth of General Electric which is much larger, highlighting the problem of constructing a counterfactual
for a single company.
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Figure 3.8: Innovation and R&D in the Bell System After the Consent Decree












1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Filing year of the patent
Bell
Synthetic Bell






































1950 1955 1960 1965



































1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Filing year
Notes: Subfigure (a) shows the total number of patents filed by the Bell System compared to a synthetic Bell. To
construct the synthetic Bell, we calculate the share Bell’s patents had in each two-digit technology subcategory
relative to all patents of companies that had at least one patent before 1949. We then assume that in the absence
of the consent decree, Bell’s patenting would have grown in each subcategory at the same pace as the patenting
of all other companies. As a consequence, Bell’s share in each technology subcategory is held constant. In a last
step, we add the number of patents up to a yearly sum. Subfigure (b) shows the ratio of R&D expenditures relative
to total R&D of American Telephone & Telegraph. The data are from the annual reports of AT&T. Subfigure (c)
shows the share of patents related to communication relative to all patents filed by Bell. We define a patent as
related to communication if the most likely application is in the production of telecommunications equipment
(SIC 3661). In Appendix C.2.6 we show the change in direction using NBER subcategories. The patent data are
from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
106
ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
were not much different compared to the pre-decree royalties (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959,
p.111). The only difference was that Bell had to give a license to any applicant.
Bell also had little incentive to reduce investment in R&D because the Bell System was subject
to a rate of return regulation following the Communications Act of 1934. According to annual
reports, AT&T had a stable ratio of R&D to operating revenue of 0.5% from 1949 to 1960 (Figure
3.8b).29 For the entire Bell System, the share of R&D to total turnover stayed almost constant
at 2%-3% from 1966 to 1982 (Noll, 1987). However, the absolute level of R&D effort increased
as the Bell System grew. Operating revenues increased from $3.2 billion in 1950 to $5.3 billion
in 1955, to $7.3 billion in 1960 and to $11 billion in 1965, while the staff at Bell Labs grew from
6,000 in 1950, to 10,000 in 1955, to 12,000 in 1960 and 15,000 in 1965 (Temin and Galambos,
1987).
But even if the consent decree offered no incentive for Bell to downsize, it offered incentives
for Bell to redirect its research budget towards applications in the telecommunications field.
Prior to the consent decree, Bell could expand to other businesses. Afterward, Bell’s future was
bound to common carrier telecommunications. The company correspondingly refocused its
research program on its core business and increased its share of patents in fields related to
the production of telecommunications equipment (Figure 3.8c).
These results are consistent with the study of Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) on patent in-
validations. They show that large companies on average do not reduce follow-on innovations
significantly if they lose a patent due to litigation. The only exception is if the large company
loses a patent outside of its core-fields. Then it reduces innovation in the field of the patent
under consideration and reacts by redirecting future innovation to a different but related field.
3.4.5 Mechanism: Increase in Citations is Driven by Start-ups.
We next examine which type of company increases innovation after the compulsory licensing
and report the results in Table 3.3. We split citations by the type of the citing assignee. An
assignee is either a company or an individual inventor; an assignee is defined as young and
29We do not know whether the consolidated balance sheet also includes the Bell Laboratories and Western
Electric. It seems that at least some parts of the Bell System are not consolidated in the annual reports of AT&T.
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small if its first patent was filed less than 10 years before it cited the Bell patent and if it had
less than 10 patents before 1949.30 We first use the number of citations from young and small
assignees as the dependent variable and report the results in column 2. We then use the
citations of all other assignees that are not young and small and report the results in column 3.
In column 4 we look explicitly at small and young assignees that are companies (“start-ups”),
leaving out individual inventors.31
We find that the increase in follow-on innovation is predominantly driven by young and
small companies entering the market and by individual inventors. Young and small assignees
increase their citations after 1955 by an average of 0.014 citations (32%) while all others
increase their citations by 0.006 (6%) on average. Around 70% of the overall increase comes
from young and small assignees, but they are responsible for only one-third of all citations to
Bell patents (columns 2 and 3 in Table 3.3).32 Among the small and young assignees, start-
ups experience a particularly strong increase: they account for 50% of the total increase in
citations although they are responsible for only 18% of all citations (column 4).
These results suggest that patents act as a barrier to entry for start-ups and prevent their
follow-on innovation. They provide support for the hypothesis that the consent decree
reduced potential bargaining failures. Several prior studies suggest that small firms might not
have large enough patent portfolios to resolve disputes or to strike cross-licensing agreements
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Galasso, 2012; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015b). As
cross-licensing was a priority in the licensing strategy of Bell prior to the consent decree, a
small patent portfolio might have been a significant handicap for small inventors seeking a
license from Bell (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p. 2685).
One potential concern might be that the observed increase of citations by young and small
companies was driven not by the consent decree itself but by other changes at Bell Labora-
tories. Historical accounts suggest that there was an exodus of important Bell researchers
30In Appendix C.2.7 we use different definitions for young and small companies and find that the effect is
mainly driven by companies that file their first patent.
31We identify companies as all assignees that are never inventors. Our results are robust to defining companies
as having Inc., Corp., Co. or similar abbreviations in their name.
32Young and small assignees are responsible for an increase of 0.014 citations (column 2). This is 70% of the
total increase of 0.02 (column 1). It is also an increase of around 32% relative to what we would have expected
without a consent decree. According to the estimates a Bell patent should have received 0.044 citations (0.068 is
the constant, the Bell effect is -0.008, and the average decrease in citations in the post treatment period is -0.016)
but did receive 0.058 citations (0.044 baseline effect + 0.014 treatment effect).
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around the time of the consent decree. For example, in 1953 Gordon Teal, inventor of a
method to improve transistor performance, joined the then small Texas Instruments Inc.
Similarly, William Shockley, one of the inventors of the transistor, left Bell in 1956 to found
Shockley Semiconductors Laboratory.
To show that this is not the case, we separately look at patent citations by people who were
at some point associated with Bell, but later patented for a different company, including
their co-inventors, and compare with citations by all remaining unrelated inventors. In
our data, there are 4,477 former Bell employees with 28,569 patents. These people have in
total 12,068 co-inventors who were never active at Bell and who filed 87,148 patents in total.
The results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.3. We find a positive effect on the
citations of unrelated inventors and a negative effect on the citations of related inventors.
This pattern does not suggest that the increase in follow-on innovation was driven by former
Bell employees. However, the results do suggest that the Bell inventors had preferential access
to Bell technology prior to the consent decree and that there was a strong increase from
unrelated inventors afterwards.
3.5 Compulsory Licensing did not End Foreclosure in the Mar-
ket for Telecommunications Equipment
The aim of the consent decree was to end foreclosure in the market for telecommunications
equipment. According to the antitrust lawsuit, Bell was closing the market to all other buyers
and sellers of telecommunications equipment by using exclusive contracts between Western
Electric and the Bell operating companies and by refusing to license patents to competitors.
In markets outside of the telecommunications industry Bell was active only as a supplier of
technology but was not an active market participant.
Market foreclosure is thought to have a negative effect on the innovation activities of the
companies that are foreclosed (Baker, 2012; Wu, 2012). The argument is that foreclosed
companies cannot earn profits by selling their improved products directly to consumers. The
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only option they have is to sell their innovations to other companies.33 Thus, foreclosed
companies have lower incentives for innovation than companies with access to a customer
base.
In this section we compare the innovation effects of compulsory licensing inside and outside
of the telecommunications industry to infer whether market foreclosure is harmful for inno-
vation and whether compulsory licensing is effective in ending it. If compulsory licensing
increases innovation in the same way in all industries, then any difference between the two
competitive settings must be due to market foreclosure in the telecommunications indus-
try. If market foreclosure reduces innovation as argued above and if compulsory licensing
was effective in ending it, we should see a stronger increase in follow-on innovations in the
telecommunications industry than in other industries. In contrast, if compulsory licens-
ing was ineffective in ending market foreclosure, we should find a smaller effect. If market
foreclosure has no effect on innovation, we should find similar effects in all industries.
To compare the innovation effects within telecommunications and outside we first need
to characterize each citing patent by its closeness to the market for telecommunications
equipment. To do this, we use the concordance of Kerr (2008) that gives us the probability for
each USPC technology class that a patent in this technology class is used in the production
of telecommunications equipment (SIC 3661). We interpret this probability as a measure
of closeness to telecommunications. We then assign this probability to each citing patent
according to its technology class and sum up the citations for each level of likelihood to
construct a different dependent variable for each level of closeness, 26 altogether. In a last
step, we repeat our main regression for each level of closeness. We can thus estimate how
much the consent decree increased citations in markets that are close to the production of
telecommunications equipment and in markets unrelated to it.
In Figure 3.9 we show the average treatment effects estimated with our baseline model in
Equation 3.2 for different levels of closeness to the production of telecommunications equip-
ment. We find a strong negative relation between the closeness to telecommunications and
excess citations. Almost all excess citations come from patents that have nothing to do with
33Such a market for ideas exists only in special circumstances (Gans et al., 2002; Gans and Stern, 2003; Gans
et al., 2008).
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Notes: This figure shows results from a difference-in-differences estimation of the impact of the consent decree
on follow-on patent citations with 1949-1954 as the pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as the treatment period,
controlling for year fixed effects. We estimate Equation 3.2 and reportβ3 separately, using as dependent variables
citations from patents with a different relevance for the production of telecommunication equipment (SIC 3661 -
“Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus”). Relevance is measured by the likelihood that a patent is used in industry
SIC 3661 using the data of Kerr (2008). The size of the circle signifies the number of Bell patents in a technology
and a solid circle implies that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The data are from the Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Figure 3.10: Excess Citations by Patents According to the Most Likely SIC Industry Classifica-
tion
3651 Audio and Video Equipment
3711 Motor Vehicles
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Other industries < 50 patents
3629 Electrical Industrial Apparatus, Not Elsewhere Classified
3661 Telephones and Telegraphs
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# of Bell patents
Notes: This figure shows results from a difference-in-differences estimation of the impact of the consent decree
on follow-on innovation with 1949-1954 as the pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as the treatment period,
controlling for year fixed effects. As the dependent variable, we use all citations by companies other than the
filing companies classified by the most likely SIC classification of the citing patent. As control patents, we use all
patents that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary USPC technology class, and the
number of citations up to 1949. To classify a patent by its most likely industry, we use the data of Kerr (2008). We
assign to each USPC class the most likely four-digit SIC industry in which it is used. A solid circle indicates that a
coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT)
of the European Patent Office.
telecommunications. We conclude from this that follow-on innovation in telecommunica-
tions was not influenced by compulsory licensing. Under the assumption that compulsory
licensing affects innovation similarly in all industries this result supports the argument that
market foreclosure has a chilling effect on innovation and indicates that compulsory licensing
was ineffective in solving it.
Next, we use Kerr’s data to assign each citing patent to the industry in which it is most likely
used and repeat the baseline regression with citations from patents in different industries.
The results are shown in Figure 3.10. Almost all additional citations are from patents with the
most likely application outside of the industry “Telephones and Telegraphs” (SIC 3661). A
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large part of the effect is driven by unrelated industries such as “Measuring and Controlling,”
“Audio and Video Equipment” or “Motor Vehicles.”34 These results support the notion that
market foreclosure is harmful for innovation and that compulsory licensing is ineffective as a
remedy.35
Foreclosure seems to be particularly harmful for start-up innovation. In columns (7) and (8) of
Table 3.3 we show that small and young companies increased their citations only outside the
field of telecommunications, but not inside.36 As a large part of the effect in the full sample
was driven by small and young companies, this suggests that also start-ups react strongly to
market foreclosure. In fields outside of telecommunications, compulsory licensing fostered
innovation by small and young companies since Bell as the supplier of technology did not
control product markets through vertical integration or via exclusive contracts.
Our results suggest that market foreclosure stifles innovation and that compulsory licensing
is not sufficient to foster innovation without supporting structural remedies. This confirms
the general perception at the time of the lawsuit. Both the public and antitrust officials
were aware that because of Bell’s persistent monopoly compulsory licensing would only help
companies outside the telecommunications field. A witness in the congressional hearings put
it succinctly: “while patents are made available to independent equipment manufacturers, no
market for telephone equipment is supplied (...). It is rather a useless thing to be permitted
to manufacture under patent if there is no market in which you can sell the product on
which the patent is based.” The Antitrust Subcommittee concluded that “The patent and
technical information requirement have efficacy only so far as they permit independent
manufacturers to avail themselves of patents in fields that are unrelated to the common
carrier communication business carried on by the Bell System companies, and nothing more.”
On May 4, 1954, presiding Judge Stanley N. Barnes suggested that compulsory licensing policy
for reasonable rates is “only good window dressing” but would do no good because Western
34In the Appendix C.3.1 we repeat the analysis using NBER technology subcategories to classifiy the citing
patent. The results are the same.
35Another explanation for our null result in the telecommunications market would be that there was a lack
of innovation potential in the telecommunication sector after 1956. To rule out this hypothetical possibility
we compare the development of patents in the telecommunications sector. Results are reported in Figure C.9
in Appendix C.3.2. They show that the number of citations to Bell’s telecommunications patents had a similar
trend as patents outside of telecommunications and that the number of Bell’s newly filed telecommunications
patents shows no signs of abating after the consent decree.
36We use the most likely SIC code to determine the field of the citing patent.
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Electric had already “achieved an exclusive position (...) and liberal licensing would not permit
competitors to catch up” in the telecommunications business (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959,
pp. 108).
In the years after the consent decree, the Bell System faced repeated allegations of exclusionary
behavior. By the 1960s and 1970s, a range of new firms were eager to enter the telecommu-
nications market but Bell implemented measures to make it expensive or impossible (Wu,
2012). This led to a number of regulatory actions, for example forcing interconnections of
Bell’s telephone system to the entering competitors MCI in 1971 which provided long dis-
tance services using microwave towers (Temin and Galambos, 1987; Gertner, 2012, p. 272).
Eventually, the continued monopolization of the telecommunications market by Bell resulted
in the 1974 antitrust lawsuits. The lawsuit mirrored almost scene by scene the case of 1949.
Again Bell was charged with excluding competitors from the market of telecommunications
equipment. Again, the Department of Defense intervened on the grounds of national defense.
But the Reagan administration was not as accommodating as the Eisenhower administration
had been and the Department of Justice was keen on going after Bell. The case ended with
the break-up of the Bell System in 1983, opening up the market for telecommunications
equipment for competition.
3.6 The Consent Decree Increased U.S. Innovation in the Long
Run
The historical set-up of the Bell case gives us the opportunity to look also at the long-run
innovation effects of a consent decree. In the previous section we have shown that the increase
in follow-on citations is measurable for the first five years. This raises the question how lasting
the impact of a large-scale intervention in patent rights really is. To answer this question we
study the long-run impact of the case against Bell on the patent activities of firms patenting in
the U.S. More specifically, we examine the increase in the total number of patents in a USPC
technology subclass with a compulsorily licensed Bell patent relative to a subclass without.
We employ the following empirical model
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#Patent ss,t =βt · I (Bel l > 0)s +Contr ol s+εs,t (3.3)
where the outcome variable is the total number of patents in a technology subclass s (Moser
and Voena, 2012; Moser et al., 2014). The treatment variable equals one if there is at least one
compulsorily licensed patent in the technology subclass. As controls, we use USPC class-year
fixed effects.37 Our sample consists of 235 classes with 6,276 subclasses of which 1,209 are
treated.38
In Figure 3.11a we plot the number of excess patents for all patent classes. We leave out
patents by Bell to focus on patenting of other companies. Starting in 1953, the number
of patents in technology classes where Bell patents were compulsorily licensed increased
relative to subclasses without Bell patents, and it continued to do so beyond 1960, when the
last Bell patents affected by the consent decree expired. This suggests that the consent decree
increased U.S. innovation in the long run.
To quantify the effect we next estimate the average yearly effect of the consent decree on the
total number of patent applications for the time period 1949-1960. We employ the following
difference-in-differences model:
#Patent ss,t =β1 · I (Bel l > 0)s +β2 · I (Bel l > 0)s · I [1955−1960]+Contr ol s+εs,t (3.4)
where I (Bel l > 0)s is 1 if Bell has a patent in the subcategory s. As controls we use class-year
fixed effects.
The coefficients are reported in Table 3.4. In the first five years alone, patent applications
increased by 2.5 patent applications in treated classes (column 1). This is an increase of
37To follow the literature we use USPC technology classes here and not SIC classes.
38We exclude subclasses that did not have any patents at all before 1956 and we include only patent classes
that contain subclasses that were treated and subclasses that were not.
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Figure 3.11: Impact of the Consent Decree in the Long Run
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Notes: The dependent variable is the number of patent applications per (aggregated) subclass per year. A
subclass is treated if it contains at least one Bell patent that was subject to compulsory licensing. Subfigure
(a) shows annual treatment effects βt estimated with Equation 3.3 for all patent classes. Standard errors are
clustered at the class level. Subfigure (b) shows the average increase in the number of patents β2 estimated with
Equation 3.4 for patent classes with varying likelihood of being used in the production of telecommunications
equipment. To determine the likelihood that a patent is used in industry SIC 3661 we use the data of Kerr (2008).
The size of the circle signifies the number of Bell patents in a technology and a solid circle implies that the
coefficient is significant on the 10% level. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT)
of the European Patent Office.
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around 24.5%.39 Furthermore, patent applications by new companies entering the market
increased relatively more than patent applications by other companies (columns 2 and 3).40
The increase appears to be stronger outside of telecommunications technologies (column
4 and 5). In Figure 3.11b we plot the average treatment effects estimated with Equation 3.4
for different levels of closeness to the production of telecommunications equipment. Again
the effects are weak for technologies closely related to the production of telecommunications
equipment and strong for unrelated technologies. This again suggests that the fields in which
Bell continued to operate experienced slower technological progress than markets where
entry of start-ups was possible.
Figure 3.11a shows that the increase in patenting begins in 1953, two years before the increase
in citations to Bell patents. In 1953, Bell’s most important invention, the transistor, became
available for licensing, spurring the creation of the computer industry. To make sure that
the entire increase is not driven by this one exceptional invention, we analyze computer and
non-computer patents separately and report the results in columns 6 and 7 of Table 3.4. The
effect is stronger for the computer patents, but the increase in patenting is also significant
without any computer patent.
Thus, overall we find that the consent decree led to a long-lasting increase in the scale of
innovation mainly outside the telecommunications field. This is consistent with the theoreti-
cal argument by Acemoglu and Akcigit who build on the step-by-step innovation model of
Aghion et al. (2001) to analyze the effects of compulsory licensing on innovation (Acemoglu
and Akcigit, 2012). They consider the case where all current and future patents in the economy
are compulsorily licensed for a positive price and identify two main effects. On the one hand,
compulsory licensing helps technological laggards to catch up and brings more industries
to a state of intense competition. This ‘composition effect’ increases innovation, because
companies in industries with intense competition invest more in R&D in order to become
39Untreated subclasses have on average 2.17 patent applications in the pre-treatment period. In these
subclasses the number of patent applications increases by 0.52 from the pre- to the post-treatment period. Using
the estimate for the difference between treated and untreated classes, 7.5, in column 1 of Table 3.4, we calculate
the counterfactual number of applications in treated classes in the absence of compulsory licensing which is
equal to 10.19 (=7.5 + 2.17+0.52). The treatment effect is 2.5. Thus, the number of patents increased relative to
the counterfactual by 24.5% (=2.5/10.19).
40The number of patents of young and small companies increases by 38% while the number of patents of all
other companies increases by 18%.
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the industry leader. On the other hands, compulsory licensing reduces the time a technology
leader keeps its profitable position. This ‘disincentive effect’ reduces the innovation and
growth in the economy.
In our case, compulsory licensing was selectively applied to one company that did not par-
ticipate in any market other than the telecommunications market. This enabled many new
companies to enter markets with state-of-the art technology and to compete for the industry
leadership with full patent protection of future inventions intact (Holbrook et al., 2000). Thus
in all industries but the telecommunications industry we measure the pure composition effect
without the counteracting disincentive effect. The interpretation that the consent decree
helped to open up new markets and enabled new start-ups to compete is consistent with
historical accounts on the growth of electronics and computers industry in the 1950s and
1960s (Grindley and Teece, 1997).
3.7 Case Study: The Diffusion of the Transistor Technology
In this section we examine the diffusion of the transistor technology because it is a particu-
larly insightful case study for the mechanisms illustrated in the previous sections for three
reasons: First, in response to the antitrust lawsuit Bell started already in 1952 to license the
transistor technology via standardized non-discriminatory licensing contracts. This creates
an interesting variation in the timing of licensing. Second, transistor patents were expected to
be particularly important, hence we can estimate how the amount of follow-on innovation
varies with patent quality. And finally, under the impression of the antitrust lawsuit Bell was
very careful not to engage in exclusionary practices with its transistor patents. Thus, in 1956
the only change for the transistor technology was that the patents were now royalty free. This
allows us to examine the isolated impact of a decrease in royalties.
The transistor is arguably the most important invention of Bell Labs. As the most basic
element of modern computers, the transistor has been instrumental in the creation of entire
industries and its invention heralded the beginning of the information age. The invention of
the transistor earned John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley the Nobel Prize in
Physics in 1956. They filed patents in June 1948 and announced the invention on July 1 of the
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same year. The patents were published in 1950 and 1951. Bell, the military, and the research
community at large immediately understood the importance and value of the transistor.
Due to the ongoing antitrust lawsuit, Bell’s management was reluctant to draw attention to
its market power by charging high prices for transistor components or for licenses (Mowery,
2011). To appease the regulator, Bell’s top managers agreed to share and license the transistor
device with standardized non-discriminatory licensing contracts (Gertner, 2012, p.111). In
addition, Bell decided to actively promote the transistor by organizing conferences to explain
the technology. In April 1952, over 100 representatives from 40 companies gathered for a
nine-day Transistor Technology Symposium, including a visit to Western Electric’s transistor
manufacturing plant in Allentown, PA. After the conference, 30 companies decided to license
the transistor technology for a non-refundable advance payment of $25,000 (∼ $220,000 in
today’s dollars) that was credited against future royalty payments (Antitrust Subcommittee,
1958, p.2957). Royalty rates amounted to 5% of the net selling price of the transistor in 1950,
which were reduced to 2% in 1953 (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p. 117).
To be able to separately analyze the transistor we identify among the patents affected by the
consent decree all patents related to the original transistor inventor team. There are two main
transistor patents: Patent # 2,524,035 with the title “Three-Electrode Circuit Element Utilizing
Semiconductive Materials” granted in 1950 to John Bardeen and Walter Brattain and Patent #
2,569,347 with the title “Circuit Element Utilizing Semiconductive Material” issued to William
Shockley in 1951. To these two patents, we add all the patents of all researchers who actively
worked towards the development of the transistor at Bell Labs.41 Then we add all patents from
all co-authors. We identify 329 “transistor” patents affected by the consent decree (i.e., held by
Bell Labs). This sample is most likely a superset of all transistor patents. For example, it also
includes patent # 2,402,662 with the title “Light Sensitive Device” granted to Russell Ohl, the
original patent of the solar cell. The median publication year of the patents in the transistor
subsample is 1947; and 168 of these patents are also included in our baseline sample.
41Researchers whom we classify to have actively contributed to the transistor at Bell Labs were in alphabetical
order Bardeen, Bown, Brattain, Fletcher, Gardner Pfann, Gibney, Pearson, Morgan, Ohl, Scaff, Shockley, Sparks,
Teal and Theurer (e.g. Nelson, 1962).
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly excess citations of transistor-related patents affected by
the consent decree (“Bell patents”) relative to patents with the same publication year, in the same three-digit
USPC primary class and with the same number of citations up to 1951. We define Bell patents as transistor-
related if they are either one of the two main transistor patents (Patent # 2,524,035 or Patent # 2,569,347) or were
filed by inventors associated with these patents or their co-inventors. To arrive at these estimates, we regress the
number of citations in each year on an indicator variable that is equal to one if the patent under consideration is
affected by the consent decree and year fixed effects. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence bands for
the estimated coefficient. To adjust for the different number of control patents per treatment patent in each
stratum, we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
To be able to repeat our regressions in this subsample of transistor patents we extend our
baseline sample to patents published up to 1951. For our control group we now use patents
with the same number of pre-citations up to 1951 while all other criteria stay the same.
Figure 3.12 shows the yearly excess citations of transistor patents relative to control group
patents. The coefficient of 1952, which is not matched and is close to zero, speaks in favor
of parallel trends. The impact of licensing is measurable starting in 1953, and lasts for at
least 15 years. This suggests that standardized licensing had a positive impact on follow-on
innovation. The fact that the impact does not strongly increase in 1956 when the consent
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Table 3.5: The Transistor Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











Start treatment 1955 1953 1955 1955 1953 1955
Bell -0.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -0.4
(0.3) (1.2) (0.3) (0.5) (2.1) (0.5)
I(53/55-60) -5.7∗∗∗ -6.3∗∗ -5.6∗∗∗ -6.4∗∗∗ -7.4∗∗∗ -6.4∗∗∗
(0.7) (2.7) (0.7) (0.6) (2.2) (0.6)
Bell x I(53/55-60) 1.9∗∗∗ 8.0∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗ 2.0∗∗∗ 4.4∗ 2.0∗∗∗
(0.5) (3.7) (0.5) (0.6) (2.3) (0.6)
Constant 19.0∗∗∗ 23.0∗∗∗ 18.8∗∗∗ 18.3∗∗∗ 22.3∗∗∗ 18.1∗∗∗
(1.4) (3.2) (1.4) (1.2) (2.9) (1.2)
# treated 5758 204 5554 4533 168 4365
Clusters 239 65 237 225 58 223
Obs. 1035421 64891 1021733 896556 56664 886044
Notes: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation. As the dependent variable we
use all citations by companies other than the filing company. For the regression with the transistor patents, we
define the treatment period as starting in 1953; for the non-transistor patents we define the treatment period
as starting in 1955, as in our main regression in Equation 3.2. Bell is an indicator variable equal to one if a
patent is published by a Bell System company before 1949 and is therefore affected by the consent decree.
As control patents, we use all patents that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary
USPC technology class, and the number of citations. We define patents as transistor patents if they were filed
by a member of the original transistor team or one of their co-authors. In the regressions for columns 1 to 3,
we use all patents with a publication year before 1952 and we match all citations up to and including 1951.
Correspondingly, in the regressions for columns 4 to 6 we use patents and citations up to 1949. The data are
from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office. All coefficients are
multiplied by 100 for better readability. Standard errors are clustered on the primary three-digit USPC technology
class level and *, **, *** denote statistical significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
decree reduced licensing fees to zero suggests instead that the price effect of compulsory
licensing had little further impact.
Table 3.5 reports the results from repeating our baseline regression in this subsample. We find
that citations to the transistor patents increase by 52% (column 2). They experience around
a four times higher increase in follow-on citations than other consent decree patents. The
magnitude of the effect is consistent with the presumption that patents on more important
inventions experience a larger increase after compulsory licensing.
Despite the large effects, the transistor patents do not drive the effect in our main sample. To
rule out this possibility we analyze our original sample up to 1949 with and without transistor
123
ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
patents. Results are shown in columns (5) and (6). We find large but insignificant effects
for the transistor sample and virtually the same effect without transistors as in the baseline
regression that includes transistor patents (column 4).42
Transistors are the classical example of a general purpose technology that has the potential
of having a large scale impact on the economy (Helpman, 1998). If it had not been for
the antitrust lawsuit against Bell, odds are that Bell’s licensing policy would have been less
accommodating and the follow on-innovations stimulated by the transistors less dramatic
than they were.
3.8 Conclusion
In this study we show that antitrust enforcement can increase innovation. The 1956 consent
decree that settled the antitrust lawsuit against Bell increased innovation, mostly by small
and young companies building on Bell’s established technologies. We conclude that antitrust
enforcement can play an important role in increasing innovation by facilitating market entry.
Several antitrust scholars have argued that antitrust enforcement should pay special attention
to exclusionary practices because of their negative influence on innovation (Baker, 2012;
Wu, 2012). Our study seconds this view. We show that foreclosure has a negative impact on
innovation and that compulsory licensing may not be an effective remedy to end market
foreclosure and to overcome its stifling effect on innovation unless accompanied by structural
remedies.
Compulsory licensing is often imposed in merger cases where the market structure changes
endogenously (Delrahim, 2004; Sturiale, 2011). We would expect that if the newly merged
company is able to foreclose the product market, compulsory licensing is not an effective
42The large magnitude of the effect should not be taken at face value. The identifying assumption of this
regression is that the control patents would have had the same number of citations as the transistor patents. In
our regression this is true for 1953, but given the exceptional nature of the invention of the transistor, it is fair to
assume that this trend might have diverged in later years. Furthermore, it is not absolutely clear from the histori-
cal records why Bell decided to license the transistor patents. If the licensing decision was taken because of the
expectation of important follow-on research, our estimate might give an upper bound on the effect. For example,
Jack Morton, the leader of Bell Labs’ effort to produce transistors at scale, advocated the sharing of the transistor
to benefit from advances made elsewhere. Source: http://www.computerhistory.org/siliconengine/bell-labs-
licenses-transistor-technology/ (last accessed 9 September 2016).
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remedy. More empirical studies are needed to assess whether the negative effect of market
foreclosure on innovation is a first order concern for merger and acquisition cases.
We estimate the negative effects of patents on follow-on innovations by other companies, but
we cannot determine how large the incentive effect of patents for the company holding the
patent is. In our case, compulsory licensing does not appear to have had a strong negative
effect on Bell’s patenting activities. It would be surprising if this was the norm (Williams, 2015).
But it is consistent with Galasso and Schankerman (2015a) who show that large companies
do not reduce their innovation activity when their patents are invalidated in court, but do
change the direction of their research and development activities.
We analyze a very important antitrust lawsuit from the 1950s. Using a historical setting has
the advantage that we can draw on a large number of detailed historical accounts and that we
can conduct a long run evaluation many years after the case. At the same time it is unclear
whether the size of the effects of compulsory licensing would be similar today. Jaffe and
Lerner (2011) suggest that many negative effects of the patent system discussed today are
related to regulatory changes surrounding the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982. The reforms led to a significant broadening and strengthening of the
rights of patent holders and consequently to a surge in the number of patents granted. This
makes us think that the effects of compulsory licensing might be even larger today.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional Tables and Graphs
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Years since Free Movement
Notes: Annual treatment effects on migration around the introduction of free movement (1986-2012). The
regression includes destination-year and country-pair-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
country-pair-industry level. Source: PATSTAT, European Commission, own calculations.
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Notes: The graph shows the number of mobile inventors normalized to the total number of patent applications.
We count as mobile inventor an inventor who changes his country of residence compared to the previous patent




Table A.1: Overview of the Gradual Opening of the EU15+4 Labor Markets
Country NMS8 NMS2 Sectoral Exceptions
(2004 entry) (2007 entry)
Austria 2011 2014 NMS8 (2007-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): Construction,
Manufacturing of Electronics and Metals, Food and bever-
age services (restaurant business), other sectors with labor
shortages
Belgium 2009 2014 -
Denmark 2009 2009 -
Finland 2006 2007 -
France 2008 2014 NMS8 (2005-2007), NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Con-
struction, Accommodation and food services (tourism and
catering), other sectors with labor shortages
Germany 2011 2014 NMS8 (2004-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): sectors with labor
shortages
Greece 2006 2009 -
Iceland 2006 2012 -
Ireland 2004 2012 -
Italy 2006 2012 NMS8 (2004-2005): sectors with labor shortages; NMS2
(2007-2011): Agriculture, Construction, Engineering, Ac-
commodation and food services (tourism and catering),
Domestic work and care services, other sectors with la-
bor shortages; Occupations: Managerial and professional
occupations
Luxembourg 2008 2014 NMS2 (2007 - 2013): Agriculture, Viticulture, Accommoda-
tion and food services (tourism and catering)
Netherlands 2007 2014 NMS8 (2004-2006), NMS2 (2007-2013): International
transport, Inland shipping, Health, Slaugtherhouse/meat-
packaging, other sectors with labor shortages
Norway 2009 2012 NMS8 (2004-2008), NMS2 (2007-2011): sectors with labor
shortages
Portugal 2006 2009 -
Spain 2006 2009 Reintroduction of restrictions for Romanians: 11/08/2011
- 31/12/2013
Sweden 2004 2007 -
United Kingdom 2004 2014 NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Food manufacturing
Notes: Column 2 shows the year of the labor market opening of the respective country for the NMS8 countries,
column 3 shows the year of the labor market opening of the respective country for the NMS2 countries. Column




Table A.2: Migration and Free Labor Mobility (First Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU19 and NMS NMS NMS 2004 only EU19 and NMS
VARIABLES all migrants all migrants all migrants patent potential
L3.FM 2.352*** 5.039** 19.37* -0.563
(0.754) (2.320) (10.48) (0.645)
L4.FM 1.860*** 3.271* 4.298 1.156**
(0.630) (1.704) (4.065) (0.506)
L5.FM -0.136 -0.0996 9.662 0.350
(0.375) (0.418) (19.23) (0.292)
in EU 0.447** -4.541* 0.261
(0.204) (2.526) (0.180)
L2.Trade flow -1.077 -74.12 -2.072**
(1.089) (76.99) (0.953)
L2.FDI inflow 1.14e-05 0.000161*** 0.000185*** 1.45e-05**
(2.40e-05) (4.31e-05) (4.76e-05) (6.90e-06)
Observations 383 186 163 383
R-squared 0.597 0.683 0.701 0.363
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
F 10.20 48.57 660.0 10.11
Clusters 53 30 23 53
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the first stage corresponding to Table 1.1 in column 1 and 4: The
dependent variable is (the second lag of the natural logarithm of) emigration in a region and outflow of migrants
with patenting potential, respectively. The instruments are the free movement variables for the three previous
years. The regressions include controls for EU membership, trade flows and FDI inflows. The first pair of
columns includes all EU and EFTA countries, the third and fourth column limit the sample to new member states
and the last two columns include only the 2004 accessions. All specifications include year and region-industry
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level. Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: Patent Applications and Free Labor Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU19 and NMS EU19 and NMS NMS NMS NMS 2004 only NMS 2004 only
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted
L3.FM 1.075* 1.309* -0.276 -0.0181 1.758 2.047
(0.576) (0.717) (2.315) (2.193) (3.247) (4.016)
L4.FM 1.786*** 2.206*** -0.606 -0.216 -4.447 -4.335
(0.276) (0.386) (0.863) (0.805) (3.655) (3.624)
L5.FM -0.177 0.0565 -0.395 -0.264 3.418 4.612
(0.392) (0.526) (0.545) (0.710) (3.751) (3.579)
in EU 0.167 0.278**
(0.107) (0.121)
L2.Trade flow -1.399** -1.456*
(0.662) (0.863)
L2.FDI inflow 3.10e-05** 4.29e-05*** 1.45e-05 4.15e-05 2.49e-05 5.34e-05
(1.26e-05) (1.28e-05) (2.70e-05) (2.75e-05) (3.15e-05) (3.20e-05)
Observations 496 496 209 209 184 184
R-squared 0.442 0.742 0.267 0.177 0.257 0.162
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 56 56 32 32 24 24
Notes: The dependent variables in the regressions shown in this table are the number of patent applications
(columns 1, 3 and 5) and citation-weighted patent applications (columns 2, 4 and 6). More precisely, the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1 plus these counts. The same transformation is applied to the
trade flow regressor and for FDI inflows, the percentage change from the previous year is used as regressor. The
first pair of columns includes all EU and EFTA countries, columns 3 and 4 include all countries which joined
the EU in 2004 and later and the last two columns only include those which joined in 2004. All specifications
include year and region-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level. Sources:
Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Patent Applications and Migration in NMS10, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0924** 0.0730* 0.115 0.212
(0.0350) (0.0375) (0.156) (0.249)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.203* 0.101
(0.112) (0.0950)
L2.Trade flow 0.482 -0.650 0.758***
(0.518) (0.820) (0.251)
L2.FDI inflow -1.41e-05 -5.82e-06 -3.23e-07 -1.80e-05 -3.03e-05 9.41e-07
(1.87e-05) (1.80e-05) (1.72e-05) (3.34e-05) (4.83e-05) (1.68e-05)
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 23 23 23 23 23 23
F 16.81 26.31 65.74
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and
innovation in that country. The first three columns are estimated with OLS and the last three columns use a 2SLS
estimation with our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent variables are the number
of patent applications in an industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the citation-weighted
patent applications (i.e., patent applications + forward citations to these patents). Patent application numbers
and citation-weighted counts, number of migrants and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample
includes only the 10 countries which joined the EU in 2004. All specifications include year and region-industry
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Patent Applications and Migration, USPTO Patents Only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0270 -0.0894 0.346** 0.503**
(0.0535) (0.0694) (0.171) (0.232)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.000889 0.702
(0.0606) (0.429)
in EU 0.0258 0.402 0.0182 0.115 0.567 -0.0508
(0.204) (0.305) (0.206) (0.238) (0.374) (0.222)
L2.Trade flow 1.623** 2.409** 1.740** 0.252 -0.144 2.493***
(0.687) (1.002) (0.654) (0.901) (1.246) (0.842)
L2.FDI inflow 1.24e-05 3.06e-05** 1.28e-05 7.25e-06 2.11e-05*** 1.13e-06
(1.02e-05) (1.41e-05) (9.91e-06) (1.43e-05) (8.16e-06) (1.16e-05)
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53
F 32.56 273.0 26.87
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and
innovation in that country, counting only patents that were filed with the USPTO. The first three columns
are estimated with OLS and the last three columns use a 2SLS estimation with our instrument based on free
movement legislation. The dependent variables are the number of patent applications in an industry and origin
region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the citation-weighted patent applications (i.e., patent applications
+ forward citations to these patents). Patent application numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of
migrants and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU members and countries in
the European Free Trade Association. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Convergence in Patenting Levels (Patent sdest /Patent sor i g i n) and Migration, NMS
only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0289 0.0349 -0.254* -0.259*
(0.0229) (0.0285) (0.141) (0.151)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.118 -1.809
(0.0747) (2.810)
Patents, origin -1.080*** -1.052*** -1.081*** -1.083*** -1.055*** -1.065***
(0.109) (0.120) (0.109) (0.110) (0.122) (0.119)
Patents, dest 1.078*** 1.128*** 1.080*** 1.071*** 1.120*** 1.044***
(0.0713) (0.0910) (0.0717) (0.0765) (0.0962) (0.0890)
Within EU 0.0435 -0.0278 0.0431 0.0572 -0.0136 0.0724
(0.0529) (0.0584) (0.0533) (0.0555) (0.0612) (0.0693)
GDPd /GDPo -0.444 -0.0942 -0.446 -0.480 -0.132 -0.471
(0.359) (0.413) (0.360) (0.372) (0.430) (0.365)
L3.Trade flow -0.0394 0.0516 -0.0355 0.00323 0.0959 -0.0277
(0.0623) (0.0792) (0.0616) (0.0662) (0.0842) (0.0633)
L3.FDI flow 0.00139 0.00150 0.00108 0.000924 0.00101 0.00544
(0.00662) (0.00662) (0.00663) (0.00750) (0.00741) (0.0112)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,681 2,681 2,681
R-squared 0.499 0.565 0.499 0.458 0.535 0.406
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 559 559 559 477 477 477
F 90.89 137.0 81.10
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patent sdest /Patent sor i g i n . Number of patents
(in origin and destination countries), number of migrants, FDI, and trade flows are in natural logarithms.
The sample includes country-industry pairs, where origins are NMS and destinations - EU19 countries. All
specifications include year and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the origin-destination-industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.7: Convergence in Patenting Levels (Patent sdest /Patent sor i g i n) and Free Labor
Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU19 and NMS EU19 and NMS NMS only NMS only EU19 and NMS (all) NMS only (all)
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents
L3.FM -0.0135 0.00186 -0.0150 -0.00166 0.0179 -0.0131
(0.0368) (0.0434) (0.0412) (0.0496) (0.0122) (0.0130)
L4.FM -0.0631 -0.0573 -0.0534 -0.0554 -0.0403*** -0.0337**
(0.0440) (0.0469) (0.0505) (0.0554) (0.0133) (0.0146)
L5.FM -0.0256 -0.0393 -0.0267 -0.0283 -0.0166 -0.00647
(0.0419) (0.0449) (0.0495) (0.0534) (0.0127) (0.0137)
Patents, origin -1.242*** -1.407*** -1.094*** -1.067*** -0.640*** -0.618***
(0.0797) (0.0873) (0.111) (0.122) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Patents, dest 1.051*** 1.090*** 1.062*** 1.112*** 0.800*** 0.813***
(0.0725) (0.0921) (0.0729) (0.0929) (0.0216) (0.0218)
Within EU -0.00662 -0.100* 0.0241 -0.0442 -0.0781*** -0.0527***
(0.0494) (0.0549) (0.0553) (0.0620) (0.0141) (0.0149)
GDPd /GDPo 0.00771 0.555 -0.251 0.0737 0.183*** 0.175***
(0.331) (0.391) (0.384) (0.451) (0.0393) (0.0402)
L3.Trade flow -0.0450 0.00903 -0.0127 0.0766 -0.0499*** -0.0341***
(0.0629) (0.0810) (0.0629) (0.0807) (0.00866) (0.00878)
L3.FDI flow 0.00170 0.000342 0.00259 0.00241 -0.0140*** -0.0112***
(0.00656) (0.00665) (0.00651) (0.00659) (0.00416) (0.00418)
Observations 2,946 2,946 2,763 2,763 71,496 66,504
R-squared 0.487 0.552 0.500 0.565 0.217 0.225
Origin-dest-ind FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 582 582 559 559 5688 5304
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patent sdest /Patent sor i g i n . Number of patents
(in origin and destination countries), number of migrants, FDI, and trade flows are in natural logarithms. All
specifications include year and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the origin-destination-industry level. Specifications 1-4 show the reduced form regressions for the sample used
in the OLS/2SLS estimations (i.e., the sub-sample for which migration data are available), specifications 5-6
show estimates for the full sample of country-industry pairs in 2000-2012. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.8: Citations to Destination Industries, NMS only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.00255 0.00895 0.427* 0.436*
(0.0281) (0.0282) (0.222) (0.224)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.124 5.695
(0.133) (5.457)
Patents, origin 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.158**
(0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0369) (0.0622)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0118 0.0121 0.0183 0.0317
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0248) (0.0332)
Within EU -0.00869 -0.00991 -0.0280 -0.0827
(0.0608) (0.0609) (0.0637) (0.0991)
L3.Trade flow -0.0575 -0.0566 -0.122 -0.0791
(0.0722) (0.0724) (0.0837) (0.0895)
L3.FDI flow 0.00342 0.00306 0.00393 -0.0129
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0268)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,681 2,681 2,681
R-squared 0.083 0.087 0.088
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 559 559 559 477 477 477
F 11.64 8.404 6.418
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in
a year. Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent applications in origin and destination
industries, FDI and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to new EU member states.
All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
origin-destination-industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.9: Citations to Destination Industries and Free Labor Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU19 and NMS NMS only
VARIABLES EU19 and NMS NMS only (all) (all)
L3.FM 0.00662 0.0785 0.0400** 0.0670**
(0.0349) (0.0516) (0.0163) (0.0306)
L4.FM 0.0734 0.0856 0.0431** 0.0903**
(0.0451) (0.0603) (0.0182) (0.0392)
L5.FM 0.0480 0.0753 0.0255 0.0406
(0.0470) (0.0559) (0.0169) (0.0337)
Patents, origin 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.0591*** 0.0974***
(0.0238) (0.0308) (0.00785) (0.0119)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0478*** 0.000519 0.0258*** -0.0130*
(0.0137) (0.0192) (0.00541) (0.00687)
Within EU 0.0154 0.163*** 0.00274 0.180***
(0.0361) (0.0553) (0.0144) (0.0247)
L3.Trade flow -0.152*** -0.0732 -0.0627*** 0.0372**
(0.0352) (0.0596) (0.00955) (0.0144)
L3.FDI flow -0.000418 0.0114 0.0257*** 0.0235***
(0.00520) (0.0113) (0.00357) (0.00639)
Observations 7,279 3,498 29,604 11,851
R-squared 0.174 0.133 0.099 0.110
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 592 2304 912
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year.
Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent applications in origin and destination industries,
FDI and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. All specifications include year and origin-destination-
industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level. Columns 1 and 2
show the reduced form regressions for the sample used in the OLS/2SLS estimations (i.e., the sub-sample for
which migration data are available), columns 3 and 4 show estimates for the full sample of country-industry
pairs in 2000-2012. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.10: Citations to Destination Industries, USPTO Patents Only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0476** 0.0313* 0.679*** 0.288
(0.0188) (0.0178) (0.197) (0.184)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0512 0.745
(0.0485) (1.703)
Patents, origin 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.186*** 0.195***
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0227)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0545*** 0.0542*** 0.0542*** 0.0491**
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0195)
Within EU 0.00444 0.00724 -0.00468 0.0300
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0343) (0.0667)
L3.Trade flow 0.0797* 0.0858** 0.0294 0.0853**
(0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0552) (0.0418)
L3.FDI flow -0.00960* -0.0102* -0.00738 -0.0152
(0.00526) (0.00527) (0.00568) (0.0134)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.132 0.150 0.149
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 44.41 35.32 34.64
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year.
Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent applications in origin and destination industries,
FDI and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to citations among U.S. patents. All
specifications include year and origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
origin-destination-industry level. Sources: PATSTAT, Eurostat, CEPII
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.11: Only Citations Added by the Applicant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0234 0.0258 0.489*** 0.336*
(0.0176) (0.0172) (0.170) (0.192)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0759** 1.239
(0.0342) (1.915)
Patents, origin 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.139*** 0.150***
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0231) (0.0233)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0253 0.0247 0.0249 0.0162
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0221)
Within EU -0.0992*** -0.0958*** -0.110*** -0.0574
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0354) (0.0712)
L3.Trade flow -0.0194 -0.0143 -0.0805 -0.0153
(0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0542) (0.0373)
L3.FDI flow 0.00811 0.00735 0.0108* -0.000953
(0.00506) (0.00508) (0.00554) (0.0154)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.070 0.080 0.080
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 22.90 20.46 18.95
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year.
Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent applications in origin and destination industries,
FDI and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to citations which have been added
by the applicant according to PATSTAT. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry
level. Source: Eurostat and PATSTAT.





Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1

























< 0. Plugging the values for profits into
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The expected absolute amounts of small and large innovation can be expressed in the fol-
lowing way, using the values for R&D investments in the leveled state from the proof of
Proposition 1.
IS = 2µ0nS =µ0∆







Next the steady state share of industries being in the leveled state (or equivalently, the proba-
bility of any particular industry being in that state) needs to be found. Using Equation 2.6 and
the fact that these probabilities have to sum to one µ0+µF = 1 and recalling from above that
nF = 18 − ∆4 , this can be written as:
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That the absolute innovation levels are indeed concave functions of competition for the
relevant values of h can be shown in the following way: Let x′ denote the derivative of a
variable x with respect to ∆ and i ∈ {L,S}.
Ii = 2µ0ni
Ii ′ = 2(µ0′ni +µ0ni ′)
Ii ′′ = 2(µ0′′ni +2µ0′ni ′+µ0ni ′′)









nS ′ = 1
2
> 0
nL′′ = nS ′′ = 0
Note that µ0′ = − 120 [3+8h+10∆]µ0′′, such that Ii ′′ can be expressed as:
Ii ′′ = 2(µ0′′ni +2µ0′ni ′)= 2µ0′′(ni − 1
10
[3+8h+10∆]ni ′).
It remains to be shown when the term in brackets is negative for the two innovation technolo-
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Thus IS is always concave and IL is concave if
1
4 < h. If innovation rates are non-negative at
∆= 0, for an inverted-U shape to emerge they must be decreasing at∆= 12 . With the equations
above, we can see that the condition d ISd∆ |∆= 12 < 0 implies h <
1
4 . If this is not satisfied, the level
of small innovation increases with competition for any initial level of competition.
d IL
d∆ shows that for IL to be increasing at ∆= 0 the condition h > 1+
p
6
8 ≈ 0.43 must be satisfied,
such that the condition for concavity is satisfied as well ( 14 < h). The condition d ILd∆ |∆= 12 < 0
implies h < 1+
p
5
4 ≈ 0.81. (Hence, if IL is not concave, it is decreasing for the entire range
of competition intensities.) If the help parameter h satisfies both of these conditions IL is
inverted-U shaped.
The level of total innovation, I = IL+ IS , has similar properties. It is a concave function of ∆,
since I ′′ = IL′′+ IS ′′ < 0 holds for any h. Summing up the derivatives d ILd∆ + d ISd∆ from above,
we can see that at ∆= 0 the slope will always be positive, i.e., for low levels of competition,
increasing the intensity of competition always increases the total level of innovation. I is
inverted-U shaped if at ∆= 12 this sum is negative. This is the case if h <
√
1
6 ≈ 0.41. If this
condition is not satisfied, overall innovation is increasing in competition for any initial level.
These results are summarized in the proposition.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that the I and IS are concave and that if IL is not
always decreasing in competition, it is concave as well. Thus the maxima are reached where
the first derivatives are zero or at the boundary of the range of possible values of ∆, i.e., at
∆= 12 or ∆= 0, following from proposition 2 as well.
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If the maxima are not at the boundaries, then the curves are inverted-U shaped and have
interior maxima. If IL has an interior maximum, it will be where
d IL
d∆ = 0. At this value for ∆
the numerator of Equation B.1 is equal to zero.
−5
2




Thus, if the maxima for the IL , IS and I curves are interior, they are (the latter two are derived
















From the above equations for the maxima it can be seen that the number of large innovations
in the economy is maximized at a lower∆ than that of small innovations. Using the properties
derived above, one can also see that this must hold in the following way.
IL = I IL
IL+ IS









At an interior maximum of total innovation I , the first order condition requires that the
first summand be zero. For the second summand, we know that I is positive and, from
Proposition 1 above, that the summand must then be negative. Thus, decreasing∆marginally
from the ∆∗ that maximizes I increases IL . The reverse holds for IS , i.e., the number of small
innovations increases moving to higher levels of competition from an interior ∆∗.
IS = I IS
IL+ IS
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IS ′ = I ′ IS











B.4 Model with Fully Incorporated Product Market Competi-
tion
The model in the main part of the chapter makes various simplifications in order to allow
for an analytical solution. This section verifies with numerical solutions that these are not
necessary for the results described in the propositions for the main model and discusses how
the two models are related. In particular, the model in this appendix modifies the following
features of the previous model:
• Firms look ahead infinitely and discount the future appropriately rather than choosing
R&D investments only to maximize the expected profit in the next period.
• The model is in continuous time, such that innovations naturally do not occur at exactly
the same time and there is no need to ensure that a certain upper limit on investments
is not exceeded in equilibrium. Recall that in the previous model, only one or zero
innovations could occur per period and thus, the sum of the probabilities of innovations
for the two types and two firms could not exceed 1. The limit on equilibrium investment
was introduced implicitly through the cost functions.
• Costs for different types of innovation are likely to differ, e.g. because high expected
return comes with high risk of failure. As mentioned above, different costs for different
types of innovations affect innovation probabilities in equilibrium and can ensure, for
example, that large innovations occur less frequently than small ones.
• A large step may lead to a large, but finite, cost reduction, such that the competitor
remains active in the market.
• Finally, the profit levels at different technological positions all follow directly from the
product market competition model here, such that a follower’s position and profit differ
depending on the step size by which the competitor leads, as depicted in Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Possible Positions on the Technology Ladder
−L −S 0 S L
Notes: Possible positions on the technology ladder: Firms may be equally advanced (0), lead by a small step (S)
or by a large step (L), or lag behind by a small (−S) or a large step (−L).
This implies that investments in catch-up innovation will also differ between these two
positions. Substitutability α is the measure of competition in this model, replacing ∆.
Duopolists compete in the product market, producing output at their current costs. In
addition to the output decision, firms invest in two different R&D technologies, which affect
the probability of generating cost-saving innovations. The framework builds on existing
models of innovation (Aghion et al., 2001, 2005), but departs in that firms choose how much
to invest in the two types of innovation technologies. Neck-and-neck firms determine their
R&D strategy with two continuous variables, denoting the probability of a successful large or
small step, respectively. Again, a cost function for each innovation type determines the costs
associated with a certain success probability.
To justify the central assumptions regarding profits in the R&D model in the main part, I start
from a product market competition model following Aghion et al. (2001). In each industry
sector there are two firms offering differentiated products and competing in prices. A unit
mass of consumers maximizes the utility function u = ∫ 1s=0 ln((qαs A+qαsB ) 1α )d s, with 0<α≤ 1,
which integrates over all sectors s. Because of the natural logarithm in the utility function,
consumer spending in each sector is the same and it is convenient to normalize this amount
to 1, i.e., prices are expressed such that in all sectors ps A qs A+psB qsB = 1. This leads to the














1Industry indices have been omitted from these equations, since all sectors are alike.
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Firm i produces qi with constant marginal costs ci , such that its first order condition is2
α−α(pi − ci )qi − ci
pi
= 0. (B.4)
Since both equalities hold for each firm, this constitutes a system of four equations, which
defines prices and quantities for both firms at the product market stage. Costs depend on
previous research outcomes and may be considered fixed at the production stage. Thus, with
the above system, the endogenous variables pi and qi determine profits pii for the firms as
well (disregarding any R&D costs at this point).
pii = (pi − ci )qi (B.5)




ci denotes the costs of producing one unit of output for firm i , j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j . Profit
depends only on relative costs and the intensity of competition, measured by the substi-
tutability parameter α. Note that this does not imply that industry profit is constant: When
one firm innovates and is a step ahead of its competitor, industry profit increases despite
constant consumer spending. The innovator can benefit from decreased costs because of the
competitor’s higher costs.
Profits in the symmetric equilibrium and the leveled state, i.e., when the duopolists are at the
same technological position, can be found as follows. (Indices are omitted due to symmetry




α−α(p− c)q − c
p
= 0. (B.7)
⇒ q = α




2The firm chooses a price to maximize pii = (pi − ci )qi with the demand function above.
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This implies that each firm’s profit in the leveled state is pi0 = 1−α2−α (where the index 0 denotes
the relative technological position of the firms – in this case the technological distance to the
competitor is zero).3
At this point, it becomes necessary to formalize the notion of small and large steps. The
motivation for this study is more the potential decline in very large innovations than the
nature of the smaller steps that are observed. Thus, large innovations4 can be modeled as
those that result in a monopoly for one firm, which corresponds to the extreme case in the
model where the innovating firm’s costs drop to zero (while the competitor’s costs remain
positive). Small innovations are those that result in reduced but positive costs for the innovator.
Furthermore, I restrict the small innovations considered in the model to those that are large
enough to increase an innovator’s profits compared to profits when monopolizing half of the
market (which is the case when α→ 0). The assumption of a duopoly makes the requirement
appear restrictive, in that it requires “small” innovations to be rather large. While the precise
distinction corresponding to the main model would indeed actually be between infinite steps
and (sufficiently large but) finite steps, the requirement on the size of the inventive step
for small innovations appears much more likely to be satisfied when we think of a global
market with numerous small national markets. Then even a small cost advantage that can
be turned into profit on the entire quantity of a product sold globally (Bertrand competition
and complete substitutability through open borders and cheap transportation) may well be
worth more than the monopoly profit in a single small economy. Hence the model should
be interpreted qualitatively, illustrating mechanisms and describing the directions of effects
rather than quantifying their sizes. If, as in the numerical solution below, large steps lead
to very small, but positive, marginal costs, the qualitative results remain the same as in the
extreme case of zero marginal costs for large innovations.
The intuition for the property that small innovations become on average relatively more
attractive compared to large ones (with the aforementioned restriction) as substitutability
(α) increases from a value near 0 to 1 is then easy to see in Figure B.2. The other axis denotes
3Cf. eq. 8, Aghion et al. (2001). Unlike in their model, here the number of steps between competitors is not
explicitly counted as there are only four relative positions a firm can be in, as explained below.
4These innovations resemble “drastic innovations”, following Tirole (1988). If marginal costs drop to zero,
the innovator extracts the entire (fixed) consumer spending of 1 as profit and is able to offer an infinite amount
of the good in return. Thus, the price per unit of the good goes to 0 and is below any strictly positive costs of the
competitor, such that the competitor is no longer a constraint on the innovator’s price setting.
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Figure B.2: Product Market Profits
Notes: The figure shows firm profits depending on the intensity of competition α and the distance on the
technology ladder (where the cost ratio is 2−n and n can be understood as a measure of the firm’s technological
lead over its competitor).
the cost ratio, i.e. the size of the inventive step. E.g. at n = 1, the cost ratio is 12 , meaning that
the leading firm produces at half the costs of the other firm.5 The profits of neck-and-neck
firms decrease from 12 to 0 over this range of α. This decrease makes both types of innovations
more attractive, as they have been defined to lead to non-decreasing post-innovation profits.
The crucial difference between the two types is that the large innovation always leads to a
monopoly in the entire market and thus a fixed profit of 1 (the maximum possible profit, since
consumer spending is assumed constant). Post-innovation profits after a small innovation are
close to 12 for low levels of α, thus the difference between pre-innovation and post-innovation
profits is also close to zero. For α= 1, however, the firms are in Bertrand competition with
perfect substitutability between their products. Again by normalization of market size to 1,
the innovator’s profit is equal to the cost difference in this case, which by the assumption on
the minimum size of small steps is larger than 12 . Thus incentives to invest in both types of
innovation increase as neck-and-neck profits decrease.6
5The n here only refers to the step size and not to R&D investments.
6As Figure B.2 illustrates, the laggard’s profit after a small innovation is also decreasing in the intensity of
competition. After a large innovation, the laggard’s profit is always zero (as a result of the assumption that a large
innovation is “drastic”). Note that if large steps were less extreme and led to small but still positive costs, the
qualitative results of this study would go through, as demonstrated with the parameterization for the numerical
solution below. The difference is just that increasing post-innovation profits would increase the incentives to
invest in large R&D for very low levels of α. As post-innovation costs approach zero (or step size approaches
infinity), post-innovation profit will approach its maximum faster and faster as α increases starting from zero.
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As the difference between pre-innovation and post-innovation profits for neck-and-neck
firms is increasing in α for the entire range from 0 to 1, an increase in competition will always
lead to more innovation of both types in this industry state.
The system of equations includes firms’ profits in the product market under the costs brought
about by the outcome of R&D projects. The numerical solutions below show that, when the
product market competition model determines all the profit levels, the economy exhibits a
decreasing share of large innovations with competition under reasonable parameterizations.7
The maximum of the absolute amount of large innovations also occurs at lower levels of
competition than that of either total or small innovations in this model. To allow for an
analytical derivation of these results, however, in the model in the main part only the essential
feature of the product market competition model is maintained by introducing the competi-
tion parameter ∆ (replacing α), which directly affects profits. In the main model, a laggard’s
profit is defined to be piF = 0, while the large step leader gets piL = 1, both independently of
competition. The competition parameter∆ captures the crucial feature of the product market
model that increasing substitutability increases the spread between the profits of leveled firms
and a firm leading by a small step. It can be defined via the product market model, which
gives the profit in the leveled state pi0, such that ∆≡ 12 −pi0. The profit after a small innovation
is set to piS = 12 +∆. Recall from above that pi0 = 1−α2−α , such that ∆ is an increasing function of
α, with ∆ = 0 if α = 0 and ∆ = 12 if α = 1. Therefore ∆ increases from 0 to 12 as competition
intensifies.8 In the following, these simplications are not necessary, as the model is studied
only numerically.
A neck-and-neck firm’s present value is the result of the following maximization:9
7To be precise, this is the case if competition is sufficiently intense. The minimum intensity for increasing
competition to decrease the share of large innovations goes to zero as the large step size approaches infinity.
8The definition of ∆ above implies that ∆= 12 − 1−α2−α . Note that the values for piF and piL correspond to the
values in the product market competition model for a large step which leads to zero marginal costs and any
α> 1. At α= 1, ∆= 12 and the simplified profits piF = 0 and piS = 1 are approached by the product market model
as the (finite) cost reduction brought about by the small step increases.
9The interest rate r is another exogenous parameter here and corresponds to the time preference of house-
holds, as in Aghion et al. (2001).
153













+e−r d t (nLd tVL+nSd tVS +nLd tV−L+nSd tV−S




pi0 is the profit in the product market for a neck-and-neck firm minus the total R&D costs. As
in the main model, depending on R&D outcomes the firm may transition to a different state.
Future values are discounted by e−r d t . The chance of making a large innovation depends on
nL and, if successful, the firm becomes a leader by a large step, such that its present value
will be VL. Analogously, the transition to small step leadership follows in the equation. The
competitor’s corresponding investments, nL and nS , are taken as given. The future present
value may be V−L or V−S if the competitor had a large or a small innovation, respectively, and
if no innovation occurs the present value is V0 again.
As in the main model, a lagging firm only has to choose the level of catch-up R&D (h−L and
h−S are the respective help parameters). However, there are two different investment levels,
n−L and n−S , now for large and small step lags behind the competitor, respectively. In this





















+e−r d t ((n−S +h−S)d tV0+ (1−d t (n−S +h−S))V−S)]
(B.11)
As before, a firm leading by a large or a small step, has no R&D decisions to take and no R&D
costs, such that the present values do not involve a maximization.
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VL =piLd t +e−r d t
(
(n−L+h−L)d tV0+ (1− (n−L+h−L)d t )VL
)
(B.12)
VS =piSd t +e−r d t
(
(n−S +h−S)d tV0+ (1− (n−S +h−S)d t )VS
)
(B.13)
Taking advantage of the fact that e−r d t ≈ 1− r d t as d t becomes small (cf. Aghion et al., 2001),
the following Bellman equations can be derived (and terms involving (d t )2 can be ignored).
To briefly exemplify the derivation, consider the last equation (for VS).
VS =piSd t + (1− r d t )
(
(n−S +h−S)d tV0+ (1− (n−S +h−S)d t )VS
)
VS =piSd t + (n−S +h−S)d tV0+ (1− (n−S +h−S)d t )VS − r d tVS
r d tVS =piSd t + (n−S +h−S)d tV0− (n−S +h−S)d tVS
r VS =piS + (n−S +h−S)(V0−VS)
Applying the same transformation to the other value functions leads to the following system
of Bellman equations:
r VL =piL+ (V0−VL)(n−L+h−L) (B.14)







+ (VL−V0)nL+ (VS −V0)nS
+nS(V−S −V0)+nL(V−L−V0)
(B.16)
r V−S =pi−S −β−S
n2−S
2





Firms’ maximization of present values (or, equivalently, annuity values) leads to the first order
conditions below, which give the optimal investment levels.
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nL = (VL−V0)/βL (B.19)
nS = (VS −V0)/βS (B.20)
n−S = (V0−V−S)/β−S (B.21)
n−L = (V0−V−L)/β−L (B.22)
In the steady state the shares of industries in the three states (leveled or one firm leading with a
technological distance of either a large step or small step) have to sum to one: µ0+µS+µL = 1.
Again, inflows and outflows have to be be the same for each state.
µ0(2nL+2nS)= (µS +µL)(nF +h) (B.23)
µS(nF +h)= 2µ0nS (B.24)
µL(nF +h)= 2µ0nL (B.25)
The average innovation rates for large and small steps are defined as in the main model (in
equations 2.7 and 2.8). Unlike in the main model of the study, however, the model described
in this section will be studied only numerically and all the profits in the Bellman equations
follow directly from the product market competition model and the associated cost ratios.
Figures B.3 to B.5 illustrate the model with a parameterization that leads to very similar results
to the simplified model in the main part of the chapter. The costs of innovations differ by
type. Increasing the probability of a large innovation at the technological frontier (in the
leveled state) is most expensive with the cost parameter βL = 8 and a small innovation is
half as expensive βS = 4. Catch-up innovation from the large lag is associated with the cost
parameter β−L = 2 and from a small lag the parameter is β−S = 1. Both help parameters h−L
and h−S are equal to 110 and constant marginal costs of production are equal to
10 c = 1, except
after a small innovation, which reduces costs to cS = 1100 , or after a large innovation that leads
to finite, but very small marginal costs of cL = 110000 .
10More precisely, the stated costs are the relative costs of the innovating firm compared to the competitor’s
costs without innovation.
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Figure B.3: Profits at Different Positions








Notes: This graph shows the profits for leveled firms (black) as well as small step (upper dotted red line) and large
step leaders (upper dashed green) and followers lagging with a small (lower dotted red) and large step (lower
dashed green). (r = 110 , βL = 8, βS = 4, β−S = 1, β−L = 2, h−L = 110 , h−S = 110 , c = 1, cS = 1100 , cL = 110000 )
Figure B.3 shows how profits change with competition (i.e., substitutability α) for the different
firm positions. The figure shows that the mechanism from the simplified model remains:
Both R&D investments become more attractive for firms in the leveled state as pre-innovation
profits (pi0, black line) decrease. However, large step leader’s profit (piL, upper green line)
increases earlier and flattens sooner than the profit of a small step leader (piS , upper red line),
as we move to higher values forα. This leads to the familiar shift towards large step innovation,
illustrated in Figure B.4. Note that the share would not be monotonously decreasing for all
parameterization. Numerical solutions suggest that if there is an initial increase, it happens at
lower levels of competition the greater the large cost reduction.
Figure B.5 confirms that innovation rates for this parameterization are similar to the simplified
model as well. The example shows that the three curves may continue to be inverted-U
shaped.
The model in this section is considerably more complicated and numerical results are shown
for one possible parameterization to demonstrate that the relationships in the simplified
model may arise in a model without these abstractions.
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Figure B.4: Share of Large Innovations








Notes: This graph shows the share of large innovations in all innovations at the technological frontier ( ILIL+IS ).
(r = 110 , βL = 8, βS = 4, β−S = 1, β−L = 2, h−L = 110 , h−S = 110 , c = 1, cS = 1100 , cL = 110000 )
Figure B.5: Innovation Rates








Notes: This graph shows the innovation rates for large (dashed green) and small (dotted red) innovation and
their sum (black). (r = 110 , βL = 8, βS = 4, β−S = 1, β−L = 2, h−L = 110 , h−S = 110 , c = 1, cS = 1100 , cL = 110000 )
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B.5 Additional Empirical Results
















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0595
Similarity (5−year−differences)
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Table B.1: Similarity Regressions Controlling for Change in Patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) dsim5all
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.486*** 0.337 0.316 0.154 0.158
(0.541) (0.330) (0.340) (0.242) (0.243)
∆ ln(patents+1) -0.040*** -0.015* -0.018** -0.013* -0.014*
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
SIC2 FE no no no no no
Companies 298 421 425 428 428
SIC4 114 135 139 142 142
SIC3 67 74 75 78 78
SIC2 17 19 19 19 19
N 707 860 865 868 868
Notes: This table adds a control variable for the change in patenting (more precisely, the five-year
difference in ln(number of patents+1)) to the regressions from Table 2.2. The dependent variable is
the five-year difference in the similarity measure (based on SVD with 100 components). In column 1,
the comparison group consists of the firm’s own past patents. In columns 2 to 4, the comparison group
contains patents of all firms in the same industry, where the industry is defined based on the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) increasingly broadly (using four, three and two-digit SIC categories,
respectively). In column 5 the comparison group includes patents of firms from all other industries as
well. The model includes year fixed effects (as in Equation 2.10) and is estimated with two-stage least
squares using Bloom et al.’s (2016) initial conditions variable to instrument for the increase in Chinese
import competition. The sample period is from 2001 to 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the
four-digit SIC level. The data are from PATSTAT, Bloom et al. (2016) and Peruzzi et al. (2014).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics (Used in Regression with Similarity to Own Patents)
mean sd min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
∆ sim(comp.) 0.03 0.27 -0.76 -0.30 -0.13 0.04 0.19 0.38 0.81
∆ sim(SIC4) 0.01 0.17 -0.51 -0.22 -0.10 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.66
∆ sim(SIC3) 0.00 0.16 -0.60 -0.19 -0.10 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.52
∆ sim(SIC2) 0.01 0.15 -0.46 -0.17 -0.08 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.50
∆ sim(all) 0.00 0.14 -0.49 -0.18 -0.08 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.48
∆ ShareImChina 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.54
ShareImChina j t−6
·∆ShareImChinat 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.75
Observations 707
Notes: The descriptives in this table include the observations of the estimation based on the comparison
to a firm’s own previous patents (see Table 2.2, column 1). This sample is the smallest one of the five
columns, as the existence of own patents in the comparison period implies that the industry in
aggregate has patents as well. This sample includes five-year differences for the years from 2001 to
2005. The data are from PATSTAT, Bloom et al. (2016) and Peruzzi et al. (2014).
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Notes: This table shows the percentage of firms in each country for the sample used in the regressions
based on similarity to a firm’s own patents in Table 2.2 (column 1). The notes to Table 2.2 regarding the
sample apply.
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Table B.4: Distribution of Firms over Industries
SIC2 Description Percent
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 24.2
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 15.1
34 Fabricated Metal Products 10.7
36 Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment & Components 10.4
38 Measuring, Photographic, Medical, & Optical Goods, & Clocks 8.7
37 Transportation Equipment 7.7
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 4.4
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 4.4
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 4.0
33 Primary Metal Industries 2.7
20 Food and Kindred Products 2.0
25 Furniture and Fixtures 2.0
26 Paper and Allied Products 1.3
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 0.7
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0.7
31 Leather and Leather Products 0.7
22 Textile Mill Products 0.3
Total 100.0
N 298
Notes: This table shows the percentage of firms in each two-digit SIC category for the sample used
in the regressions based on similarity to a firm’s own patents in Table 2.2 (column 1). The notes to
Table 2.2 regarding the sample apply. Descriptions are added from http://www.dnb.com/content/
dam/english/economic-and-industry-insight/sic_2_digit_codes.xls.
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B.5.1 Regressions Using Different Samples of Patents
Table B.5: Similarity (USPTO Patents Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.642** -0.237 -0.390 -0.443 -0.224
(0.686) (0.430) (0.469) (0.432) (0.346)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 127 187 191 195 195
SIC4 69 84 88 92 92
SIC3 45 52 53 57 57
SIC2 14 17 17 17 17
N 270 341 346 350 350
Notes: This table replicates Table 2.2 with a restricted sample: Only patent applications filed with the
USPTO are included. Apart from that, the notes to Table 2.2 apply.
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Table B.6: Similarity with All Patents (Including Chinese and Other Non-English Patents)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.192** 0.167 0.135 0.052 0.038
(0.498) (0.309) (0.317) (0.240) (0.242)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 315 457 462 464 464
SIC4 116 136 141 143 143
SIC3 68 74 76 78 78
SIC2 18 19 19 19 19
N 764 937 943 945 945
Notes: This table replicates Table 2.2 with an extended sample, which in addition includes patents filed
in China, as well as any patents for which no English abstract is available. Apart from that, the notes to
Table 2.2 apply.
B.5.2 Regressions Weighting Firms Equally
Probability weights are used to weight firms equally here. I.e., individual observations for
a firm, whose five-year differences in similarity are observed in two years, receive half the
weight of a firm which is only once in the regression’s sample.
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Table B.7: Similarity Regressions Weighting Firms Equally
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.121* 0.406 0.211 0.012 0.156
(0.670) (0.329) (0.267) (0.251) (0.239)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 298 421 425 428 428
SIC4 114 135 139 142 142
SIC3 67 74 75 78 78
SIC2 17 19 19 19 19
N 707 860 865 868 868
Notes: This table presents modified regressions from Table 2.2, where each firm in the sample receives
equal weight. E.g. an observation of a long difference for a firm for which two observations are included
in the sample receives half the weight of an observation for a firm for which only one long difference is
observed. Apart from that, the notes to Table 2.2 apply.
Table B.8: First-Stage Regressions Weighting Firms Equally
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
ShareImChina j t−6
·∆ShareImChinat 0.112*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 707 860 865 868 868
R2 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18
F 15.77 24.76 25.27 25.50 25.50
Notes: This table shows the first-stage regressions belonging to the 2SLS regressions in Table B.7.
The number of observations per firm included in the regressions is shown in the Table B.9
(the sample is the same as in Table 2.2 in the main part). In the regression in the first column
of Table B.7, for 40% of included firms only one long difference is observed. For 20% of firms
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differences are observed in two year, while the percentages of firms with three, four and five
observations are above 10%. The additional observations in the four other columns of the
table do not alter this distribution much.
Table B.9: Number of Observations per Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
comp. SIC4 SIC3 SIC2 all
n Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
1 40.3 53.0 53.2 53.5 53.5
2 19.8 17.6 17.6 17.5 17.5
3 15.1 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.7
4 12.1 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.1
5 12.8 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 298 421 425 428 428
Notes: This table shows the distribution of the number of observations per firm included in the
regressions Table B.7 (which is the same as for Table 2.2). The columns correspond to the columns
in these tables, i.e., the first column includes the sample in the regressions with the similarity to a
company’s own previous patents, in the second to fourth column the comparison group is the four,
three and two-digit SIC category of the firm and in the fifth column all patents are included in the
comparison group.
B.5.3 First-Stage and OLS Regressions
Table B.10: First Stage of Similarity Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
ShareImChina j t−6
·∆ShareImChinat 0.127*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 707 860 865 868 868
R2 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
F 12.54 16.37 16.53 16.70 16.70
Notes: This table shows the first-stage regressions belonging to the main 2SLS regressions in Table 2.2.
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Table B.11: Similarity (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 0.480* 0.337** 0.108 0.113 0.038
(0.250) (0.161) (0.113) (0.099) (0.100)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 298 421 425 428 428
SIC4 114 135 139 142 142
SIC3 67 74 75 78 78
SIC2 17 19 19 19 19
N 707 860 865 868 868
Notes: This table shows the OLS regressions corresponding to the main 2SLS regressions in Table 2.2.
Apart from that, the notes to Table 2.2 apply.
B.5.4 IV Regressions, First-Stage and OLS Regressions Using Quota IV
The following tables repeat the estimations from the main part of this study using Bloom
et al.’s (2016) main instrument, which is based on the abolition of quotas for textile and
apparel after China’s WTO accession, instead of initial conditions.
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Table B.12: Similarity (Quota IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 2.501 2.744 1.449 1.715 2.048
(3.636) (1.884) (2.393) (2.063) (1.939)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 65 86 87 90 90
SIC4 25 34 35 38 38
SIC3 19 23 23 26 26
SIC2 12 14 14 14 14
N 92 114 115 118 118
Notes: Like Table 2.2, this tables shows estimations of Equation 2.10 using 2SLS, but instruments for
Chinese import competitions with Bloom et al.’s (2016) quota instrument. These quotas affected only
textile and apparel, such that the sample is smaller. The sample includes the years 2004 and 2005.
Apart from these changes, the notes to Table 2.2 apply.
Table B.13: First Stage of Similarity Regressions with Quota IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina ∆ ShareImChina
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆Quota 0.047 0.075 0.117 0.112* 0.112*
(0.046) (0.057) (0.069) (0.056) (0.056)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 92 114 115 118 118
R2 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.12
F 1.38 0.99 1.43 1.99 1.99
Notes: This table shows the first-stage regressions belonging to the 2SLS regressions in Table B.12,
which use the quota instrument.
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Table B.14: Similarity (OLS for Quota IV Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina -1.608 -0.121 -0.375 -0.383 -0.148
(1.598) (0.451) (0.514) (0.491) (0.618)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 65 86 87 90 90
SIC4 25 34 35 38 38
SIC3 19 23 23 26 26
SIC2 12 14 14 14 14
N 92 114 115 118 118
Notes: This table shows the OLS regressions based on the sample in the 2SLS regressions using the
quota instrument in Table B.12.
B.5.5 Details and Variations of Latent Semantic Analysis
The main part of the chapter uses a low-rank approximation with 100 components in the LSA.
This is based on a commonly applied rule of thumb. The number is found in Deerwester et al.
(1990) and recommended in the documentation of the scikit-learn package, for example. The
truncated SVD matrix explains about 20% of the variance (see Figure B.7). To demonstrate
that the decision to follow this rule is not consequential for the qualitative results of this study,
this section lists the same regressions with different variations of the text-based measures.
Table B.15 shows the results based on a truncated SVD matrix with 1000 components for
slightly more than 50% explained variation.
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Figure B.7: Graph of Explained Variance






Notes: Graph of explained variance (vertical axis) for singular value decomposition with different numbers of
components (horizontal axis)
Table B.15: Similarity (LSA with 1000 Components)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.399*** 0.193 0.339 0.246 0.192
(0.528) (0.263) (0.237) (0.188) (0.196)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 298 421 425 428 428
SIC4 114 135 139 142 142
SIC3 67 74 75 78 78
SIC2 17 19 19 19 19
N 707 860 865 868 868
Notes: This table estimates the regressions from Table 2.2 with a similarity measure that is based on
LSA with 1000 components (instead of 100). The notes to Table 2.2 apply.
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SVD for dimensionality reduction is known to be able to improve the identification of concepts
from texts compared to the original tf-idf matrix. The qualitative results are robust to skipping
this step and directly comparing tf-idf vectors. Table B.16 shows the results with the 1000
most common terms. (As above, this happens after terms that appear in more than half of all
documents are removed.)
Table B.16: Similarity (tf-idf Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ sim(comp.) ∆ sim(SIC4) ∆ sim(SIC3) ∆ sim(SIC2) ∆ sim(all)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆ ShareImChina 1.248** 0.161 0.301 0.205 0.203
(0.507) (0.254) (0.244) (0.199) (0.214)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Companies 298 421 425 428 428
SIC4 114 135 139 142 142
SIC3 67 74 75 78 78
SIC2 17 19 19 19 19
N 707 860 865 868 868
Notes: This table estimates the regressions from Table 2.2 with a similarity measure based on the cosine
similarity of tf-idf vectors with 1000 most common terms (without singular value decomposition). The
notes to Table 2.2 apply.
B.5.6 Topic Modeling with Latent Dirichlet Allocation
A generative probabilistic model that can be applied to text corpora and that is increasingly
used in the literature is the latent Dirichlet allocation (Blei et al., 2003). I follow Kaplan and
Vakili (2015) in estimating the model with 100 topics. The results are shown in Table B.17.
Since a probability distribution over topics is estimated for each document, in addition to
cosine similarity, the table’s second set of columns uses the (five-year difference in) Kullback-
Leibler divergence. A decrease in this divergence implies more similar patents, i.e., the results
point in the same direction and are in line with the ones reported in the main part of the
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chapter. The hyperparameters of the Dirichlet priors are both set to 1100 (i.e.,
1
nr. of topics , which
is the scikit-learn default), and the maximum number of iterations has been set to 100.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Appendix to Section 3.2
C.1.1 Compulsorily Licensed Patents by NBER Technological Subcategory




































Earth Working & Wells
Organic Compounds








Notes: The pie chart shows the distribution of compulsorily licensed patents over 35 NBER technological subcat-
egories. The legend is sorted from largest share to smallest. The categorization in technological subcategories is
based on US patent classifications, following Hall et al. (2001). The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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C.1.2 Patenting of Bell in Radar and Cryptography














Notes: This figure shows the yearly number of Bell patents relating to radar and cryptography, two technologies
relevant for World War II. We identify both technologies by their USPC class: We use the class 342 titled
“Communications: directive radio wave systems and devices (e.g., radar, radio navigation)” to classify radar and
class 380 titled “Cryptography” to classify cryptography. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
C.2 Appendix to Section 3.4
C.2.1 Comparing the Average Number of Citations of Treatment and Con-
trol Patents
In Figure C.3 we compare the evolution of patent citations to Bell patents and control patents
in the same publication year and the same four-digit technology class. We use the weights
proposed by Iacus et al. (2009) to adjust for the different number of control patents for each
Bell patent. From 1949 to 1953, the average number of citations of treatment and control
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49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Filing year of citing patent
Control
Bell
Notes: This figure shows average patent citations of patents published before 1949 in every year after publication.
The line with solid circles shows patent citations of the treated patents (Bell patents) and the line with empty
circles shows patent citations of control patents, with the same publication year and the same four-digit
technology class as the Bell patents. For aggregation we use the weights of Iacus et al. (2009) to adjust for a
different number of control patents for each Bell patent. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
patents track each other very closely. This implies that the Bell patents and the control patents
exhibit a parallel trend in citations in the first four years after the plea. The two lines diverge
in 1954, with Bell patents receiving relatively more citations than control patents, and they
converge again in 1961/1962. This is prima facie evidence for an effect from 1954 onward.
C.2.2 Pseudo Outcomes: Unaffected Companies Have No Excess Citations
In the main part of the text we use time varying coefficients to show that there are no yearly
excess citations from the B-2 companies, which were exempt from the compulsory licensing
agreement. In column 2 of Table C.1 we estimate the average effect for these companies
and find none. There are also two other groups of companies that were to a lesser degree
affected by the consent decree: foreign companies and companies that already had licensing
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agreements in place.1 Foreign companies could license for free but did not receive any
technical description or assistance from Bell.2 In Table C.1 we show the results using as the
dependent variable the citations from foreign companies in column 3 and from companies
that had a license before the consent decree in column 4. In the last column we use data on
all companies that did not have a license from Bell. We do not find a measurable effect for
foreign companies or companies with a license and a large effect for companies without a
license.
1 All companies with a license agreement are listed in the hearing documents (Antitrust Subcommittee,
1958, p. 2758).
2Verbatim in the consent decree “The defendants are each ordered and directed (...) to furnish to any person
domiciled in the United States and not controlled by foreign interests (...) technical information relating to
equipment (...)”.
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Table C.1: The Effect of Compulsory Licensing on Subsequent Citations of Unaffected Compa-
nies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline B-2 Companies Foreign companies License No license
Treatment -0.4 -0.1 -0.0 0.5∗∗∗ -0.9∗∗
(0.5) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.4)
I(55-60) -6.4∗∗∗ -1.2∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗ -1.1∗∗∗ -5.4∗∗∗
(0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5)
T x I(55-60) 2.0∗∗∗ 0.2 -0.0 0.4 1.6∗∗∗
(0.6) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5)
Constant 18.3∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗ 15.2∗∗∗
(1.2) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (1.0)
# treated 4533 4598 4533 4533 4533
Clusters 225 225 225 225 225
Obs. 896556 1096212 896556 896556 896556
Notes: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation with years 1949-1954 as pre-
treatment period and 1955-1960 as treatment period. The estimation equation is
#Ci t ati onsi ,t =β1 ·Bel li +β2 · I [1955−1960]+β3 ·Bel li · I [1955−1960]+εi ,t (C.1)
where I [1955− 1960] is an indicator variable for the treatment period 1955-1960. The variable "Bell" is an
indicator variable equal to one if a patent is published by a Bell System company before 1949 and therefore
treated by the consent decree. As dependent variable we use in the first column all citations by companies other
than the filing company. In the second column we use all citations of companies exempt from the consent
decree (GE, RCA, Westinghouse & ITT) and in the third column all citations of foreign companies. In the fourth
column we use citations of companies that had no licensing agreement with any Bell company prior to the
consent decree and in the last column we look at the citation of companies that had a licensing agreement.
As control patents, we use all patents that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary
United States Patent Classification (USPC) technology class and the number of citations up to 1949. The data are
from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office. All coefficients are
multiplied by 100 for better readability. Standard errors are clustered on the three-digit USPC technology class
level and *, **, *** denote statistical significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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C.2.3 Pseudo Treatment: Citation Substitution is Small
One possible interpretation of our estimates is that due to the free availability of Bell tech-
nology, companies substituted away from other, potentially more expensive technologies.
If this were the case, we should find a negative impact of the consent decree on citations of
similar patents of other companies.3 To see if this is the case, we assign a pseudo treatment to
the patents of GE, RCA, Westinghouse, which were part of the B-2 agreement, and ITT. These
companies were among the largest patenting firms in the ten technology classes in which
Bell had most patents between 1939 and 1949. Results are reported in Table C.2, column 2.
We find no effect, implying that the citation substitution is either small or homogeneous to
patents of these companies and the control group.
For a second approach, we exploit the fact that a patent’s technology is classified twice: once
in the USPC system, which has a technical focus, and once in the IPC system, which reflects
more closely the intended industry or profession (“usage”) (Lerner, 1994). In columns 3 and 4
of Table C.2 we assign a pseudo-treatment to all patents that have the same USPC class and
the same IPC class as the Bell patents. As control group we use in column 3 patents with the
same USPC, but a different IPC classification as Bell patents. In column 4 we use as a control
group patents with the same IPC, but a different USPC classification as Bell patents. Thus we
compare patents that are arguably more similar to the Bell patents to two different control
groups. We find a small, negative but statistically insignificant effect. Again, this speaks in
favor of limited citation substitution or - alternatively - a homogeneous citation substitution
to all control groups.
3This approach is suggested by Imbens and Rubin (2015).
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C.2.4 Effects are Robust to Different Matching Strategies
In columns 5 to 7 of Table C.2 and in Figure C.4 we report results from using several alternative
matching variables. In the main specification, we use the age (measured by the publication
year), the technology (measured by USPC class) and the quality of a patent (measured by the
number of citations up to 1949). In column 6 we use patents in the same IPC but different
USPC class instead of using those in the same USPC class. In column 7 we match on the IPC
classification, independent of the USPC class. Finally, in column 8 we do a coarsened exact
matching in order to match all Bell patents.4 In all three cases the size of the effects is similar
to the one in the main specification. In Figure C.4 we show the size of the treatment effects for
different combinations of background variables as proxy for age, technology and quality. On
the vertical axis we plot the number of matched patents. The coefficient is mostly around 2.
4Coarsened exact matching was proposed by Iacus et al. (2012). In this specification we match on one of five
publication year categories that contain two years each and one of ten prior-citation categories.
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# of Bell patents matched
Significant on 10% level Insignificant
Notes: In this figure we plot the parameter estimates from difference-in-differences estimations of the impact of
the consent decree for different matching strategies, controlling for year fixed effects. As before, as dependent
variable we use all citations by companies other than the filing company. In all regressions, we use a measure
for the age, the technology and the quality of a patent for matching. As measures for the age of a patent, we
alternatively use application year, publication year or both. For technology, we use the USPC, the USPC with
subclasses, the three and the four-digit IPC. As a measure of quality, we use the number of pre-citations as
exact numbers, coarsened to steps of five citations and an indicator for at least one citation prior to 1949. The
horizontal axis displays the number of matched Bell patents. Empty symbols are insignificant and full symbols
are significant at the 10% level. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the
European Patent Office.
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C.2.5 Patenting Behavior of Bell Relative to Comparable Companies




































Companies in field of Bell
Notes: In this figure we compare Bell’s total patenting to a synthetic Bell, the number of patents filed by the B-2
companies (General Electric, Westinghouse, RCA and ITT), General Electric and Westinghouse separately and
all companies that existed before 1949 and had at least 100 patents in any field in which Bell was active. The
number of patents are normalized to the average number of patents from 1946-1948. We show General Electric
and Westinghouse separately, because RCA had a consent decree involving patents in 1958 and thus might have
changed its behavior. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European
Patent Office.
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C.2.6 Share of Communication Patents Measured with NBER Technology
Subcategories
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Notes: This figure shows the share of patents related to communication relative to all patents filed by Bell. We
define technologies related to communication as the NBER subcategories “Communication” and “Optics” (Hall
et al., 2001). We include “Optics” because after the invention of the laser at Bell Labs in 1958, Bell officials
predicted correctly that optics might be crucial for the future of communication (Gertner, 2012, p. 253).
C.2.7 Effect for Different Definitions of Small and Young Assignees
In Figure C.7 we estimate the main treatment coefficient separately for citations of different
size and age groups of assignees. We find that the effect is driven mainly by companies and
individual inventors without patents before 1949 and companies and individual inventors
that have been active for less than one year at the time of the citations.
185
APPENDIX: ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
Figure C.7: Sample Split by Characteristics of Citing Firm
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Notes: These subfigures show results from a difference-in-differences estimation with the years 1949-1954 as
pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as treatment period, controlling for year fixed effects. As dependent variable
we use all citations by companies other than the filing companies with a specific size of their patent portfolio
(Subfigure (a)) and a specific company age (b) as indicated in the figure. As control patents we use all patents
that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary USPC technology class, and the number of
citations up to 1949. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European
Patent Office.
C.3 Appendix to Section 3.5
C.3.1 Effect by NBER Technology Subcategory
In this section we estimate our main treatment effect separately for citations of patents in
different NBER technology subcategories. The results are reported in Figure C.8. The increase
in citations comes mainly from technologies related to electrical components, in particular
in “Electrical Devices”. Yet, there is no increase in citations by patents in the subcategory
of “Communication”. These results corroborate the finding in our main text that there is no
increase in follow-on innovation in industries concerned with production of communication
equipment, the core business of Bell.
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Notes: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the consent decree on citations
from patents in different NBER technological subcategories, controlling for year fixed effects. As dependent
variable we use all citations by companies other than the filing company. As control patents we use all patents
that were published in the U.S., matched by publication year, primary USPC technology class, and the number
of citations up to 1949. A solid circle means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. We split the citing
patents by NBER technology subcategory following Hall et al. (2001). The data are from the Worldwide Patent
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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C.3.2 No Lack of Follow-On Innovation in Telecommunications
This section presents evidence that the null effect in telecommunications was not due to a
lack in potential follow-on innovation in the telecommunications market. To do this we look
at the total number of citations, the sum of citations of other companies and self-citations, to
Bell patents inside and outside of telecommunications. In Subfigure (a) of Figure C.9 we plot
the average number of total citations to Bell patents related to communication and related
to other fields. We use the concordance of Kerr (2008) to assign to each Bell patent the most
likely SIC code. We find that the total number of citations to telecommunications patents of
Bell was at least as high as to patents outside of communication. This speaks against a low
quality of compulsorily licensed patents as a reason for the lack in follow-on innovation in
telecommunications. In Subfigure (b) we show that the total number of patent citations to
Bell’s patents inside and outside of telecommunications were also almost identical before
and after the consent decree. This suggests that after the consent decree the potential for
follow-on innovation was not significantly lower in telecommunications than in other fields.
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Figure C.9: Number of Citations to Bell Patents Inside and Outside of Communication
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Notes: Subfigure (a) shows the average number of citations per year for all Bell patents that are most likely used
in the production of communication equipment (SIC 3661) and that are used in any other industry. To classify
a patent by its most likely industry, we use the data of Kerr (2008) to assign to each USPC class the most likely
four-digit SIC industry in which it is used. Subfigure (b) shows the total number of citations to Bell patents
inside and outside of telecommunication filed in a particular year. In this graph we use total citations, the sum
of citations from other companies and from Bell to its own patents. The data stem from the Worldwide Patent
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